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ABSTRACT

This paper presents a narrative history of Iranian revolutionary ideology and its
evolving impact on foreign policy. It looks at this history primary through the Islamic
Revolutionary Guard Corps, an institution established after the revolution and designed to
defend the Islamic political order in Iran as well as oppressed Muslims abroad. The
Revolutionary Guard, or Guard for short, became a focal point in the efforts of Iranian
revolutionaries to export their ideology and has evolved overtime into a politicized and
unconventional military force, often associated in the media with supporting foreign
terrorists and militants. This paper argues that the Guard has implemented revolutionary
ideology in an arc from radical to pragmatic. Unlike past literature on the Guard, this
paper situates the organization’s institutional history in Iran’s broader political context
and concentrates on its relationships to and differences with other factions. A persistent
aim is also to analyze terminology such as radical and pragmatic and provide theoretical
foundations for the use of such terms.
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Introduction

Discussions of the Iranian nuclear program dominate the current discourse on USIran relations. While this nuclear program remains an important security concern for the
US, overladen attention to it has obscured the intricate historical reasons behind both the
program itself and the US obsession with its evolution. Studying Iran’s development of
enrichment capabilities without reference to the country’s complicated post-1979 history
puts analysts at the risk of drawing conclusions about its purpose and possible effects
based on specious premises. Defective analysis could have disastrous consequences, in
terms of leading the US and Israel into a potentially avoidable military confrontation with
Iran. This thesis does not provide a direct answer for why Iran has developed nuclear
power nor even address its nuclear program. Instead, it seeks to explain how the history
and influence of revolutionary ideology shapes Iranian foreign policy. It distills the
premises of Iranian politics and foreign policy and explicates a set of terms descriptive of
a range of political actors and operatives. Its final analysis will hopefully help those
interested to better grasp Iran’s geopolitical insecurities and the significance of ideology
to its policies.
Following the revolution in 1979, in which the Iranian people deposed the Shah
Mohammad Reza Pahlavi and set in motion events with global consequences, Iran
entered a period of vast political opportunity. The prominent clerical faction of the
revolutionary coalition advocated a drastic departure from the Shah’s monarchical
political order. Their leader, the charismatic and popular Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini,
had crafted a theory of Islamic government which he aspired to implement in Iran. He
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promoted Islamic government as a panacea to the problems of not only Iran, but also of
all oppressed Muslims. The clerical faction fastened the rise of its own political star to a
new militarized vision, establishing the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, which
consolidated various anti-Shah militias supportive of Khomeini’s ideology. The clerics
intended for the nascent organization to defeat internal political challengers and to furnish
Islamic Revolutions abroad. The Khomeinist faction, in tandem with the Guard,
succeeded in asserting control over the chaotic post-revolution political process after
undermining more moderate contenders. They deemed the first two post-revolution
governments, those of Mehdi Bazargan and Seyyad Abolhassan Banisadr, as
insufficiently radical and exploited the 1979 hostage crisis, as well as Saddam Hussein’s
invasion of Iran in 1980, to maneuver their demise. The Khomeinist faction enshrined
their leader’s ideology in the new constitution, although not to the exclusion of all other
ideas, enough to provide a legal mandate for executing revolutionary policy. With an
ideological foothold in the constitution and moderate factions sidelined, the Guard
conducted revolutionary policies in the Arab peninsula and Iraq. Once Banisadr retreated
from an overwhelming political scene, the Guard took control of the war effort against
Hussein and escalated it with a revolutionary design.
Iran’s revolutionary policies abroad did not, for the most part, elicit the grand
reaction among the oppressed masses anticipated by revolutionaries in Khomeini’s party
and the Guard. At a certain point in the early to mid-1980s, the revolutionary state
stopped exerting itself to export Islamic Revolution. This trend accelerated after the
lackluster end to the Iran-Iraq war in 1988. After expending thousands of lives in Iraqi
battlefields and cloistering the country in economic and diplomatic isolation, Khomeini
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decided to stop pressing for victory over Hussein and finally sued for peace. These lessthan auspicious outcomes of revolutionary policy precipitated a shift in favor of national
self-interest. The Guard predicated foreign policies upon national, as opposed to
revolutionary, interests, but still focused on aligning Iran’s foreign policy with
revolutionary principles. An ideological prism colored their pursuit of national interests.
The Guard viewed Iran’s regional adversaries as imperialist collaborators, lacking
independence or self-identity, and denying Iran a role in regional security despite its
undeniable geopolitical importance. It connected these states’ collective disdain for Iran
to their dependency upon the US. Iranians perceived the US as building an exclusionary
regional system of security to contain the appeal of an ideology that stressed true
independence from outside powers. The suspicion that the US sought to kill authentic
political ideologies and dominate regional security affairs has locked the two countries
into a strategic and ideological struggle.
The transition from fomenting revolutions to pursuing national interests did not
necessarily mean Iran extricated ideology from its policies. A state that attaches national
interests to an ideologically-constructed notion of the nation cannot truly separate the
two. If the object of national interests is to preserve the state, and the state embodies an
ideological concept, then the object of national interests is to preserve an idea, or at least
a particular embodiment of that idea. This sort of tautology means the nationalideological tension concerns the nation-state and the ideology itself. A state founded on
an idea expresses ideological qualities, but is not and cannot be that idea in and of itself.
As a brief example, the US was founded in a revolutionary insistence on the idea of the
equality and freedom of the individual, but, initially excluded everyone but white,
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propertied men from this definition. As the ancient Greek philosopher Plato argued, the
completeness of ideas is limited to their theoretical and intelligible dimension and not
transferrable to sensory reality. In Iran’s case, the Islamic Republic was formed as a
revolutionary state based on ideological principles expounded by Ayatollah Khomeini.
The ideology, in and of itself, is a universalist call for Muslims to untether themselves
from secular political theories and cultural customs and to erect Islamic sovereignties. It
conceptualizes the nation-state as a vessel for realizing a future utopia of a unified and
singular Islamic government with sovereignty over all Muslims. The nation-state
becomes an instrument in the overall process of Islamic Revolution and is not its ultimate
political order. Ideological principles treat the state in this manner. They pressure it to
sacrifice itself for its ideals, and therein lies the central contradiction of the Islamic
Revolution. If the revolutionary state tends to itself without striving for the grander
transnational cause, it fails its own ideology. But how can the revolutionary state
guarantee its survival without ending abrasive pro-revolution foreign policies that
threaten to destroy it? This state, then, is saddled with a dilemma between preserving
itself and preserving the revolution. The law of self-preservation, perhaps the single most
irreducible law of nature and certainly of state-making practices, prevents the
revolutionary state from self-immolation. The state navigates this contradiction by
positing that it cannot preserve the revolution without preserving itself. It no longer
foments revolution, but rather models the government conceived by the revolutionary
ideology. The revolutionary state can never completely abandon these principles without
negating its own political logic. These revolutionary principles, while not dictating the
state’s external policies, contextualize its actions, imparting them meaning or legitimacy.
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They shroud the pragmatic pursuit of national interests in a revolutionary mystique, and
cloak them in a revolutionary terminology.
Pragmatists inside the government aim at preserving the state, at protecting it
from foreign diplomatic, economic, or military warfare and from popular uprisings. They
take a deliberate and considerate approach to making policy, gauging it in comparison
with domestic and international opinions to maximize their chances of survival. Radicals,
in the pure sense of the term, aim at preserving the revolution. They orient the state in
relation to its ideals and prioritize the advance of revolution over the state’s survival.
These true radicals were always on the fringe even during Iran’s own revolution and,
while determining some of the state’s policies in the early 1980s, were eventually
expelled from the government. However, the tension between national interests and
revolutionary principles did not simply dissipate. The question as to what extent Iran
could pursue revolutionary principles without sacrificing national interests lent itself to a
wide variety of interpretations as applied to different policy areas. A radical, but not a
pragmatist, might think of attacking US forces in Afghanistan as advancing both Iran’s
national interests and its revolutionary principle of confronting US military power. Even
more frustrating was the lack of consensus among revolutionaries over which principles
to follow. Pragmatists emphasized revolutionary principles that favored the state’s
survival, ones which stimulated good relations between the state and the people and
between the state and the outside world. More radical revolutionaries, on the other hand,
invoked a militarized revolutionary vision, burdensome for the Iranian people.
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Chapter 1: Friction With Bazargan and Banisadr

The Iranian revolution culminated from a history of popular resentment against
obtrusive foreign powers and, for many participants, was independent of an overriding
Islamic ideology. An Islamic discourse, however, permeated the slogans and arguments
of an otherwise diverse opposition. Islam represented an authentic, organic, and
dialectical form of resistance to the Shah’s tyranny. With the Shah gone, the patina of
Islamic unity soon vanished, slowly but surely exposing the opposition’s ideological fault
lines. Conflicting appraisals of socialism, communism, theocracy, liberal-democracy, or
come combination of each, splintered the opposition. The power to determine the
structure of the new state sundered the formerly united factions. The course of these
internal struggles followed Crane Brinton’s model of revolutionary politics. Brinton
deduced a tendency in revolutions for “power to go from…the conservatives of the old
regime to the moderates to the radicals or extremists. As power moves along this line, it
gets more and more concentrated, more and more narrows its base in the country and
among the people, since at each important crisis the defeated group has to drop out of
politics…after each crisis the victors tend to split.” 1
His theoretical continuum applied in Iran: the first revolutionary civilian leader,
Mehdi Bazargan, was most closely identified with the ancien régime as he argued for a
gradual and partial transformation of the Shah’s state apparatus. His successor, Seyyad
Abolhassan Banisadr, was more “Islamic” and was open to partnering with the radical
left, but he firmly placed the interest of the nation above that of an Islamic Revolution.
1

Crane Brinton, The Anatomy of a Revolution (New York: Vintage Books, 1965), 123.
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After his impeachment, revolutionary radicals from the right consolidated power and
installed the first fully theocratic government of the modern world, based on Khomeini’s
doctrine of Velayat-e Faqih, or guardianship of the Islamic jurists. This transition of
power from moderate leaders of the laity to more radical clerics paralleled developments
in framing Iran’s new constitution. Sovereignty moved from a point of duality to
singularity, after the radical power subsumed the moderate. As Brinton described it, this
conflict takes place “between two governments within the same state, an irregular civil
war.” 2 In Iran, power was initially divided between a provisional government, led by
Bazargan, and a Council of Islamic Revolution, led by Khomeini. The former wielded
formal authority over the extant state apparatus while the latter, enjoying unofficial
sovereignty, held sway over the people. The radical “populist clerics” under Khomeini’s
tutelage constantly chipped away at the legitimacy of this provisional government and
used the Guard instrumentally toward this end. Bazargan and the provisional government
disbanded in response to the US hostage crisis on November 4, 1979, ceding formal
control of the state to the Revolutionary Council. The political transition would have
finished then if not for Banisadr’s unexpected challenge, backed by a majority of the
people, to clerical domination.
The election of the liberal democratic Mehdi Bazargan to prime minister was the
first test of the radical revolutionaries’ ability to overcome opponents. Khomeini’s de
facto party, the Islamic Republic Party (IRP), represented those interested in empowering
the faqih (supreme leader) and other tenets of Islamic Revolution. The Party was led by
Khomeini’s former students, namely Ayatollah Beheshti, Ayatollah Mohtahhari, Hojjat
2

Ibid., 161.
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al-Islam Rafsanjani, and Hojjat al-Islam Khamenei. Most of the group were middleranking clerics that came from middle-class clerical and bazaari backgrounds. 3 They had
been in prison briefly either in 1963-4 or in 1975 and were devoted to establishing
Khomeini’s Islamic government. 4 The Party’s launching slogan was, “One community,
one religion, one order, one leader,” and its newspaper mouthpiece accused anyone in
disagreement with the Party’s version of Islam of being “anti-Islamic,” “tie-wearer,”
“weak-minded,” “liberal,” and “Westoxicated.” 5 Bazargan’s party, the Liberation
Movement, advocated an opposing, mainly nationalist vision of the revolution. He and
the lay-religious liberals who followed him believed in replacing the Pahlavi monarchy
with a pluralistic and secular democratic republic. They envisaged themselves finishing
what the liberal-democratic Prime Minister Mossadegh had started in 1951. Unlike
Mossadegh, who refused to appeal to the religious sentiments of the masses, the
Liberation Movement employed patriotic as well as religious symbols. Bazargan
described his movement as bridging the ideologies of Mossadegh’s secular National
Front and Khomeini’s religious movement. Nonetheless, the Liberation Movement’s
nationalistic and democratic ideas substantively crossed the IRP’s Islamic agenda.
The Islamic revolutionaries removed Bazargan in order to bolster their influence
over the future of Iran’s political order and foreign policy. They delivered a fateful
masterstroke against him on November 4, 1979, when militant students overran the US
embassy in Tehran, forcing the prime minister to resign. The ensuing hostage crisis
heralded fundamental shifts in the revolutionary state’s constitution and foreign policy.

3

Ervand Abrahamian, The Iranian Mojahedin (Wiltshire: I.B. Tauris & Co., Ltd., 1989), 44.
Ibid.
5
Ervand Abrahamian, The Iranian Mojahedin (Wiltshire: I.B. Tauris & Co., Ltd., 1989), 45.
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Commensurate with the radicals’ ascendancy in domestic politics between November
1979 and the summer of 1981, their share of influence over foreign policy grew. The
clerics named the deep changes produced during this tumultuous period a “second
revolution.” The central questions involved in this second revolution dealt with the
relationship between anti-imperialism, Islam, and nationalism. The entire opposition
opposed imperialism, but each faction interpreted the extent of this struggle differently.
Nationalists were content to oppose imperialism insofar as it affected Iran whereas
radicals aimed at broadening Iran’s struggle to emancipate all Muslims from the clutches
of imperialism. Banisadr and Bazargan, owing loyalty principally to Iran, balanced antiimperialist stances with conflicting national interests. For them, normal diplomatic
relations and the nation’s economic well-being took precedence over an obstreperous and
unduly ambitious foreign policy. The IRP, on the other hand, were anti-imperialist and
Islamic. They attributed imperialism with uprooting the region’s Islamic political and
social mores, and thus made resistance of it an Islamic cause. They believed a rigidly
principled conduct of Iranian foreign affairs could have vast implications for all Muslims.
the IRP fought for Iranians only in coincidence with the broader Islamic struggle, which
trumped national interests, as nationalism itself was an illegitimate form. If revolutionary
policies exacted costs on the Iranian people, the IRP would have to accept them.
Bazargan elucidated this difference in an interview: “I believe in the service of Iran by
means of Islam,” while Khomeini “believes in the service of Islam by means of Iran.” 6
During the 444-day crisis, the clergy usurped the right to define the loose concept of antiimperialism and its configuration in the state.
6

Rouhollah K. Ramazani, Independence without Freedom: Iran’s Foreign Policy (Charlottesville:
University of Virginia Press, 2013), 113.
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The Bazargan administration pursued a conservative foreign policy, striving to
refurbish ties to the US and attempting to marginalize the Guard’s role. The prime
minister wished to terminate US domination by undoing the alliance system between the
Shah’s regime and the US. He aimed to defend Iran’s integrity and independence by
refusing alignment with either the Soviet or US blocs while simultaneously respecting the
status quo of international politics. His policy, largely inspired by Mosaddegh, was based
on four pillars: “history, the country’s geographic position, the spiritual and humanist
ideals of Islam, and the complete reciprocity in relations with other countries.” 7 Vestiges
of this doctrine, summarized as “negative equilibrium,” still inspire the Iranian diplomats
whom predicate negotiations over Iran’s nuclear program on reciprocal steps and
proportional concessions. 8 Bazargan sought to ease US hostility to the Iranian revolution
and to gain access to US intelligence on internal and Soviet threats to the new
government. Beginning in the summer of 1979, intermediaries and then top Iranian
officials entered into contact with US officials. 9 President Carter then granted the Shah
asylum for cancer treatment. Negotiating with the US became much more dangerous.
Bazargan foolishly went ahead with a meeting on November 1, 1979, in Algiers, between
himself, two of his cabinet members, and US National Security Adviser Zbigniew
Brzezinski. 10
Students who perceived Bazargan’s government as an organ for pro-Western
liberals mistook his policy of non-alignment for a plot to resubmit Iranian independence
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Ibid.
Mohammad Ali Shabani, “Iran Seeks Reciprocity in Nuclear Negotations,” Lobelog, February 18, 2013,
www.lobelog.com (accessed December 14, 2013).
9
Charles Kurzman, “Soft on Satan,” Middle East Policy 6, no. 1 (June 1998): 63-72, 66.
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to imperialist powers. It was three days after the meeting in Algiers that a group of them
stormed and occupied the US embassy. The student group proclaimed, “recent events in
our society have caused us to feel that the main direction of the revolution is being lost
and the movement is being diverted…” 11With the IRP’s blessing, they refused
Bazargan’s order to immediately evacuate the embassy, and the prime minister and his
cabinet resigned that same day. For those distrustful of Bazargan, the seizure confirmed a
paradigm that Iran should to adopt combative policies, more extreme than the negative
equilibrium espoused by Bazargan, to inure Iran to US imperialism. This “second
revolution” substituted hostility for equality as the touchstone of Iran’s foreign affairs.
Bazargan described Iran’s outward behavior as changing from “defensive” to
“confrontational.” 12 The embassy seizure dislodged Iran from the bipolar international
structure. The Guard, which has since converted the US embassy into a base, painted on
its walls in bold blue letters, “The superpowers’ veto right is worse than the law of the
jungle.” 13 The message conveyed the Guard’s acceptance of anarchy before the will of
either superpower. The diplomatic crisis transformed Iran into a vehicle for the
uninhibited exercise of revolutionary policy.
Bazargan’s resignation also propelled what he termed a “revolution within a
revolution.” 14 In other words, the Khomeinists had ousted Bazargan and the Liberation
Movement from the political scene. During the embassy occupation, students
reassembled hundreds of sensitive diplomatic documents that US personnel had shredded
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Ibid., 67.
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shortly before the impending crisis. They published facsimiles of the material in a series
of 70 volumes, most of it consisting of CIA cables related to clandestine Iranian contacts.
Some of the cables showed senior members in Bazargan’s government colluding with the
US. 15 The clerical populists discredited Bazargan and the other liberals by selectively
publishing these documents. They imprisoned a number of liberals and Bazargan’s top
aid. 16 Grant Ayatollah Shariatmadari, who had supported Bazargan and denounced the
embassy occupation, was placed under house arrest and stripped of the pinnacle of
clerical titles, marja’-e taqlid, on the grounds that he had plotted to overthrow the
government. Shariatmadari’s pro-democracy Islamic People’s Republican Party was also
dissolved. The Guard triumphantly declared that the affair “cleansed the revolution from
impure elements.” 17 This political maneuvering cleared the way for the populist clerics
to ratify a theocratic constitution.
Khomeini finessed the state-making process by manipulating the anti-imperialist
cause. In response to alleged US conspiracies of counterrevolution, Khomeini proposed
an Islamic sovereignty, which would better resist foreign plots. In effect, he greatly
expanded the faqih’s power. Under Bazargan’s premiership, the original Assembly of
Experts had passed only one general clause (Article 5) on the mandate of the jurist. After
his dismissal, the Assembly passed the substantive articles 107 and 110, which
enumerated the faqih’s extensive duties and powers. Bazargan and other groups
representing the laity or the left declared themselves constrained to support the
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The Internet Archive, “Documents from the U.S. Espionage Den,” The Internet Archive. n.d.
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“improved” draft of the constitution in order not to jeopardize the “ongoing antiimperialist struggle and the political line of the Imam.” 18 When Bazargan had earlier
proposed holding a plebiscite between an Islamic Republic or a Democratic Islamic
Republic, Khomeini responded acerbically: “What the nation needs is an Islamic
Republic—not a Democratic Republic, not a Democratic Islamic Republic. Don’t use the
Western term ‘democratic.’ Those who call for a Democratic Republic know nothing
about Islam.” 19 Khomeini twisted the anti-imperialist discourse to suit his Islamic
political vision. Any ideology originating from the West was ipso facto derivate of
imperialism and therefore illegitimate. He argued that no political ideology could
possibly be authentic to a Muslim people except an Islamic one. The centrality of antiimperialism to political legitimacy during this critical moment has had lasting effects on
the state’s self-representation. Even after the Islamic Republic stopped exporting
revolution, the intertwining of anti-imperialism with the Islamic basis of the state has
greatly slowed the process of normalizing relations with the West. For the sake of
maintaining its Islamic identity as construed from these early years, conservative
elements of the Islamic Republic continue to ridicule the West, even when such rhetoric
has become perfunctory.
Bazargan hoped to decouple the Guard from the IRP, which he suspected,
correctly, of plotting to monopolize power in large part through its agency. He in fact
begged Khomeini to bar the Guard from opining on political matters and affiliating itself
with parties. 20 In an interview, the former commander of the political bureau of the Guard
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Ebrahim Hajj-Mohammad-Zadeh argued that Bazargan’s transitional government
planned on disbanding the Guard: “The transitional government was of the belief that we
have the Army, the Police and Gendarmie. Therefore, the Guards… should only operate
for a short period until those forces could reorganize and after that leave the arena.” 21 At
one point, Bazargan announced the Guard would be dissolved after the establishment of a
formally elected government, arguing that its duties duplicated those of the regular
army. 22 Khomeini had long before understood the value of a loyal militia; he contradicted
Bazargan’s announcement a week later by officially establishing the Guard. As tension
mounted, the Guards’ mouthpiece Payam-e Enqelab reduced the Bazargan government to
“groups opposed to Islam, the leadership and the Guardianship of the Jurist who in
various ways opposed revolutionary institutions such as the Guards.” 23 The unfolding of
the hostage crisis hammered the nail in its coffin. It is hard to ascertain if the clerics
deliberately planned the crisis, but the Guards responsible for the security of the US
embassy at least made no effort to stop the attack. 24 Bazargan also called the hostage
taking “‘nothing but a plot to get rid of me.’” 25 With or without this particular crisis,
some form of collision between the two was well on the horizon.
The next civilian authority to replace Bazargan opposed the Guard even more
vehemently than his predecessor. Banisadr, elected the first president of the Islamic
Republic, hoped to diminish the Guard’s responsibilities and independence. He was an
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unlikely opponent; in Paris he had developed a reputation as a radical, religious
theoretician molding an “Islamic concept of economic” and in close contact with
Khomeini. In 1978, when Khomeini arrived in Paris, he became one of Khomeini’s
trusted advisers—especially when he, unlike Bazargan, opposed a compromise offered by
the Shah. 26 In 1979, Khomeini placed him as one of few non-clerics in the Revolutionary
Council and Assembly of Experts. 27 In the Revolutionary Council, he antagonized the
Bazargan government by espousing radical policies such as the nationalization of all
foreign companies and supporting the clerical constitution. 28 As his political clout grew
though, he drifted away from Khomeini’s camp. A number of prominent clerics who had
actively opposed the Shah and had now grown suspicious of the IRP endorsed his
candidacy. He campaigned on the theme “Islam represents social justice and political
pluralism,” and won 76 percent of the vote. 29 In June 1980, the Mojahedin-e Khalq, an
anticlerical organization, leaked tapes of a damning secret conversation between an IRP
leader and his entourage immediately after the presidential election. Banisadr was
accused of being a “Bazargan with a different face:” of opposing the IRP and
sympathizing with the National Front and the Liberation Movement; and of being a
“nationalist-monger” rather than a true Muslim. 30 The tape argued for abasing “him to a
ceremonial role” and eliminating his supporters from high office and the military. 31 Upon
taking office, Banisadr aggravated these fears. He criticized the hostage takers for
creating “a state within a state,” in reference to the blatant lack of civilian control over
26

Ervand Abrahamian, The Iranian Mojahedin (Wiltshire: I.B. Tauris & Co., Ltd., 1989), 59.
Ibid.
28
Ibid.
29
Ibid.
30
Ervand Abrahamian, The Iranian Mojahedin (Wiltshire: I.B. Tauris & Co., Ltd., 1989), 60.
31
Ibid.
27

16

the increasingly expensive ordeal; the U.S. had retaliated by withholding highly
important spare parts from the army and impounding Iranian assets totaling $13 billion. 32
His stance on the crisis tied into his approach to the war. He demanded that the war
should be entrusted to the army; that purged officers should be reinstated, and that the
country should buy essential spare parts from the West, which would have entailed the
hasty release of American hostages. 33 Banisadr indeed produced a US-backed plan for a
UN commission to investigate Iran’s grievances against the Shah in return for the release
of the hostages. Although shortly thereafter, Khomeini declared that only the IRPcontrolled majles could settle the crisis. 34
The IRP fought him hard on war issues, preferring the ideological purity of the
Guard to the professional competence of the army. Khomeini, intending to embarrass
Banisadr, appointed him commander-in-chief of the Armed Forces. 35 The army lay in
ruin when Banisadr became commander and Khomeini wanted to prove that he was
incapable of rectifying the situation. The Sisyphean task of reorganizing the army
included a silver lining: formal control and appointment powers over the regular military
as well as the Guard. 36 Banisadr relayed Khomeini his dissatisfaction with the Guard’s
desultory counterinsurgency operations in the Arab-populated province of Khuzestan in a
letter from May 22, 1980. He wrote, “I’m sure that elements in the Guards…will once
again do away with the cooperation between [the Army and the Gendarmie] and will
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promote disorder and insecurity.” 37 His anxious tone persisted in a letter dated later that
June, in which Banisadr warned of the Guards’ designs to “start an all-out general assault
and subject the people to a series of great dangers.” As an armed and ideological group,
he argued, it was disposed to “cleanse Iran of the counterrevolution in a swift move and a
general war.” 38 The talk of “an all-out general assault” referred to the Guard’s aggressive
operations to quell Kurdish, Turcoman, and Sunni uprisings in the months after the
revolution. The Guard later defied Banisadr’s declaration of a ceasefire with Kurdish
rebels following the Iraqi invasion and continued the counterinsurgency campaign against
them. 39 The IRP had struck a bargain with the Guard—the former trading influence and
autonomy in return for complete loyalty from the latter—that chartered their path to
power. Together, they helped Khomeini do whatever it took to ordain an Islamic
government, including the execution of dissidents. Khomeini reportedly said, “If we have
to execute 50,000 people to establish the mullahs’ regime, we will do it.” 40 He left
Banisadr up to his own meager devices to deal with the Guard’s anti-democratic and
illiberal flairs.
The president attempted to control the organization by placing trusted civilian
supervisors at its head. In the same June 1980 letter, Banisadr expressed his frustration
with the Guards’ rejection of his personal selection of Abou-Sharif for guard commander:
“Instead of proceeding the plans they made it be known that one can’t work with Abou-
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Sharif.” 41 In another instance, Banisadr named his ally Abbas Zamani, who already
served as a senior officer in the organization, as Guard commander. Banisadr’s opponents
in the Guard branded Zamani one of the president’s pawns, ousting him a month after his
appointment. 42 The successive attempts by Banisadr to infiltrate the Guard decreased its
trust of civilian leaders and, inversely, increased it loyalty to Khomeini. The Guard’s first
unofficial Commander Javad Mansuri remarked in a 1982 press interview, “Banisadr’s
being made Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces was the hardest blow struck on
the Corps during its existence, but it was able to escape the danger…This danger even
brought the Corps more solidity.” 43 Ultimately, the Guard elected Morteza Rezai, one of
its own, as Guard commander and has protected ever since its prerogative in deciding the
question of leadership.
Rebuffed in his initial efforts, Banisadr later tried curbing the Guard’s power once
the Iraq war broke out by constricting its supply of heavy arms. In his memoirs,
Rafsanjani blamed a period of stalemate during the Iran-Iraq war on Banisadr’s denial of
arms to the Guard. 44 Javad Mansuri shared this assessment. He recalled asking Banisadr
during the Iraq War to give the Guard “the necessary equipment in proportion to the
operations it is commissioned to make, and he used to answer frankly that they gave no
arms to the Corps, and the Guards had to arm themselves by disarming the enemy
only.” 45 According to Khomeini’s son Ahmad, Banisadr opposed “pious and ideological
elements” and “wanted to gain absolute power in Iran and considered the Guards the
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primary and most powerful group resisting him.” 46 The Guard’s allies in the IRP, Ahmad
among them, played an instrumental role in repelling Banisadr’s efforts to constrict the
Guard. The IRP-aligned prime minister and IRP members of parliament opposed
Banisadr’s injunction against arming the Guard with heavy weapons. 47 In the late spring
of 1981, they passed a war-oriented budget allocating to the Guard and other
revolutionary organizations funds and supplies four times greater than what the regular
army received. 48 The IRP and the Guard arrogated the Iranian revolution from its
multivalent meaning. They commandeered it from its constituent liberal democratic
currents and affixed it to a revolutionary view of Islam. As Bandisadr put it:
Everything was changing. The mullahs—more and more detested—made the
people wonder. Many of the Guards responded unequivocally, ‘Yes, the power of
the clerics must be obeyed. The people must obey Behesthi, not vice versa’…To
correct this, I explained everyday that the army is responsible to the nation, that
power comes from the people, that an army that betrays the people serves
strangers. I also tried to explain these concepts to the Guards, for whom obeying
any power other than that of the people should have signified a departure from the
principles of the revolution. 49
Banisadr rebuked the radicals for alienating the revolution from its popular sovereigntybased, democratic foundations.
The nature of revolutions perhaps predetermined the ascendance of an antidemocratic, radical faction. A small, disciplined, principled, and fanatical group generally
accedes power in the aftermath of revolution. Their focus on power follows from an
unimpeachable conviction that they alone understand where the revolution needs to go.
Instead of answering to the people, the Guard set about making the people answerable to
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Islam. They scorned democracy, like radicals in other revolutions who necessarily
“cannot risk anything like a free election.” 50 Although more limited in number and broad
appeal, they surmount opposing groups by virtue of their willingness to work hard and
sacrifice and meld their individual personalities to a group identity. 51 They maintain an
esprit de corps—an active moral union—far beyond the powers of ordinary men. 52 The
enmity between Banisadr and the Guard revealed a final, most important quality about
the organization—single-minded loyalty. Like extremists in other revolutions, the Guards
followed their leader with a devotion and unanimity not to be found among the
moderates. 53 In a way, the Guard approximated the guardian class in Socrates’ schema of
the ideal city. Khomeini represented their version of the philosopher-king, who, in
possession of near divine knowledge, alone could drive the illusory shadows cast by
imperialism out of the allegorical cave, leading Muslims to freedom and truth. The Guard
itself would contribute justice to this ideal Muslim society by providing the ruling, wisest
part with unbounded courage and faith. Radicals would sacrifice peace and blood to
protect and promote Khomeini and his ideas. Brinton characterized them as combining,
“in varying degrees, very high ideals and a complete contempt for the inhibitions and
principles which serve most other men as ideals.” 54 The contempt of Iranian radicals for
moderates stemmed from their construction of a binary between ignorance and
knowledge—they would gladly purge society of men who did not recognize the supreme
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goodness of the faqih. In pursuit of the ideal society, Khomeini’s loyal adherents would
eliminate the openly resistant and indoctrinate the others.
By early 1981, the populist clerics and the Guard were winning the battle.
Banisadr was soon rendered powerless in the wartime decisions of the Supreme Defense
Council; revolutionaries stepped up purges and executions in the army and imposed on it
a new Department of Ideology, which assigned religious advisers to frontline infantry
battalions. 55 To further diminish the large pro-Banisadr faction in the army, the IRP
lavished the Guard with arms and recruits. Within a year, it had grown from a force of
30,000 to over 100,000 and quickly rising. 56 The fissures steadily widened, with Banisadr
alleging IRP complicity in human rights violations, torture, and censorship. In June 1981,
Banisadr recognized the impossibility of reconciliation with the clerics. He challenged
them directly by demanding a referendum between his and their governments. The IRP of
course rejected his proposal and mass demonstrations soon swept the country into
pandemonium. The Guard began shuttering pro-Banisadr Mojahedin offices and rallies
and obliterating Mojahedin cells. The Guard shot indiscriminately into the crowds of
protestors and had been given the legal right to summarily execute rioters. 57 Banisadr
absconded into hiding with the Mojahedin leaders on June 12 and dissidents lashed out at
the IRP and Guard with a string of deadly terrorist attacks. The most notable of them
occurred on June 28, when unknown assassins detonated a large bomb in the IRP
headquarters, killing IRP leader Mohammad Beheshti, four cabinet ministers, seven
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assistant ministers, and twenty-seven parliamentary deputies. 58 As the opposition grew
increasingly violent—the Mojahedin even defected sides during the war—the pretexts of
a repressive security state grew more plausible. In 1987, Guard Commander Rezai
exclaimed, "We create a solid nationwide terror, which controls the
counterrevolutionaries. When this terror is lifted, the counterrevolutionaries come to life
and spread." 59 In this atmosphere of insecurity, the most militaristic revolutionaries
grabbed power and steered Iran toward exporting the revolution through subversive
means in the Gulf, and, by means of war in Iraq.
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Chapter Two: War of Revolutionary Self-Defense

What began as Iraq’s limited invasion of Iran in September 1980 had transformed
into a protracted, total war by the mid-1980s, with little end in sight. The Guard fought
with unswerving dedication to topple Saddam Hussein’s regime, even as the war broke
the country’s economy and agonized its people. The accepted estimate of the war’s toll
on Iran’s economy puts the number at $627 billion in indirect and direct costs, in addition
to $644 billion in reconstruction costs. 60 Even more staggering is Iran’s loss in human
life. Conservative Western estimates tally the war’s total number of deaths at 367,000—
with Iran accounting for 262,000 and Iraq, 105,000—and of total non-fatal casualties at
700,000. 61 The sheer size of these costs begs the question of why Iran insisted on turning
a fairly straightforward war of self-defense into a tortuous offensive war against Hussein.
For at least two years following the revolution, the power of liberal, moderate, and leftist
revolutionary factions collectively checked that of the truly radical. A sequence of
disparate events, along with the unsurpassed ability of radical clerics to exploit them
politically, led to a shift in the arrangement of power that left radicals in control of Iran’s
foreign and war policy. The new elite transformed a war of national self-defense into the
locus of a universal struggle against anti-Islamic imperialist forces. They set offensive
goals against Baghdad and mapped worldwide Islamic struggle onto a war between two
nations. The Guard and Khomeini viewed the Iranian nation-state as a tool at the disposal
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of Islamic Revolution. They endangered the nation for the sake of destroying the pillars
of imperialism and creating space for the growth of authentic and Islamic forms of
government.
Khomeini evaluated international politics through the lens of Umma. The Umma
refers to the community of believers, bound together by shared faith and nothing else. Its
meaning cannot be rigidly defined, but it always refers to ethical, linguistic or religious
bodies of people who are the objects of the divine plan of salvation. 62 Ties of kin, race,
and ethnicity dissolve before the primacy of belief. As Khomeini said in 1964, “Islam has
dismissed racism. There is no difference between blacks, whites, Turks or non-Turks.
The only point of reference and the source of loyalty is Islam, in which righteousness is
the only standard.” 63 The Umma transcends territorial demarcation, as people across
geographic borders join it by token of their faith. Things that threaten the Umma threaten
faith; thus, territorial threats elicit a response because they may destroy the political
organization of the Umma, or believers themselves, but not on the basis of state territory.
Any state that oppresses the Umma deserves to be destroyed. When Iraq invaded Iran,
Khomeini railed against the threat to Islam rather than the Iranian nation-state. Khomeini
encouraged patriotism and defense of the homeland because these mottos overlapped
with Islamic causes. Khomeini premised the defense of Iran on the defense of Islam: “All
these martyrs, invalids and homeless ones were for the cause of Islam. We suffered all
these calamities for Iran only because it is an Islamic country.” 64 Khomeini exalted the
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war to a conflict between Islam and blasphemy with Iran and Iraq treated as mediums in
the grander struggle of good and evil.
The Iran-Iraq struggle was the first step in reviving the Umma and destroying the
impediments to its prosperity. Again, Khomeini described Iran as a cog in bigger
machinery: “Iran…is determined to propagate Islam to the whole world. She takes pride
in being the springboard for the advancement of Islam. From Iran the divine revelation
and the message of the Exalted Prophet will travel everywhere.” 65 He burdened Iran with
leadership of the Islamic world, framing its purpose and obligations in terms of ideology
rather than nationality or territory. The identification of Iraq with the dominant force of
oppression against the Umma—imperialism—shaded the morality of the war in black and
white. This religious explanation immediately foreclosed any diplomatic solutions as
compromising with the face of evil becomes impossible. In an address to the nation from
September 1980, Khomeini proclaimed:
You are fighting to protect Islam and he is fighting to destroy
Islam…There is absolutely no question of peace or compromise and we shall
never have any discussions with them; because they are corrupt and perpetrators
of corruption.
The damage caused by this criminal is irreparable unless he withdraws his
forces, leaves Iraq and then abandons his corrupt government; he must leave the
Iraqi people to decide their own fate. It is not a question of a fight between one
government and another; it is a question of an invasion by an Iraqi non-Muslim
Ba’thist regime against an Islamic country; and this is a rebellion by blasphemy
against Islam. 66
According to Khomeini’s logic, Hussein hated Islam and Iran is an Islamic country,
therefore, Hussein hates Iran. If Iran compromised with Hussein, he would fight against
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Islam on other fronts and battlefields. The conflict was essentially ideological and not a
question of fighting between two nations. Compromise would also have signified the
weakness of a supposedly divine and unstoppable movement vis-à-vis the decaying and
false regime in Baghdad. Such an action would admit the failure of Iran’s revolutionary
ideology to dawn a new order. This ideological interpretation of the conflict, driving
senior Guard leaders to cling onto the hope of victory till a bitter end, precluded
compromise.
When Iran began attacking Iraq in 1982 with the stated goal of taking Baghdad, it
appeared to contravene a major Shi’i belief on war and peace. Khomeini adamantly
maintained that Iran’s war was defensive for only in the presence of the Imam may Shi’is
wage aggressive war. According to him,
There are two types of wars in Islam: one is Jihad; that is, the war of
expansion…and the other is Defa, struggle to preserve one’s independence.
Jihad means expansion and the taking over of other countries, which will
be carried on by the Imam himself or under his command. In that case it will
become everyone’s duty…to fight and to spread the Islamic laws throughout the
world…
The second type, what we call Defa, is a war to defend one’s
independence, which does not require the Imam nor his command.
Following the occultation of the twelfth Imam in 940, Shi’is generally accepted that
initiating any type of war was the prerogative of the Imams. Shaykh Tusi, a Shi’i cleric,
formulated a theory which made defensive war permissible in the absence of the Imam. 67
The doctrinal bias against aggressive war led Khomeini to paint Iran’s offensive attack on
Iraq on July 13, 1982 with pure defensive hues:
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We have no intention of fighting against any country, Islamic or non-Islamic. We
desire peace and amity among nations. Up to date we are engaged only in self
defense which is both a God-given and a human right. We never intend to commit
aggression against other countries. 68
Khomeini did not lend weight in his speeches to the historical or legal roots of the
conflict. He portrayed it as a clear case of aggression against Islam itself in which the
aggressor should be punished and eliminated out of self-defense.
Khomeini treaded a fine line between rightfully defending an Islamic country and
waging the impermissible war of offensive jihad. Iran’s war strategy seemed to aim at
spreading revolution through military means rather than at defending Islam. In 1982 he
outlined how victory in Iraq would expand the revolution:
If the war continues and if in the war Iran defeats Iraq, Iraq will be annexed to
Iran; that is, the nation of Iraq, the oppressed people of Iraq, will free themselves
with the Iranian nation. They will set up their own government according to their
wishes—an Islamic one. If Iran and Iraq can merge and be amalgamated, all the
diminutive nations of the region will join them. 69
He clearly conflated defeating Iraq with overthrowing Hussein. This presents a highly
aggressive understanding of defense, where states cannot be secure until they demolish
their aggressors. Khomeini perhaps hoped that overthrowing Hussein would help
resurrect the Umma by inspiring “all the diminutive nations” to follow the revolutionary
cues of Iran and Iraq. In his memoir, Banisadr referenced an influential article written by
former US ambassador to Tehran William Sullivan in which he anticipated the aftermath
of an Iranian victory in war. Sullivan described the emergence of an alliance between
Syria, southern Lebanon, Iraq, and Iran to menace Israel. Sullivan’s idea of a Shi’i belt
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captivated Khomeini, who circulated the article among top government officials. 70 Iraq
was the preparatory stage of the “20 million-strong march to free the Al-Aqsa Mosque,”
as Ayatollah Montazeri put it. 71
The revolutionary concentrated their efforts on Iraq for two main reasons. First,
they expected their revolutionary message to lead Iraq’s semi-discriminated against
Shi’is, who accounted for 60 percent of the total population, into revolt. Iraq’s unique
position as the only Arab country with a majority Shi’i population certainly made
revolution there seem most likely. Khomeini illustrated this point in a December 1978
interview: “Sunni-populated countries believe in obeying their rulers, whereas the Shi’is
have always believed in rebellion—sometimes they were able to rebellion, and at other
times they were compelled to keep silent.” Khomeini went on to remark that specifically
in Iraq, “The likelihood [of revolt] is greater in areas of Shi’i population.” 72 However, the
Iranians overestimated the allure of their revolution; when they went on the offensive in
1982, Iraqis perceived Iran as intent on occupying their country and did not perceive an
avenue for alliance based on religious sectarianism. Few if any soldiers of Iraq’s army
defected to the Iranian camp and Shi’i solidarity did not operate as the motor for a
genuine revolution in Iraq. 73 Second, Iraq, as the largest and most powerful Arab state in
the Gulf, appeared to impede, more so than other states, the spread of the Islamic
Revolution. In the words of Hojjat al-Islam Sadeq Khalkhali, a leading revolutionary

70

Bani-Sadr, My Turn, 184.
Terry Povey, “Pressure grows in Iran for invasion of Iraq,” Financial Times, July 10, 1982.
72
Khomeini, Islam and Revolution, 327-328.
73
Laurence Louer, Transnational Shia Politics (New York: Columbia University Press, 2008), 190.
71

29

cleric, “We have taken the path of true Islam and our aim in defeating Hussein lies in that
we consider him the main obstacle to the advance of Islam in the region.” 74
The war’s religious aura affected the Guard’s strategy, as it precluded
compromise, and the Guard’s tactics, as it led them to appreciate death as martyrdom.
Khomeini braced the nation to die in defense of Islam, in defiance of America; as he
declared, “it prefers a bloody death to a life of shame.” 75 He mobilized the concept of
martyrdom to rationalize high-casualty tactics. At the reductive level, martyrdom means
dying for the sake of Islam—death in service of and rewarded by God. Clerics often
elevated it to a heroic act. The influential Ayatollah Motahhari called it “the only type of
death which is higher, greater and holier than life itself.” 76 As shown, Khomeini insisted
upon portraying the war as an Islamic defense. Iranian soldiers, then, died for the sake of
Islam and thus deserved martyrdom status. In a speech shortly after the Iraqi invasion,
Khomeini explained:
Our goal is to fulfill our responsibility, which is the preservation of Islam. Even if
we get killed, or kill someone in the process, we do so in order to fulfill that
responsibility…Indeed, it is of no importance if we get killed, because if we kill
[on the path of God] and succeed we have God’s blessing as well as worldly
success, and if we get killed we will be taken to heaven. 77
The revolutionary undertones of the war, moreover, reinforced the willingness of radical
commanders to “martyr” their soldiers. The religious argument that Iran attacked Iraq to
defend Islam coincided with the implied revolutionary argument that Iran attacked Iraq to
extend the Islamic Revolution into the Arab world. This latter argument translated into a
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revolutionary zeal as adherents would view themselves as pushing the limits of history,
leading humanity down the true path set by God. The grandiose dimensions of such a
vision justified extraordinary means. Since revolutionary ideals by definition reject
current geopolitical conditions, then revolutionary action may challenge the existing
order only with upheaval, often with violence. This seeming necessity for violence can
lead to contradictions between methods employed and ends sought. As Crane Brinton
wrote, “a sincere extremist in a revolution can kill men because he loves man, attain
peace through violence, and free men by enslaving them. Such contrasts in action would
paralyze a conventionally practical leader, but the extremist seems quite undisturbed by
it.” 78
Iranian forces encompassed a plethora of ideological standpoints. The most
pronounced differences arose between the regular army and the Guard. Their tactical and
strategic differences resulted from a variable commitment to national interests. In the
purest sense of radical Islam, this outlook would entail completely subscribing to the
transnational and pan-Islamic tenets of Khomeini’s ideology and casting off national
concerns. Milder revolutionaries would accept the nation as a legitimate entity, necessary
for nourishing and promoting the Islamic Revolution. Many of the more pragmatic type
blended patriotism with Islamic ideology as they saw the two as mutually reinforcing. A
long spectrum stretched between pure Islamic radicalism and extreme nationalism.
Between the Guard and the army, the latter would have called the former radical because
the Guard deemed the revolutionary reasons for war superior to national ones. However,
in contrast to Guards in the Office of Liberation Movements, who participated in a
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strictly Islamic cause, without much regard for the Iranian nation, one might call Guards
in the war pragmatic due to their mixing of nationalism with Islam. The tension between
nationalism and Islamic radicalism also pervaded what it meant to be a revolutionary.
The Guard perceived the revolution as primarily Islamic whereas the army perceived it as
primarily national. Furthering the revolution could mean either spreading an Islamic
ideology by means of the nation or strengthening the nation by means of Islam.
Another way to separate radical from pragmatic is to assess the relationship
between revolutionaries and Islamic principles. Those who accepted the nation-state
would necessarily balance Islamic goals with the practical affairs of running a state. This
often meant dealing with pragmatic economic and strategic interests first, in order to
assure the functioning of the regime, and revolutionary ones second. For example, when
war broke out in Russia’s province of Chechnya, Iran abstained from giving Muslim
rebels material or moral support for fear of straining its relations with Russia. The logic
of the state, that is, not alienating powerful neighbors, trumped the logic of revolution.
Pragmatic revolutionaries commonly advocate that Iran focus on national survival and
prosperity first, and propagate the revolution passively by modeling its political and
spiritual genius. Radicals, on the other hand, viewed the nation-state as a vehicle for the
achievement of Umma, to be used up and squeezed dry in pursuit of Islamic utopia.
Mehdi Hashemi, who directed the radical organization charged with exporting Islamic
Revolution, the Office of Liberation Movements, was at the center of a political struggle
against the pragmatists. As a representative of the radical set in Iranian foreign policy, he
admitted his disinterest in ensuring the survival of the state:

32

this office is under my patronage. Its philosophy is different from yours. You are
a state with relations that you must preserve. The Office is a revolution and it has
relations of it own that it must preserve…Whatever the outcome, there are now
two opposing logics in Tehran: the logic of the State and the logic of the
revolution. If it is difficult for either of them to back away from their ideas, it is
still more difficult for either of them to stop leveling the worst accusations against
the other to make their logic prevail.” 79
The clash between these “two logics,” though in an attenuated form, percolates into
debates among Iranian elites today, namely, whether or not to improve ties with the US.
The Western media often uses the terms moderate and extremist to describe the two
currents in Iranian politics, but this usage simplifies the actual situation. An “extremist”
such as Ayatollah Montazeri, may have directed many of Iran’s most radical foreign
policies, but he also became an early and leading critic of the regime’s denial of human
rights and its “disregard for the revolution’s true values.” 80 Thus, a radical can appear to
a Western audience “extreme” in one regard and paradoxically “moderate” in another.
The tension between radicals and pragmatists constantly pushes and pulls
government policy in different directions, often at the same time. As sovereign of the
system, the faqih can tip the balance between these two groups. He typically vacillates
from one to the other in order to prevent either one from monopolizing power. This
crudely triangular arrangement breeds highly fluid policy, which embraces revolutionary
dogma as well as pragmatism and couches all of it in orthodox convictions. Factions from
across the pragmatic-radical spectrum and the reformist-conservative spectrum all use
Khomeini’s legacy as a reference point. Divergent political positions reflect ongoing and
deeply different interpretations of Khomeini’s worldview. Policy-making and the broader
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power struggle rotate around the process of defining the lasting meaning of the Iranian
revolution. This dynamic favors the radicals due to the radical beginnings of the
government. As they consolidated power, the IRP, the Guard, and other revolutionary
organs, legitimated a radical, Islamic discourse that set the tone for the following
decades. Pragmatism has to be heavily defended whereas revolutionary action does not.
The burden of proof rests squarely with the party proposing change. The resistance of the
radical establishment to President Rouhani’s pragmatic outreach to President Obama
exemplifies the difficulty of changing course. The Guard’s internal pragmatic-radical
division should not belie its overall identity as a radical institution. Revolutionary
pragmatic and radical factions both subscribed to Khomeini’s Islamic ideology and
disagreed not so much over whether to spread revolution as over how to. This line of
division was best highlighted within the Guard through the Iran-Contra affair, which
affirmed the underlying similarity in revolutionary agents while also spotlighting their
differences. The scandal much strengthened the position of revolutionary pragmatists in
the Guard, but it neither ended all revolutionary provocations in the Gulf nor eliminated
idealism.
The scandal turned on the question of whether violating principles justified a
greater revolutionary end. In 1986, Rafsanjani and other “moderates” agreed to release
American hostages held by Iranian proxies in Lebanon in return for indirect shipments of
US anti-tank missiles. In February, the US sent 1,000 TOW missiles from American
stocks to Israel, which immediately delivered the arms to Iran. 81 An additional 1,000 anti-
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tank missiles plus spare parts made their way from the US to Iran through this process
over the course of the remaining year. 82 After the February shipments, Rafsanjani sought
to strike a covert deal with the US. He invited a US delegation of backchannel contacts
headed by President Reagan’s former National Security Adviser Robert McFarlane to
discuss the plan for direct and bigger shipments. Rafsanjani’s representatives promised a
cessation of Iran-sponsored terrorism in Lebanon, to release four American hostages held
by Hizbullah, and the possibility of eventual rapprochement. 83 These promises would
have abandoned the Guard faction operating in Lebanon. The meetings, which took place
in Tehran between May 25 and 29, ultimately failed, but both sides agreed to keep back
channels open in the future. 84 Guard Commander Rezai, as well as Khomeini supported
Rafsanjani’s push for US arms. Rezai’s men took possession of consecutive US arms
shipments and reportedly negotiated directly with some American officials. 85
Rafsanjani’s dealings with US officials—and presumably Rezai’s complicity—incensed
revolutionary radicals. Flyers appeared around the Tehran University campus announcing
and simultaneously denouncing the US visit by highlighting its violation of an antiimperialism stance. 86 Mehdi Hashemi, a leading radical and head of the Guard’s Office
of Liberation Movements, exposed the backchannel contacts and arms deals, intending to
hold Rafsanjani accountable for betraying the Islamic Revolution. Hashemi, however,
gravely miscalculated. Khomeini stood by his support for the revolutionary pragmatists,
consenting to Hashemi’s imprisonment and execution the year after.
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The Guard’s apparently heavy involvement in the Iran-Contra affair did not
suggest a deterioration of ideology. On the contrary, its participation won the Guard
heavy weapons desperately needed for achieving a revolutionary end in Iraq. Rezai
tolerated secret relations with the Americans only insofar as they advanced the Islamic
cause of destroying Hussein’s taghut (a blasphemous kind of despotism) regime. The
receipt of these weapons no doubt helped the Guard persuade its civilian superiors to
approve its end-game military strategy over the far more restrained one advocated by the
regular army. The Guard also appeared well capable of disrupting real US-Iran
rapprochement by instigating the seizure of more hostages in obvious contradiction with
US interests. In September and October 1986, a group synonymous with Hizbullah 87
abducted two American citizens in Beirut, with an unknown group abducting a third US
citizen around the same time. 88 This spate of kidnappings replaced the hostages Iran had
released to obtain US arms, thereby retaining Iran’s leverage over the US. The new round
of hostage-takings also revealed the unwillingness of the Guard to make substantive
ideological compromise. The arms deals further benefited Rezai’s faction by sidestepping
Hashemi’s camp and demonstrating the plight of its influence over key decisions. Rezai
believed the meddling of Iranian revolutionary radicals in Lebanon and the Gulf harmed
Iran’s international standing, and thus its access to international arms supplies, and
diverted resources and men from the more important and feasible mission in Iraq.
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Hashemi had stuck to the principle of anti-Imperialism at too great of a sacrifice
to both national and Islamic interests, as the Iraq war involved both. His radicalism
veered on the self-destructive and in light of this, his execution should not come as a
surprise. The excessive and unbridled support for Gulf revolutionaries could have
endangered the Iranian state existentially. It provoked the Gulf countries into forming the
Gulf Cooperation Council and the Saudis and Kuwaitis into strongly supporting the Iraqi
side. If Rafsanjani and others had allowed Hashemi to fully unleash his radicalism, Iran
could have expected much fiercer, possibly fatal economic and military pressure from its
enemies. Ideological commitments become untenable when they threaten the ideological
system itself. Rezai and Rafsanjani must have disdained Hashemi’s then delusional
obsession with fanning revolution in the Gulf—his activities not only negatively affected
the war, but also aimed at, by then, an evidently chimerical end.
After Banisadr fell, the Guard took leadership of the war. Banisadr had in fact
convinced Hussein to agree to his proposal for peace in May 1981. His accord, however,
was sabotaged by the populist clerics, “who preferred an Iranian defeat to a Bani-al-Sadr
victory.” 89 Around this time, Banisadr’s opponents first introduced the slogan, “War!
War until victory!” and decisively changed the objectives and conduct of the war to derail
his peace plan. 90 After 1981, they passed the mantle of military leadership to the Guard.
As early as October 1980, the Guard had shaped their understanding of the conflict in
terms of expanding the Islamic revolution. In a military communiqué, the Guard
announced its acceptance of the “mission of expanding the Islamic revolution throughout
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the world to free the world oppressed from the claws of the arrogant ones,” in relation to
war against Hussein. 91 After 1982, it pressed indefatigably into Iraqi territory with a view
toward Baghdad. After it floundered militarily for two years, the professional military
prevailed upon the authorities to reconsider which armed force should conduct the war.
The military shifted to a strategy of limited mobile attacks, attrition, and “defense
jihad.” 92 With an intervening two years of conservative policy by the regular military, the
Guard eclipsed their conventional counterparts again in 1986 and redoubled Iran’s frontal
offensives on Iraq. 93 The clerical leadership moved the professional army in as an ersatz
substitute whenever the Guard’s strategy became prohibitively costly. It had always
identified the Guard as the ideal military representation of the revolution. A ceasefire or
even victory led by the army would erode if not discredit the Islamic component of the
Iranian revolution.
A debate over how to capture Basra in 1986 epitomized the broader competition
between the two forces. Mohsen Rezai led the “maximalist” position, which favored a
decisive, all-out frontal assault on the city. Most regular army commanders, including
army chief of staff Ali Shirazi, strongly disagreed. They believed that any direct
offensive on Basra was fraught with risk; they favored the continuation of a slow war of
attrition. 94 The regular army commanders feared the Guard would repeat its disastrous
attempt to take and hold territory near Basra in February 1984, in which Iran suffered
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27,000 fatalities compared with 7,000 Iraqi fatalities. 95 The disagreements over how to
take Basra culminated in Shirazi’s dismissal from command and the Guard’s resumed
control over Iranian strategy for much of the last two years of the war. The tension over
Basra accrued from stark ideological differences. The Guard believed in Khomeini’s
quixotic ideas of Islamic Revolution; the army fell for no such illusions, its end was the
protection of Iranians and their national borders. If the army did not grasp the beautiful,
utopic visage of the Islamic Revolution as the Guard did, it could never support such
high-risk operations as Basra that sacrificed Iran’s national interests for the sake of
revolutionary ones. Taking Baghdad promised to display the inherent power of a
universalist Islamic Revolution, and hopefully shock the region’s oppressed masses into
an Islamic awakening.
The regular army counterpoised the Guard’s reliance on faith and zeal. It
advocated careful preparation and training, the development of adequate logistical
support, and deliberate planning to minimize casualties and the risk of defeat. 96 The first
civilian defense minister, Mostafa Chamran, laid out these differences: “My view is that
the army possesses technical power…that is, military science, a technology which the
guards corps lack, while the guardsmen are endowed with a stronger spirit of faith and
revolution.” 97 This difference led to a bifurcated Iranian strategy. The more radical
institution coveted Baghdad at all costs, attempting to neutralize Iraq’s superior
armaments with Iran’s greater numbers and zeal, whereas the regular army prioritized
national security over the Islamic Revolution, accepting Iraq’s astounding objective
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advantages. According to a US Senate Foreign Relations Committee report from
September 1984, Iraq had 2600 tanks to Iran’s 1040; about 3000 armored personnel
carriers to Iran’s 800; and more than 400 airworthy combat aircraft to Iran’s 90. 98 By
1988, the margins had widened; Iraqi tanks outnumbered Iranian tanks by more than five
to one and Iraqi fighter aircraft outnumbered Iranian jets 10 to 1. 99 In protest of what they
saw as futile aggression, sections of the army refused to cross the border at the outset of
the Iranian invasion. 100 The regular army believed Iran’s independence from imperialist
powers had made it weak militarily and a successful conquest of Iraq seemed out of the
question. 101 In contrast to the army’s timidity, the Guard set out to show how the
independence won by Islamic Revolution made Iran stronger against the odds.
The head of the Basij, Hojjat al-Islam Salek, made the sanguine observation that
his volunteers had succeeded “in doing away with conventional warfare methods and had
introduced a new method called ‘Islamic warfare.’” 102 Guard Commander Rezai affirmed
the military value of this so-called Islamic warfare; “It is sufficient for us to bring into the
battlefield four times more infantry forces with light weapons than the Iraqis.” 103 Rezai’s
belief turned out to be wrong; no manner of zeal paired with manpower could overcome
the disparities in munitions. One author has argued that the Guard was less concerned
with outcomes than processes, less with gaining victory than affirming certain values and
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commitments. 104 Indeed, this would explain why the Guard rejected the manifold benefits
of even slight integration with the professional army. Banisadr recounted how the Guard
opposed the army enough to actively undermine its operations by attacking the enemy
unexpectedly and without warning or else appropriating weapons delivered to the
front. 105 In this respect, the Guard feared integration would extricate religious values
from Iranian military operations and taint the process of victory despite making its
eventuality more likely. In the Guard’s defense, one politician coined the oft-repeated
assertion that “a maktab [ideologically pure] army is better than a victorious one.” 106 The
concern with values would also explain the ease with which the Guard expended Basij
fighters. In truth though, the Guard cared about process and victory in equal measure.
They understood the two as codependent; only through a revolutionary process could Iran
accomplish an Islamic victory and only by attaining an Islamic victory could it guarantee
the march of revolution.
The debates over how Iran should fight the war tactically became a synecdoche
for why Iran was fighting at all. An Islamic victory incorporated Islamic values into
tactics. Khomeini alluded to this in a comment to the Guard, “Victory is not achieved by
swords, it can only be achieved by blood…it is achieved by strength of faith.” 107
Conversely, a national victory rested on a restrained, professional approach to expelling
the Iraqis from Iran. Martyrdom became the central means to proving the thesis of
Islamic Revolution. In the words of Khomeini, “We regard martyrdom as a great blessing
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and our nation also welcomes martyrdom with open arms.” 108 Guard Commanders
mobilized Basij volunteers, whom constituted the majority of actual infantry soldiers, in
unprotected, densely concentrated infantry formations aptly named “Carvans of Karbala,”
but better known in the West as human waves, to frontally assault Iraqi positions. 109
Basij volunteers bore the brunt of Iranian casualties, and doubled the nearest Iranian
armed force in deaths. 110 Such human wave attacks were frequently (and pointlessly)
used in the trench warfare of World War I; their goal was to overcome enemy fire with
greater numbers and then overrun the enemy line with the soldiers still standing. The
emphasis on melee and the extreme likelihood or certainty of death required a great deal
of physical courage.
To this end, regime apparatchiks inundated Iranian youth with martyrdom
propaganda. One former Basij member recalled,
On the television they would show a young boy dressed as a soldier, carrying a
gun and wearing the red headband of the basij. He would say how wonderful it
was to be a soldier for Islam, fighting for freedom against the Iraqis. Then he
would curse the Iraqis and all Arabs, saying they were not good Muslims…At
school there were always mullahs coming to speak to us and interrupting our
lessons…They talked about the glorious Islamic Revolution and the Ayatollah
who had rescued us from the hands of the Americans…The mullahs said it was an
honor to go and fight for Islam and to be martyred for Islam, just like Imam
Hussein. 111
Guard commanders built on the initial indoctrination with material symbols designed to
consummate a readiness to die. They adorned Basij volunteers with red headbands
inscribed with Khomeini’s or Allah’s greatness, pinned to their uniforms strips of
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funerary white cloth, and hung around their necks plastic keys symbolizing their assured
entry into paradise upon martyrdom. 112 These tropes mostly exploited the common
infatuation of fourteen and fifteen year old boys with guns and adventure. An Iraqi
officer described the jarring effect of the Basij on his men,
They chant ‘Allahu Akbar’ and they keep coming, and we keep shooting,
sweeping our 50 millimeter machine guns around like sickles. My men are
eighteen, nineteen, just a few years older than these kids. I’ve seen them crying, at
times the officers have had to kick them back to their guns. Once we had Iranian
kids on bikes cycling toward us, and my men all started laughing, and then these
kids started lobbing their hand grenades and we stopped laughing and started
shooting. 113
In other instances, the Guard dispatched waves of Basij volunteers to clear Iraqi
minefields. The overall project of revolution subsumed ethical questions raised by these
tactics. Basked in the sanctity of their mission, Guard commanders put moral scruples
aside.
Iraq’s invasion of Iran stemmed from its desire to expand territorially and crush
its traditionally stronger neighbor. In September 1980, Iraqi forces glided into the
southern province of Khuzestan after a series of border skirmishes with the Guard earlier
that summer. Not meeting any coordinated resistance, Hussein easily took control of the
Shatt al-Arab (known as the Arvand in Persian), a strategic river, and a small portion of
Khuzestan, before halting his victorious army. The Iranian Arab population is
concentrated in Khuzestan (persistently called “Arabistan” outside of Iran) and Hussein
incorrectly expected strong cooperation from the local population there. In Iraq, the war
was known simply as “Saddam's Qadisiyyah,” in reference to an ancient battle at the
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town of that name in 636, when the Arab Muslim army first pushed the Sassanid Persian
Empire out of what is today modern Iraq. 114 The Arab majority in this “liberated” zone of
“Arabistan,” however, greeted the Iraqis with indifference. 115 Hussein inflamed antiPersian sentiments to legitimate his attack. He triumphantly called Iraq’s invasion a
“historic defense of Arab sovereignty and rights against the marauding Persians.” 116 He
focused on placing the Shatt al-Arab, Iraq’s only outlet into the Gulf, and hence its only
port for oil tankers, under his full control. His act of war abrogated an unfavorable 1975
truce with the Shah that had evenly split sovereignty over the waterway. 117 He hoped a
quick, limited, yet decisive campaign would swiftly convince the volatile revolutionary
state to capitulate these territories, which would cement Iraq’s position as regional
heavyweight, and leader of the Arab world.
Iraq attacked Iran at its weakest moment in decades. Revolutionaries had crippled
Iran’s military by purging its highest echelons and expelling American technicians and
arms suppliers, whose departure left Iran’s arsenal in disrepair or obsolescence. Between
1955 and 1979, Iran agreed to purchase military equipment from the US worth about $21
billion, of which it received about $9 billion in actual material. 118 These prodigious sales
helped give the Shah, by 1975, the largest blue water navy in the Persian Gulf, the largest
Air Force in Western Asia, and the fifth largest army in the world. 119 But the revolution
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wrecked Iran’s military prowess. Between February and September 1979, some 85 senior
officers in the Shah’s army were executed and hundreds more (including all majorgenerals and most brigadier-generals) were imprisoned or fired. By the war’s onset, some
12,000 officers had been purged. 120 These purges eviscerated the army’s higher ranks,
while the air force lost half of its pilots and 15-20 percent of its officers, noncommissioned officers, and technicians. By the outbreak of the war, the Iranian army
dwindled from 285,000 to approximately 150,000, whereas the Iraqi army stood at
200,000. The flight of American avionics advisors combined with a reduced pool of
pilots denied the Iranian air force the ability to fly half its aircraft. Iran also lacked critical
access to the international arms market, whereas Iraq received support from both Russia
and the West. As Rafsanjani noted, “…it became completely evident that the West and
even Russia were determined not to let us win the war militarily in the region…” 121
Notwithstanding the Iran-Contra fiasco, an effective international arms embargo took
place to deny Iran advanced weapons. The US spearheaded the project, which it called
“Operation Staunch.” In 1987, for example, the US scuttled the proposed $170 million
sale of 16 aging F5 fighter jets to Iran even amid the suggestion that Iran would return
nine US citizens held hostage by Hizbullah. 122 The US role in the notorious tanker war
also illustrated its pro-Iraqi stance. In the last two years of the war, the US sent a large
naval force to protect international shipping lanes allegedly threatened by Iran and the US
destroyed many of its oil platforms and ships. State department officials acknowledged
during Congressional testimony that less than one percent of all tankers transiting the
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Gulf had been attacked before the US provided protection, and 70 percent of those
attacked were hit by Iraq. 123 Nonetheless, by February 1988, the US had deployed 29
warships and approximately 20,000 men to the Persian Gulf. 124
Beyond the balance of power dimensions of the Iraqi invasion, Hussein also
meant to end the Iranian revolutionaries’ increasing support for Iraqi Shi’i dissidents. In
June 1979, Tehran began publicly urging the Iraqi people to overthrow the secular Baath
regime. 125 A few months later, Tehran resumed the Shah’s support for insurgent Iraqi
Kurds and provided aid and impetus to Iraq’s underground Shi’i movements, mostly alDa’wa, which began terrorizing the Iraqi government. 126 Around the same time, the
Guard began harassing and attacking Iraqi interests in Iran, including schools, consulate
generals, and other institutions in Tehran and especially in the border city of
Khorramshahr. 127 Its actions overtly defied the Bazargan administration’s official policy
of neutrality. By the end of 1979, the Iraqi regime moved to contain the insurgency threat
by expelling some 100,000 Iraqi Shi’is from the country and retaliating with support of
separatist Kurdish and Arab elements within Iran. 128 By the end of the war, Hussein
pressured or deported an additional 250,000 Iraqi Shi’is into Iran. 129 In the spring of
1980, Iran severed diplomatic relations with Iraq. On April 9, the day that Hussein
executed Mohammad Baqir al-Sadr, the leader of al-Da’wa, Khomeini, in a broadcast
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speech, attacked Saddam Hussein and Egyptian President Anwar Sadat, who had given
refuge to the deposed Shah. He urged "noble Islamic nations" to attack both leaders,
while calling Hussein a "treacherous parasite" and urging the Iraqi Army and people to
"wake up and topple this corrupt regime in your Islamic country before it is too late." 130
That month, Khomeini called on Iraqi law enforcement forces “to rise up heroically and
to destroy the foundations of oppression just as happened in Iran.” 131 A leading radical
and patron of the Guard, Ayatollah Montazeri, advocated armed conflict until “Hussein’s
regime is completely overthrown and until the Islamic republic is established.” 132 Iranian
support for lethal subversion reached its zenith around the same time, when Iraq’s deputy
premier and minister of information narrowly escaped two separate assassination
attempts and 20 Iraqi officials were killed in bomb attacks by al-Da’wa militants who
were almost surely in contact with the Guard. 133 In his memoir Hashemi Uncensored,
Rafsanjani obliquely censured Iran’s revolutionaries. “You must keep in mind the point
about how we could have controlled the factors which led to war…Maybe if in our
foreign relations…we had arrived at a different set of imperatives, then perhaps it would
have been possible to avoid war.” 134 The invasion aimed to disable a perennially
problematic neighbor. Suspicion of an Iranian fifth column reached as far back as the
modern Iraqi state itself. A 1924 law establishing Iraqi citizenship carved out a special
category for “Iraqis of Iranian nationality,” requiring them to display this information on
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identity cards. Hundreds of thousands of Iranian-Iraqis had previously held Iranian
citizenship under three former Ottoman provinces before the Iraqi state acquired their
land. 135
As the war escalated, and the size of the Guard mushroomed, the Guard
reorganized itself under a conventional structure. The structural changes were limited to
form, however, and not substance. As former Guard Minister Rafighdoost recounted in a
1985 interview,
When we wanted to send the IRGC to the battlefronts, this force did not have the
necessary military formation or organization. The IRGC was not created defend
the country’s borders but rather the main aim for the creation of the IRGC was to
defend the Islamic revolution. It was at this time that we realized the imposed war
was not against our borders but rather that it was aimed against the Islamic
revolution and was bent on its destruction. Therefore, we felt the need to mobilize
the IRGC. 136
Rafighdoost’s comments attested to the Guard’s loyalty to the Islamic Revolution, which
meant, theoretically, that the security of the country’s borders was secondary to the
revolution. With the revolution in peril, the Guard acquired the necessary military
organization to defend it. Border security was important only insofar as it overlapped
with the safety of revolution, a point that underscores the Guard’s revolutionary, not
nationalist roots. In the same interview, Rafighdoost described how the battle for the
Khuzestan city of Abadan spurred the Guard’s development into a conventional form:
When the Iranian forces started widespread operations, it was felt that the IRGC
had to be present on the fronts in an organized formation. The organization and
reshaping of the IRGC started with the establishment of border companies which

135
136

Louer, Transnational Shia, 87.
Katzman, Warriors of Islam, 85.

48

took part in the breaking of the Abadan siege. The companies were later expanded
into brigades and then armies. 137
This reorganization gradually rationalized the Guard’s tactics, but the onerous goal of
total victory remained the same. Guard commanders continued to inefficiently counteract
Iraq’s advantages in firepower with human-wave formations until late 1986. Even when
the Guard and the regular military achieved their highest degree of cooperation and
limited battlefield integration during the 1986 Al-Faw offensive, the Guard would not
forfeit unconventional tactics. 138
The adoption of a rank system, hierarchy, and salary by the end of the war did not
spur a decline in revolutionary fervor or radical decision-making. On April 18, 1988, for
example, Iranian naval vessels commanded by the Guard counterattacked against the
overwhelmingly more powerful US Navy, which was conducting a retaliatory strike off
the Iranian coast. 139 The Iranian assault resulted in the loss of about 20 percent of Iran’s
major naval warships. 140 A change in tactics did accompany the Guard’s reorganization,
but as part of a separate process. By 1988, Rafsanjani went from intonating, “The faith of
the Islamic troops is stronger than Iraq’s superior firepower,” to demanding that the
Guard “must not think that when it is attacked it can fight with Molotov cocktails.” 141
And the Guard indeed dropped the use of human waves by 1987. However, the deepened
organizational and military capabilities alluded to by Rafsanjani did not correspond with
diminishing commitment to ideology. On the contrary, these formal changes better
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operationalized the Guard’s support for Khomeini’s ideology. Guard leaders have
consistently affirmed their faith in and loyalty to the faqih, and have expressed
ideological sentiments with respect to the US, Israel, and imperialist domination. They
turned away from exporting the revolution in the post-war period largely because of the
dismal outcome of the war, rather than organizational reform. The Guard developed a
sophisticated force structure in response to the challenges of winning the war. With the
regular army reluctant to prosecute the war until victory, it seized any opportunities to
enhance its war effort.
The Guard’s radicalism, though diminishing after the war, did not disappear.
Elements in and supportive of the Guard continued to sanction terrorist attacks in order to
prevent a US-Iran rapprochement. An unclassified Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA)
report links Ayatollah Mohtashemi to the December 1988 bombing of American
commercial jet Pan Am Flight 103. Mohtashemi worked intimately with the Guards,
especially in the Office of Liberation Movements and had established Hizbullah when he
served as ambassador to Syria. He was removed from his diplomatic post in conjunction
with the closure of the Office. The report alleges that he paid the Palestinian groups
responsible for the attack $10 million, in retaliation for the US shooting of an Iranian
airbus. 142 A CIA double agent in the Guard claimed Guard agents coordinated the
bombing, although a special agent who headed the FBI’s investigation into the incident
refuted this, underscoring the lack of credible evidence. 143 An Iranian intelligence officer
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who defected to Germany in the 1990s also alleged that Iran had commissioned the
bombing, with the confirmation of Khomeini. 144 The same DIA report also claims that
Mohtashemi urged the government to agree to Hussein’s plan to use Iraqi aircraft
stationed in Iran during the Gulf War against US bases in the Gulf and Turkey. 145 In a
separate incident, Argentina charged Mohsen Rezai and Quds Commander Ahmad
Vahidi, along with a number of other high-ranking Iranians, with organizing the 1994
bombing of a domestic Israeli cultural center. Interpol concurred with the judgment and
Rezai’s disaffected son Ahmad confirmed it. 146 The restructuring of the Guard into
formal branches did not evidently end radical, although increasingly sporadic, decisionmaking that was anathema to the regular military.
In another indication of its radicalness, it appears the Guard would not have
ceased warfare without Khomeini’s personal intervention. The hardships of war had
steadily eroded civilian support for it. Hussein was bombing Iran’s cities, destroying its
economy, and burying a generation of its youth. Yet the Guard refused to give up. As
Rafighdoost declared in spring 1987, “To avoid any misunderstanding that we are setting
a date for finishing the war, I reiterate that we shall fight to the last man, to the last house
and to the last drop of blood, and for this very reason we are bound to win.” 147 For all his
bravado, Iranian diplomats characterized Rafighdoost as a restraint on the more
pugnacious Rezai. 148 In the last years, the Guard dominated the Supreme Military
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Council, allowing it to largely control war policy. 149 In light of this, it was highly
possible that no authority lower than Khomeini could have overridden its opposition to a
cease-fire. As late as June 1988, the Guard’s spokesperson Majid Ali Reza dismissed
compromise: “The war will be decided on the battlefield and not on the conference
table.” 150 The Guard’s uncompromising militancy abraded the Iranian people, who no
doubt greatly desired peace by 1988. Instead of placing the onus for ending the war on
more vulnerable civilian leaders, Khomeini took it upon himself to bear the burden of
compromise. The Guard had no choice but to accept his decision. In an open letter
announcing his ceasefire decision, Khomeini related the contents of an epistolary
exchange with Rezai. Khomeini wrote,
The IRGC Commander is one of the few commanders who believes in the
continuation of the war providing that the needed equipment can be procured…In
his letter the IRGC commander has written that there will be no victory in the
next five years and he may be able to embark on destructive operations or retaliate
if he obtains the necessary equipment during the same period…He adds that the
strength of the IRGC must be increased seven times and the Military by two-andhalf times. He also said that America should be evicted from the Persian Gulf,
otherwise he would not succeed…In spite of stating this, he said the Islamic
republic must continue fighting which is now no more than a slogan. 151
Khomeini sketched a picture of Rezai as reserved over the chances of victory barring a
propitious change in tides, but still adamant in pressing the war.
Khomeini’s assumption of responsibility avoided a potentially violent
confrontation between the Guard and its opponents over the course of the war. Many of
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the same politicians who allied with the Guard from an early stage withdrew their support
as Iraq increasingly targeted civilians and economically strategic infrastructure.
Rafsanjani and other influential clerics had moved in a moderate direction, but worried
their advocacy for peace would elicit punishment from the Guard. Khomeini intended for
his official statement on the ceasefire to blunt an anticipated backlash from the Guard and
political hardliners. 152 Rafsanjani praised his decision since it averted the acrimony that
would have arisen otherwise inevitably. “Afterwards, Haj Ahmad Khomeini told us that
the Imam had decided to announce it himself, because differences could have risen
among ‘you’ if ‘you’ announced it.” 153 Khomeini forced the Guard to end its
revolutionary war against Hussein, and, more generally, reevaluate its feasibility and
costs. As the final blow to idealism, Iran’s brutal war experience extinguished the idea of
exporting Islamic Revolution through force of arms.
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Chapter Three: Exporting the Revolution

The Islamic Revolution focused on supplanting imperialism with Islam.
Khomeini’s pre-revolution diatribes characteristically linked the iniquity of the Shah with
US foreign policy and, indeed, the very system of international order. Although
concentrated on liberating Iran, Khomeini harbored international ambitions. He hoped
Iran’s revolution would launch worldwide revolutions against imperialists, which would
then pave the way for Islam to reach its full political and social potential. He advocated
overthrowing the pro-Western regimes in power throughout most of the Middle East. In
his seminal lecture series on Islamic Government, circa 1970, Khomeini characterized
Arab regimes as fulfilling the imperialist designs of dividing and conquering the Middle
East. “We see, too, that together, the imperialists and the tyrannical self-seeking rulers
have divided the Islamic homeland. They have separated the various segments of the
Islamic umma from each other and artificially created separate nations…the imperialists
at the end of World War I divided the Ottoman State, creating in its territories about ten
or fifteen petty states.” 154 To consolidate their control, the imperialists installed “one of
their servants or a group of their servants, although certain countries were later able to
escape the grasp of the agents of imperialism.” 155 The dictators sowed even greater
dissension among the umma by virtue of their taghut, the form of despotism that
encourages rebellion against Allah. Consequently, Khomeini pronounced, “We have in
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reality, then, no choice but to destroy those systems of government that are corrupt in
themselves and also entail the corruption of others.” 156
Khomeini denigrated any un-Islamic form of government as imperialistic because
he believed in the exclusive power of an Islamic governmental framework to lift man
from a natural state of corruption. Khomeini reasoned that God appointed Islamic
sovereigns in order to set man on the right path; any sovereign drawing power from a
different source would necessarily fail to do so.
Men have been set upon a certain well-defined path and commanded not
to stray from it, nor to transgress against the established limits and norms, for if
they were to stray, they would fall prey to corruption. Now men would not be able
to keep to their ordained path and to enact God’s laws unless a trustworthy and
protective individual (or power) were appointed over them with responsibility for
this matter, to prevent them from stepping outside the sphere of the licit and
transgressing against the rights of others. If no such restraining individual or
power were appointed…everybody would engage in oppressing and harming
others for the sake of their own pleasures and interests. 157
This premise creates the need for “a ruler who acts as trustee and maintains the
institutions and laws of Islam.” 158 Although Khomeini blames Muslims for not erecting
such a system of Islamic sovereignty in the first place, which through its wisdom would
have protected them from rapacious foreign powers, he still castigated imperialism for
misleading Muslims from God’s political plan for their salvation: “the nation of Islam has
fallen victim to division and weakness…the imperialists have propagated foreign laws
and alien culture among the Muslims through their agents for the sake of their evil
purposes, causing people to be infatuated with the West.” 159 Saudi authorities in fact
found this message sufficiently dangerous to arrest and imprison the partisans of
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Khomeini who were promulgating it amongst pilgrims in Mecca. 160 Khomeini was
dealing with a political problem with religious means because all politics were
problematic when they lacked an Islamic foundation. He expanded on this in a speech
from 1981,
The problem of the Muslims is that despite enormous natural resources, land and
population, they have to comply with the major powers because of incompetent
elite groups…We need to analyze what are the roots of the problems among
Muslims and how they can be resolved…The problem of the Muslims is their
governments and political systems. It is the political systems that have created the
current problems for the Muslims. These regimes have nothing to do with
Islam…And unless we return to Islam, our problems will remain…Nations as
well as governments need to return to Islam in order to resolve their
difficulties. 161
Thus, the basic function of revolution was to spread this message and boost the
confidence of Muslims in the ability of their faith to return man to the right path as laid
out by the Prophet Muhammad and Imam Ali.
Khomeini’s ultimate vision may best be conceptualized as a “pan-Islamic
revolution” resulting in an Islamic order, or front, that could resist domination by the
world’s superpowers. He dreamed of an Islamic front coalescing in pursuit of a
politicized religious awakening kindled by Iran’s struggle. The Islamic front would
defend Islam and the dignity of its people, “If the 700 million Muslims, with the vast
countries that they inhabit, had the political maturity to unite and organize themselves in
a single front, it would not be possible for the big imperialist powers to penetrate their
countries, let alone a handful of Jews who are the servants of imperialism.” 162 The
Islamic front would also rely on revolutionary means to achieve its end of a single
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Islamic government, “It is the duty of Islamic scholars and all Muslims to put an end to
this system of oppression and…to overthrow these oppressive governments and form an
Islamic government.” 163 Umma, or a front in close approximation to it, then, represented
the ideal end point of Islamic Revolution. In this utopic stage, Muslims would comport
themselves solely in accordance with Islam. Successive Islamic Revolutions would have
purged all secular constructs such as nationalism and ethnicity from the body politic. The
unity of this purely Islamic system would demand their eradication. Khomeini illustrated
this point in a speech from 1980, “Nationalism that results in the creation of enmity
between Muslims and splits the ranks of the believers is against Islam and the interests of
the Muslims. It is a stratagem concocted by the foreigners who are disturbed by the
spread of Islam.” 164 To be sure, he did not give a detailed explication of its qualities, but
such a state logically concluded from his interpretations of the state of nature, of the
political role of Islam, and of the umma.
Khomeini also distinguished worthy governments from the worthless based on
their affiliation with an Islam of the oppressed versus an Islam of imperialism. His
dichotomy turned on the notion that subservience to imperialism contaminated Islam. In a
speech directed against Saddam Hussein on the eve of the Iran-Iraq war, Khomeini
illustrated this paradigm:
The Great Satan gives its orders to one of its pawns in the region, one of the dead
Shah’s friends, to obtain decrees from Sunni fuqaha and muftis to the effect that
the Iranians are unbelievers…Certainly the Islam of Iran is different from the
Islam of those who support the pawns of America, like Sadat and Begin, who
extend the hand of friendship to the enemies of Islam and flaunt the commands of

163
164

Ibid., 50-51.
Ibid., 302.

57

God Almighty, and who leave no lie and calumny unuttered in their efforts to
create disunity among the Muslims. 165
Any country dependent on superpowers necessarily opened itself to the penetration of
alien and foreign political theory and custom. These foreign influences waylaid Muslim
countries from the straight path of Islam, directing them instead to focus on the selfinterests of the nation. Iran, by contrast, was “waging a determined struggle to ensure the
unity of all Muslims in the world on the basis of tawhid [oneness of God] and true
Islam.” 166 The Islam of the oppressed would found a truly independent Islamic
sovereignty in place of “shameful and reactionary” monarchies. The urgent need for true
Islamic government led him to condemn Gulf leaders enthralled by the Islam of
imperialism. On one occasion, he expressed hope “that the heads of these governments,
some of whom are indulged in sensuality, some preoccupied with their debaucheries,
some embroiled in clashes with their brethren, and some emasculated by their fear of the
United States, will be awakened into an Islamic humanitarian consciousness, thus putting
an end to their sordid governments and rejecting all superpowers, just as our heroic
nation has done.” 167
Khomeini and his faction incorporated many of the salient elements of this
worldview into the constitution. One of its opening sections on “Structure of Government
in Islam” provides “a basis for the continuation of that [Islamic] revolution both inside
and outside the country. It particularly tries to do this in developing international relations
with other Islamic movements and peoples, so as to prepare the way toward a united
single world community.” Article eleven also enjoins the government to “constantly
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strive to bring about the political, economic, and cultural unity of the Islamic world.”
These clauses in fact obligate Iran to pursue Khomeini’s ambition of internationalizing
the Islamic Revolution. This point is further explained in article three, section sixteen,
which commands the Islamic Republic to frame its foreign policy “on the basis of Islamic
criteria, fraternal commitment to all Muslims, and unsparing support to the freedom
fighters of the world.” While the constitution conferred the responsibility for “fulfilling
the ideological mission of jihad in God's way” to the Guard and the Army, the real
burden rested squarely with the former. It would be absurd to think that the Shah’s
military, designed to mimic Western armies in its composition, could operate as standardbearers of the Islamic Revolution without rebuilding itself from the ground up. If the
regular army were to be purged, yet left intact, the Islamic Republic would need to raise a
new force, revolutionary in both its nature and activities.
Thus, Khomeini envisioned a region-wide liberation movement with Iran at its
center and the Guard at its helm. Khomeini went into further detail of the Guard’s role
when he formally established the organization on May 6, 1979. The decree instructed the
Guard to “protect the revolution in Iran and spread it in the world on the basis of genuine
Islamic ideology.” The Guard would also “support just liberation movements of the
impoverished masses of the world under the leadership of the revolution and in
consultation with the government…” and, “wage armed struggles against those who
attempt armed struggles against Islam.” 168 This principle of waging war against those
waging armed struggle against Islam coheres with the classical Shi’i doctrine on jihad,
which proscribes offensive holy war but not defensive holy war in the absence of the
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infallible Imam. This same meaning of jihad applies to the constitutional decree of
“fulfilling the ideological mission of jihad.” This defensive limitation to the term means
that Iran could not export its revolution by force of arms, unless doing so also constituted
self-defense. Khomeini may have exhorted Muslims “to export Islam to other places, and
the same version of Islam which is currently in power in our country,” but he also
categorically declared that violence should not be employed as the means, “It does not
take swords to export this ideology. The export of ideas by force is not export…When we
say we want to export our revolution, we do not want to do it with swords.” 169 In light of
this prohibition against using “swords,” Iran could legitimately export its revolution
through armed struggle only in conjunction with a war of self-defense.
The Iraqi invasion of Iran and Israeli invasion of Lebanon both provided fairly
clear pretexts for Iran to wage wars in defense of Islam in which they could
simultaneously export the doctrine of velayat-e faqih. Unless Khomeini declared the Gulf
States as also at war with Islam (he did not), he was theoretically precluded from
militarily forcing Islamic Revolution upon them. He confirmed this, “We have neither
ambition in, nor right to, any country, and God Almighty has granted us no permission to
interfere in any country, unless it is solely a matter of self-defense.” 170 Again, however,
Khomeini enwrapped his statement in titillating ambiguity. Self-defense justified
interference in other countries and also armed conflict against them, but these two
outcomes respectively represent less and more extreme reactions to aggression. This
indicates a differentiation in the severity of attacks against Islam, with some deserving a
reaction of armed struggle and others, interference. Khomeini’s May 1979 decree about
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the Guard also separated supporting “just liberation movements of the impoverished
masses of the world under the leadership of the revolution” from waging defensive armed
struggle. How much could Iran support revolutionary forces without transgressing the
line of offensive jihad? If Iranians supplied Bahraini revolutionaries with arms, but did
not fire the weapons themselves, were the Iranians waging an offensive armed struggle
against the House of al-Khalifa?
The Guard exploited these ambiguities. The space of possibility for employing
violent means indeed increased after the governments of Banisadr and Bazargan fell.
These moderate leaders had curtailed the Guard’s militancy in different ways. The first,
Bazargan, firmly supported a doctrine of “negative equilibrium,” that sought to make Iran
a strong, independent, yet accommodating actor in international politics. In effect, he
avoided the revolutionary posture that would soon alarm Iran’s neighbors and the US.
The second leader, Banisadr, saw the Guard as a destabilizing political rival and sought to
subordinate it to civilian control. The relevancy of these moderate political forces to the
revolution explains the somewhat anomalous parts of the constitution that downplay its
overall revolutionary tenor. For example, articles 152 and 154 declare that Iran’s
constitution, while in part based on “unsparing support” to freedom fighters worldwide, is
also based on “scrupulously refraining from all forms of interference in the internal
affairs of other nations” and “the maintenance of mutually peaceful relations with all
non-belligerent States.” Once the clerical faction unseated the moderates, the Guard
could flout the constitution’s limitations on the use of force. In his memoir, Ahmad
Khomeini recalled the urgency with which the Office of Liberation Movements wanted to
export the country. He recalled the revolutionary sentiments, tinged with a pretense of
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self-defense, of Mohammad Montazeri, who led the Office until his death in 1981, to
“raise a revolutionary mayhem in the region, which would also clarify the role of the
Guards in export of the revolution…he would say: ‘We should not wait for them to come
and invade and occupy Iran and begin when it is all over. It is a waste of time to be
here.’” 171 Montazeri also suggested that Ayatollah Khomeini go elsewhere since “he has
liberated Iran and the work is over. It would be better if you [Ahmad] and the Imam and
some other friends go to another retrograde country and begin the work anew.” 172 Ahmad
recalled a differing viewpoint that discouraged intervention, but concluded “the only
difference is with regard to practicalities and methodology. We all desire the
establishment of Islamic republics controlled by a central government and there is no one
who does not desire this, but in the way of achieving the goals there are differences.” 173
The Guard principally exported the revolution by conjoining it with transnational
Shi’i networks. As the advent of the Islamic Revolution captivated a Shi’i audience, the
Guard built inroads into extant transnational parties of Islamic activists and militants. It
bonded primarily with the Shirazists, the most extreme of these, which was under the
tutelage of the cleric Mohammed al-Shirazi. This network, and others sympathetic to the
revolution, namely the Najafi-based al-Da’wa party, circulated Khomeini’s ideology and
challenged the allegedly faux-Islamic regimes in the Gulf on his behalf. The Iranians and
their co-revolutionaries used foreign policy to express the general appeal and inherent
dynamism of the Islamic Revolution; accordingly, Khomeini’s revolutionary acolytes
banded together in the Guard. The revolution indeed gained a global or at least regional
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conceit as its success reverberated through much of the Arab Shi’i world. However, the
devotion of resources and political capital to genuine attempts at exporting the revolution
largely subsided during the late 1980s amid internal power shifts. These conflicts came to
a head in 1986, when a revolutionary radical exposed the Iran-Contra affair. As the dust
of this struggle settled, the farthest left wing of the Guard was purged, and the top brass
of commanders from the Iran-Iraq war was poised to capture the organization. This
change-up roughly preceded with the end of the war, during which the vagaries of
demilitarization added additional pressure on the Guard to revise its raison d’etre.
Subsequently, the Guard used foreign Shi’i parties as tools to pressure Iran’s enemies
rather than as catalysts of Islamic Revolution. In addition to these internal shifts, the
major transnational Shi’i networks underwent a process of “autonomization,” driving a
wedge between them and Tehran. As a result, the Guard lost any chance to muster mass
revolutionary élan in the Arab states; instead, it was left with a small pool of compatible,
yet socially marginalized ideologues. Nevertheless, the Guard still displayed acumen for
co-opting pro-Tehran zealots. These external factors, coupled with the ousting of the
Guard’s most idealistic component, ended the era of active revolutionary export. The
Guard’s rotated away from genuine revolutionary exporting because foreign Shi’i
populations rejected it. Once this became clear, the idealistic echelons in the Guard
amounted to little more than entropy within Iran’s ideological system.
These transnational clerical networks, already steeped in political conceptions
similar to Khomeini’s, dispersed Iran’s revolutionary spirit to the Shi’i populations of
Arab countries in which they had taken root; in some cases, they acted violently as proxy
actors for the Guard. This moment—around late 1979, early 1980—sparkled with the
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prospect of revolution and the organizations subcontracted by the Guard played crucial
roles in mobilizing or inciting Shi’i communities. One should not overstate the
contribution of Iran’s actual policies, as opposed to the sheer accomplishment of its
revolution, to this scintillating moment in Middle Eastern history. For one, the Guard did
not introduce a new mode of diffusing ideology. Moreover, the impact of the Islamic
Revolution on various countries depended upon the varying social and political
circumstances of respective Shi’i populations. 174 In other words, national political
structures trumped Iranian efforts in determining the revolution’s course. For example,
the revolution lent itself to political violence in Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, and Kuwait, but
beyond this apparent similarity, the violence widely varied in its meaning as well as
purpose. 175 The Guard usually attains plausible deniability by denying any role in arming,
funding, and directing foreign militias or cells, which complicates any attempt at
ascertaining the extent of its leadership in foreign operations. Conversely, the proclivity
of Gulf monarchies to pin domestic unrest on the Guard consistently stretches the extent
of its power and the dialectic between denial and blame muddles the truth.
Mohammed al-Shirazi and his followers, the Shirazists, extended their influence
through clerical networks into Bahrain, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia over the course of the
1970s. Their groundwork provided the revolution with a line of transmission into the
Arab world. This network originated in the 1960s, when Mohammed al-Shirazi anointed
himself marja’iyya from the hawza, or institution of higher Islamic learning, of Karbala.
The marja’ is a figure of utmost authority to Shi’i believers and stands at the top of the
clerical hierarchy. He is not designated or elected by an institution or organ; instead, the
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marja’ must demonstrate sagacity and earn the unanimous respect of the masters and
advanced students of the hawza at which he studies. 176 The marja’ then promulgates
religious precepts for Muslims to follow, at which point he becomes a source of taqlid, or
emulation, and assumes a role of religious leadership. 177 The marja’iyya is a plural
institution, mainly divided between hawzas in Qum and Najaf, but possibly between
other poles like Karbala, Mashhad, or Beirut. 178 The Iranian Supreme Leaders have tried
monopolizing the institution of marja’iyya to widen Iran’s influence over the Shi’i world
and gain control of its financial streams. Khomeini’s ambition in this respect nettled alShirazi early on; he always demanded to be respected by Khomeini as an equal, not as a
subordinate marja’iyya. This tension later killed their friendship. In 1989, sensing the
imminence of his death and grappling with a paucity of eligible successors, Khomeini
proposed to amend the constitution to lower the religious qualifications of the Supreme
Leader from marja’ to mujtahid. The amendment allowed Khomeini to designate the
previously unqualified Ali Khamenei as his successor. Even then, most religious scholars
deemed Khamenei’s religious knowledge insufficient for the practice of ijtihad, a
prerequisite aptitude in legal reasoning for mujtahids. 179 In 1995, Khamenei made the
somewhat egregious decision to present himself as a candidate for the supreme
marja’iyya in Iran. 180 Later, he attempted to assert his political and religious authority
over Shi’is outside of Iran by claiming the status of wali amr al-muslimin, or “head of the
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Muslims.” 181 Khamenei’s audacious claims polarized the Shi’i world into pro and antiIranian factions and nearly led to a split in Hizbullah (the organization ultimately
accepted Khamenei’s marja’iyya). 182 The reception of Khamenei’s claims also became a
litmus test for Shi’i militias working with the Guard. The groups that questioned
Khamenei’s religious legitimacy for all intents and purposes signaled their unwillingness
to further Iranian interests. As a result, the groups that did accept his marja’iyya also
defined themselves as dedicated proponents of Iranian power.
Al-Shirazi’s movement offered a more radical alternative to the competing Shi’i
network, al-Da’wa, which promulgated a less extreme message and espoused a different
interpretation of religion’s role in politics. Al-Da’wa also began and anchored itself in
Iraq’s premier Shi’i religious establishment, Najaf, and resented the emergence of a rival
movement from Iraq’s lesser holy city. Al-Shirazi’s claim to marja’iyya in fact openly
challenged the mujtahid of Najaf. For one, al-Shirazi held the Najafi hawza in disdain and
made his claim without its consultation. 183 Secondly, according to the marja’iyya’s
gerontocratic standards, he was forty years too young to declare the title. 184 Al-Shirazi
further aggravated the Najafi clerical activists by proposing to endow the marja’iyya with
full power over the state. 185 Al-Da’wa’s spiritual leader Mohammed Baqir al-Sadr argued
for the creation of a supervisory body of senior mujtahid who would veto un-Islamic laws
passed by the democratic executive and legislative branches of government. 186 The
Shirazists, therefore, rejected this dual source of authority endorsed by al-Da’wa’s
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statutes. 187 Al-Shirazi actually formulated his doctrine of “the government of the
jurisprudents” in a 1963 book. Like Khomeini, his doctrine affirmed that in the absence
of the Imam, the marja’ were invested with his political temporal power. 188 Al-Shirazi
indeed became Khomeini’s closest clerical ally during the prerevolutionary years. When
Khomeini took refuge in Najaf in 1964, al-Shirazi was the only cleric to welcome him
and join his outspoken criticism of the Shah. 189 Al-Da’wa functioned mostly as a
propaganda machine for Iranian soft power. 190 Their sense of pragmatism aligned alDa’wa with the central state institutions, foremost among them the office of the prime
minister (until its disbandment in 1989). 191
The Shirazists’ position that Iran’s Islamic revolution could be spread only
through force of arms allied them with a radical faction in the Guard led by Ayatollah
Hussein Ali Montazeri. This faction represented itself in the Guard’s now defunct Office
of Liberation Movements. This office, initially led by Ayatollah Montazeri’s son
Mohammad, coordinated the activity of foreign revolutionary movements and quickly
became the point organ for exporting the revolution. Its ethos prized the pan-Islamic
struggle above all else, including the process of rebuilding the Iranian state. Ayatollah
Montazeri expressed this sentiment in an interview from October, 1979: “I would like to
assert that we in the Muslim revolution cannot remain calm or sleep on silk while the rest
of the Muslim peoples and countries are encountering danger, injustice and oppression—
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oppression by dictatorships and imperialism.” 192 After Mohammed Montazeri’s death in
an armed attack in 1981, his brother-in-law Mehdi Hashemi took charge of the office. For
the Montazeri faction, the Shah’s overthrow opened the floodgates of a worldwide
Islamic revolution. The Guard provided the Shirazists with asylum, offices in Tehran,
administrative facilities, and arms to carry out their operations in Iraq and the Gulf. 193
The Guard underwrote the Shirazists’ establishment of a radio station in Abadan, an
Iranian city on the Gulf a few miles from the Iraqi frontier and close to the Gulf
monarchies. 194 From there they broadcasted polemics against Saddam Hussein, but soon
graduated to calling for the removal of the Al Khalifa of Bahrain and the Al Saud of
Saudi Arabia. 195 Shirazist members actually contend that they had imposed their agenda
of armed conflict with Saddam Hussein on the Iranian leadership. 196 Khomeini’s
supporters also arranged for Shirazist cadres to train in guerilla warfare camps in
Lebanon run by the Palestine Liberation Organization. 197 Prior to the revolution, the Iraqi
Shirazists fought the Shah in the Arab province of Khuzestan, where they passed
themselves off as Iranians of Arab ethnicity. Then, during the years of turmoil in
Khuzestan following the revolution, Shirazists, using their native Arabic, took on the role
of propagandists for Khomeini’s ideology. 198 The Shirazists also played a central role in
organizing the first of a series of annual Conferences of the Liberation Movements,
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which gathered cadres of revolutionary movements worldwide in Tehran, starting in
1982. 199
Beyond their strong support for the revolution in Iran, the Shirazists also acted as
the main brokers, working in tandem with the Guard, for exporting it outside of Iran. One
prominent Shirazist activist, Hadi al-Mudarrisi, announced he was Khomeini’s official
representative in Bahrain as he attempted to marshal a mass uprising there. After Bahraini
authorities expelled him, he relocated to Tehran, where he subsequently masterminded a
thwarted coup in Bahrain. 200 Al-Mudarrisi’s revolutionary projects exemplified the
broader approach of the Shirazists, which centered on mass mobilization and political
violence. 201 Elsewhere, Shirazist branches conducted assassinations and insurrections in
Iraq and Saudi Arabia. While no evidence exists to link the Guard directly to Shirazist
plots, the shared goal of spreading an Islamic Revolution to Shi’i communities and the
organizational association between the two suggest an intimate partnership in which the
Guard played an influential role. Without a network of its own to export the Iranian
revolution, the Guard relied on those enamored of Khomeini’s vision of a region
revolutionized along the principles of true Islam. However, the symbiosis abruptly ended
in the late 1980s due to the rising popularity of moderate leaders, chiefly Rafsanjani, and
a falling out between Khomeini and al-Shirazi. 202 Toward the end of the Iraq war,
Rafsanjani formed a pact of sorts with Khamenei and Khomeini. The triumvirate ousted
Ayatollah Montazeri, whom had been Khomeini’s heir apparent as the supreme leader
and the Shirazists’ lifeline to the regime, and dissolved the Office of Liberation
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Movements. In response to Rafsanjani’s gestures of goodwill toward Iran’s neighbors,
the Gulf countries, and Bahrain in particular, made it a condition that Iran close Shirazist
fronts. 203 Rafsanjani obliged them and the activists’ personal facilities, including their
houses, cars, offices, etc. were confiscated. 204 The Shirazist-Guard partnership, though,
had caused lasting damage to the reputation of the central government.
The power shift in Iran complemented a process of “autonomization,” by which
transnational networks of Shi’i activists turned away from Tehran in the prudent pursuit
of strengthening their legitimacy in Arab states. The more transnational Shi’i networks
established branches and accrued local audiences, the less likely they were to respond to
an Iranian solicitation that would contradict their domestic interests, and the more likely
they were to use Iran than be used by it. 205 The transnational nature of clerical networks
has not prevented constituents from developing national identities and platforms. For
example, the Shirazists in contemporary Saudi Arabia now systematically downplay the
scope of their past relationship with Tehran in order to appear as a legitimate political
actor to the Saudi regime and people. 206 They have rewritten the history of their role in
Saudi uprisings in November 1979 so as to decouple their decision-making from that of
their supporters in Iran. 207 The failure of uprisings and subversive and terrorist acts to
embolden the revolutionary spirit of the oppressed changed expectations of whether the
Islamic Republic could engender an anti-imperialism, transnational movement. The
clerical networks recognized a higher likelihood of success in working within national
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limits and addressing national problems via Islam. The Iranians likewise stopped
exporting the revolution in the genuine sense of the word. Their policies still derived
from revolutionary principles but did not in and of themselves pursue those principles.
Iranian policy became aimed at concrete strategic and political goals but was legitimated
by revolutionary ideology and often couched in its terms.
Iran still selectively roused revolutionary feelings abroad after the demise of
extreme radicals and the Office of Liberation Movements. One of the more salient
examples concerned armed Iranian pilgrims rioting in Mecca during the 1987 Hajj
season. By the Saudi estimate, the clashes led to the death of 275 Iranians, 42 pilgrims
from other countries, and 85 Saudi policemen and the injury of over 600; Iran claimed
600 of its pilgrims killed and 4500 injured. 208 A contingent of several thousand
Revolutionary Guards spearheaded the disturbance, according to non-Iranian
eyewitnesses and Saudi officials. 209 They aimed to take control of the entrances to the
Grand Mosque to hoist portraits of Khomeini and distribute leaflets condemning
America, the Eastern bloc, and Iraq. Witnesses recounted in horror how thousands of
Iranians blocked pilgrims from leaving or entering the mosque and beat, stabbed, or
clubbed anyone who objected to their demonstration. 210 Khomeini had addressed the
Iranian pilgrims days before their departure and blessed their agitations, “Expressing
hatred for blasphemers, which is one of the requirements of the Haj, must be carried out
through demonstrations and marches.” 211 The speech was then repeatedly broadcast to
the Mecca compound housing the Iranians up until the disturbance. In conjunction with
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the rioting, Saudi Arabia arrested scores of Guards posing as pilgrims and trying to
smuggle weapons and explosives into Mecca. As a result of the conflagration, Iran
boycotted the Hajj season in Saudi Arabia for two years and severed diplomatic ties.
The Guard incited the pilgrims and escalated tensions in support of Khomeini’s
principle of hostility to the Islam of imperialism. From a policy perspective, however, the
incident sent a shockwave against the center of Saddam Hussein’s chief economic
supporter of the war. Iran demonstrated its power to impose instability on Hussein’s
supporters. Speaking on the officially designated “day of hatred” against the US,
Rafsanjani told demonstrators, “We have no doubt that this massacre was undertaken at
America's behest in response to its repeated humiliations in the gulf…We, as soldiers of
God and implementers of divine principles, oblige ourselves to avenge these martyrs by
uprooting Saudi rulers from the region.” 212 In the corridors of a hospital treating victims
of the Hajj violence, the Guard conveyed a more revealing message. Its consolatory
banners read, “Iranian pilgrims this year have gained the respect of the revolution through
giving their blood and their lives on their Muslim fellows all over the world.” 213 In this
sentence revolution takes on a transnational meaning, transcending the vicissitudes of the
Iranian national experience. Revolutionary martyrdom is an undertaking conceived for
the sake of all Muslims and the sacrifice of Iranians is a means to the grander, panIslamic end. The zeal to enact this revolution, however, was limited mostly to Iranians.
The cause may have purported to be universal, but in reality, it asserted through violence
a peculiarly Iranian interpretation of Islam.
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In orchestrating a violent response to the “unprovoked” bloodshed in Mecca, the
Guard showed a remarkable level of independent control over Iran’s foreign affairs.
According to one Iranian diplomat, Iranian Foreign Ministry officials called in Kuwaiti
and Saudi diplomats immediately after the Mecca violence and warned that something
was about to happen to their embassies in Tehran the next day, but that the ministry was
powerless to stop it. 214 As forecasted by the diplomat, mobs sacked both embassies,
killing one Saudi diplomatic official and sowing doubt among foreign diplomats about
who sets foreign policy for the government. 215 A witness said he saw a few of those
ransacking the Kuwaiti Embassy give orders to uniformed Guard officers directing the
crowds. 216 This can be interpreted as a sign that those doing the ransacking were
themselves higher-ranking Guards, meaning the decision to sack the embassies was, like
the Hajj episode, premeditated, hence the warning from the Foreign Ministry, and came
from high up the Guard’s chain of command. The warning displayed the Foreign
Ministry’s opposition to the Guard, which probably instigated the anti-Saudi violence
under the aegis of Khamenei, or perhaps unilaterally. Informants told the Washington
Post around the time of the rioting that Guard units could decide on actions to provoke
conflict in the Persian Gulf without a deliberate decision at the top in Tehran, where,
according to diplomats, the desire is to avoid hostilities if possible. 217
The top decision-makers in Tehran, however, typically do not agree or cooperate
on policies any better than the Foreign Ministry and the Guard did in 1987. To the
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surprise of the nation, Prime Minister Mir-Hossein Mousavi suddenly resigned from
office September 6, 1988. In an exchange of letters between himself and then-president
Khamenei, former Prime Minister Mir-Hossein Mousavi explained his reasons for
resigning. 218 The private letters were obtained in Tehran and released to the British
Broadcasting Company—Mousavi subsequently denied their authenticity while
Khamenei did not comment. Under the heading of “making the government powerless in
foreign policy,” Mousavi bemoaned the large volume of foreign policies deliberated and
executed in disregard to his personage. In reference to the Guard’s involvement in
Lebanon, he wrote, “When a machine gun goes off in the streets of Beirut and there is
news of it everywhere, then I hear about it.” With respect to the Hajj disturbance, he
wrote “After explosives are found in the luggage of our pilgrims, I get to know about
it…Unfortunately, with all its harmful effects, such operations are being continued every
hour and minute in the name of the government.” Mousavi painted a shadowy picture of
the decision-making behind Iranian foreign policy. The mentioned anecdotes all involved
the Guard. Mousavi insinuated that Rafsanjani and Khamenei together steered these
covert policies. He wrote, “Today, the affairs of Lebanon, Iraq and Afghanistan are in
your hands.” To speak of “Iranian goals,” such as Lebanon or now Syria, one runs the
risk of wrongly imputing the Iranian government with consensus. More often than not, it
appears that certain institutions aligned with individual politicians define Iranian aims at
variance with other institutions under other political patronage.
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Lebanon appealed to Iranian revolutionaries before and after 1979 as a place to
transplant Islamic Revolution. Many Guard leaders were, in fact, shaped by the milieu of
Lebanese militants and Palestinian guerillas in Lebanon prior to the revolution. A slew of
the Guard’s founders spent time fighting, training, or doing both in Lebanon before the
revolution. For example, in his memoirs, Rahim Safavi recounts having trained at a
Palestinian camp in Syria in the winter of 1978, where he learned “partisan warfare
techniques” that included demolition techniques and the use of chemicals. 219 After a
month of training, Safavi traveled to Lebanon to the Fatah camp in Nabatia and fought
Israeli forces at the Litani frontlines. 220 Mohsen Rafighdoost, who served as minister of
the Guard throughout the 1980s and played a crucial role in its founding, trained in the
Beqaa valley of Lebanon with the PLO. 221 The two heads of the Office of Liberation
Movements, Mohammed Montazeri and Mehdi Hashemi, also trained in the PLO
camps. 222 The Office administered Iranian support to guerillas and revolutionaries
throughout the region; as early as December 1979, Mohammed Montazeri led two to
three hundred “volunteers” to southern Lebanon to meet up with the PLO and fight
against the Israelis. 223 According to Mohsen Rafighdoost, Montazeri was the first person
to propose the creation of the Guard. 224 With the ascendance of these Iranian
revolutionaries to a state apparatus, the Guard found fertile ground in Lebanon’s
unremitting turmoil to cultivate a proxy actor at once responsive to Lebanon’s unique
crises and loyal to Tehran. The country was a logical destination for a revolutionary
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expedition. Lebanon is home to a sizable and historically “dispossessed” Shi’i
population, fragile or failed governments, adjacent to a friendly state in Syria, and it abuts
the borders of Palestine and Israel. This last consideration particularly lured the Guard,
since fighting against Israel struck at the foundation of an anti-Islamic, imperialist plot.
Khomeini expressed this opinion in a 1978 speech,
The imperialist states, like America and Britain, brought Israel into existence, and
we have seen what misery they have inflicted on the Muslim peoples by means of
Israel, and what crimes they are now committing against the Muslims, particularly
the Shi’a. In Lebanon they install one agent and reduce the country to its present
miserable state, and in Egypt they install another, by the name of Sadat, whose
every act is devoted to serve imperialism. A short time ago he went to Israel and
gave Israel official recognition…The Shah of Iran also says it is necessary to
make peace with Israel. In fact, this wretch recognized Israel twenty years ago” 225
Khomeini’s invectives tied the mere act of recognizing Israel to imperialism, a principle
which has bound future Iranian leaders to a rejectionist position. Building a military
presence on the border with Israel was also expedient geopolitically, as it enabled Iran to
menace a key enemy and US client.
The strategic and ideological opportunity at hand in Lebanon precipitated the
coming of a highly driven attaché of Guardsmen. Before their entrance into Lebanon
though, the Guard had dispatched some five thousand soldiers to Syria in anticipation of
a confrontation with the Israeli Defense Force (IDF). 226 Dozens of Guard commanders
affirmed their readiness to fight Israel in a communiqué to the Syrian president,
Despite the war which Zionism and the United States have imposed on us through
their confidant, Saddam the infidel, who is daily shelling and bombarding our
towns and villages killing our innocent men, women and children, we ask our
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brother Hafiz al-Asad who is a believer and a head of a Muslim nation to permit
us to travel to the Golan in order to fight the Zionist enemy at the side of Syrian
brothers. 227
Notably, the willingness to open a completely new and unpromising front parallel with
the war then engulfing Iran signaled the Guard’s dedication to transnational Islam at the
grave and admitted expense of national security. Despite this intention, by the time the
Guardsmen arrived, the fighting between Assad and Israel had ended. 228 The cessation of
Syria-Israeli fighting did not, however, deter 1,500 Guardsmen, drawn mainly from the
Office of Liberation Movements, from spreading their doctrine of revolutionary
resistance to Lebanon. The residual contingent established a base of operations on the
outskirts of Zabadani, a Syrian town also bordering Lebanon. 229 Guard cadres trickled
discreetly from Syria into Baalbek, in the Beqaa Valley, to germinate the core group that
formed Hizbullah.
The Guard’s presence seemed to transform the town into an Iranian satellite
almost overnight. Huge, eye-catching murals appeared on walls depicting Shi’i motifs
like Imam Hussein in the blood-splattered sands of Karbala, or Khomeini gazing intently
at the al-Aqsa mosque in Jerusalem, and Iranian flags fluttered alongside banners touting
“Death to America.” 230 The Guard assisted, if not commissioned entirely, the public
outreach as it plastered Khomeini’s revolutionary slogans around town and put up posters
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of veiled women to exhibit conservative Shi’i social tenets. 231 Clerics employed by the
Guard taught classes on the Qur’an and Khomeini’s theories of Islam. 232 The town
quickly embraced these messages; its main square was renamed after Khomeini and
women began to wear the Iranian style black chador. 233 Hizbullah leader Hasan Nasrallah
attested to the intensity of this campaigning, noting that he and his compatriots spent all
their energies that first year—instead of fighting—recruiting young men, adding about
two thousand to its ranks, and educating the public about the holy struggle against Israel
and the West. 234 The Guard set up its first training camp in a valley near Janta. Guard
instructors taught weapons handling, delivered religious instruction, and oversaw fitness
regimens. 235 In the military portion of training, recruits learned how to operate basic
weapons such as the AK-47 rifle, light machine guns, and rocket-propelled grenades, and
how to plant land mines and move stealthily through rugged terrain. 236 By the third wave
of recruits, the Guard delegated basic fitness training to the Lebanese, but still supervised
the other courses. 237 Promising recruits were sent to Iran for three-month advanced
courses—a training tactic faithfully repeated with Shi’i militants from the fray of the
Syrian civil war. 238 Iran offered safe, surveillance-free grounds for training in larger-scale
weapons systems such as artillery rockets or anti-aircraft weapons. Advanced recruits
usually travelled to Damascus, and then flew to Tehran before being bussed to one of
several training camps run by the Guard’s Quds Force near Karaj, Isfahan, Qom, or
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Tehran. Once Hizbullah acquired the requisite expertise, it could appoint as trainers its
own men, who shared the same cultural background and language as the recruits.
Iran’s ambassador to Syria, Ali Akbar Mohtashemi, played a principal role in
assisting the Guard’s creation of Hizbullah. In later years, Mohtashemi would voice the
contentious positions shared by that eminently ideological faction of the Guard associated
with Hizbullah. In 1983, he allegedly conducted suicide truck bombings against the US
marine barracks at Beirut airport and the French paratroop headquarters in southern
Beirut on October 23, which killed 241 American servicemen and 58 French soldiers. US
military officer Admiral James Lyons later provided testimony that incriminated Iran. He
claimed to have intercepted a message between Tehran and Damascus, in which Iran’s
Ministry of Intelligence Services had directed Mohtashemi to instruct Iranian proxies to
attack multinational forces in Lebanon, and “to take spectacular action against the US
Marines.” 239 At the same trial, evidence was presented that Mohtashemi contacted the
Guard’s commander in Lebanon, Ahmad Kanani, instructing him to instigate the Marine
barracks bombing. According to the testimony of a ranking Hizbullah member, Iranian
personnel assisted in manufacturing a truck in an underground warehouse that looked
identical to the red dodge truck then delivering water to the barracks. During the attack,
the operatives ambushed the real truck and drove their dummy one, laden with
specialized, military-grade explosives, equivalent to 15-21,000 pounds of TNT, into the
center of the US barracks. 240 One of Hizbullah’s now-disaffected founders, Sobhi al-
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Tufayli, later confessed that Hizbullah had planned the attack. 241 The technical and
material sophistication of this attack, as well as Hizbullah’s nearly absolute dependency
on Iran in 1983 suggest Iranian involvement. When the US declined to retaliate for the
attack on the marines, Israel bombed the Guard’s camp at Janta on November 16, killing
twenty-three Revolutionary Guards and a dozen Lebanese recruits. 242
Hizbullah codified its allegiance to revolutionary Iran in a manifesto explaining
its program from 1985. In the opening paragraph, Hizbullah’s leaders professed, “We
obey the orders of one leader, wise and just, that of our tutor and faqih who fulfills all the
necessary conditions: Ruhollah Musawi Khomeini…Our behavior is dictated to us by
legal principles laid down by the light of an overall political conception defined by the
leading jurist (wilayat al-faqih).” 243 The document praised the Iranian revolution, “the
Muslims’ experience in Islamic Iran left no one any excuse since it proved beyond all
doubt that bare chests motivated by faith are capable, with God’s help to break the iron
and oppression of tyrannical regimes.” 244 Hizbullah hewed to Khomeini’s revolutionary
vision. It stressed the need for all the oppressed to “form an international front that
encompasses all their liberation movements,” and proclaimed “Islam alone is capable of
being the idea to resist aggression.” 245 Hizbullah’s objectives reiterated the chief
objective of Islamic Revolution, that is, the eradication of imperialism. Hizbullah
declared itself in “a state of ever-escalating confrontation” until it achieved the objectives
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of “Israel’s final departure from Lebanon,” as a “prelude” to its obliteration, and of “The
final departure of America, France and their allies in Lebanon and the termination of the
influence of any imperialist power in the country.” 246
The Islamic Republic had created a satellite revolution that mirrored the agenda of
the Islamic Revolution. Hizbullah founder Sobhi al-Tufayli recalled the distinctly
transnational flavor of Hizbullah’s early period, “We wanted to…be independent and not
have specific influences on the Lebanese scene. We wanted it to be completely dependent
on Islamic law and not influenced by nationalist ideologies.” 247 Hizbullah’s unreserved
commitment to Khomeini separated it from most other Shi’i militant or activist groups,
who supported Islamic Revolution, but followed an independent marja’iyya. The use of
Hizbullah in future years to designate pro-Iranian Shi’i political currents in the Arab
peninsula encapsulated this distinction. Hizbullah has become a catchall label for groups
of foreign Shi’i militants obsequious to Iran’s supreme leader. The usage does not always
refer to a structured organization and may simply encompass individuals who view the
Islamic Republic as an ideal model of government and follow the marja’iyya of the
supreme leader. In the words of a “Hizbullah” figure in Bahrain, “Hizbullah is a concept
in Bahrain and an organization in Kuwait and Saudi Arabia.” 248 Shi’i dissidents in
Bahrain accuse their government of promoting the myth of a cohesive Bahraini Hizbullah
organization in order to traduce popular and legitimate uprisings. 249 As one Gulf
Hizbullah member noted, “Hizbullah does not follow the Islamic Republic, it follows the
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wali al-Faqih. It does not follow the President, it follows the Supreme Guide.” 250 The
identification of the Guard with the supreme leader imparts it legitimacy with which it
can lead Lebanese Hizbullah and Gulf Hizbullah cells in operations independent from
other branches of government.
In light of Hizbullah’s ideological and material dependence on Iran, its
extraterritorial forays into Iraq and Syria are likely coordinated and directed by the
Guard. In Syria, for example, Hizbullah has justified its intervention in terms of
preventing the nearby violence from spilling over into Lebanon. In September 2013,
Reuters cited “regional security officials” who estimated that Lebanese Hizbullah was
committing some 2,000-4,000 fighters to Syria. 251 The types of units have included “elite
and special forces” and “reservists” and have engaged in a range of missions, from
training for regime regular and irregular forces to directing and advising combat
operations. They, along with Guard and Quds agents, have prevented al-Assad’s collapse.
Hizbullah’s actions have also invited sectarian bloodletting and political retributions into
Lebanon and stretched the country’s social fabric. Hizbullah’s intensive assistance to the
Assad government reflects its narrow tactical dependency on the Iran-Syria axis for
missiles and supplies. The Syrian war has highlighted its tactical insecurities and forced
the party to reaffirm a pro-Tehran stance. During the 2000s, Hizbullah’s political wing
toned down its ideological links to Iran. In its 2006 memorandum of understanding with
Michel Aoun, the organization stated that “consensual democracy” remains the
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“fundamental basis for governance.” 252 Paying more homage to nationalist ideas
(democracy) improved Hizbullah’s working relationships with other sects, particularly
the Christians, but also distanced it from Tehran’s orbit. Hizbullah’s controversial
decision to intervene in the Syrian war has reversed this gradual integration into the
Lebanese political scene and repolarized Lebanon’s sects.
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Chapter Four: The Rise of Pragmatism

The split between Rafsanjani and the Guard over whether to end the war
foreshadowed future discord. Rafsanjani, who defined his presidency on the basis of
pragmatism, recognized that Iran’s economic straits and hefty geopolitical challenges
after the war necessitated a change in strategy. He sought to reduce surrounding states’
economic and strategic hostility toward Iran in order to facilitate the country’s postwar
reconstruction. The rhetoric and policy of revolutionary posturing only exacerbated the
sense of insecurity of the US and its allies. States that actively opposed the US vision of
order found themselves with less leverage than ever and less ability to organize in
nonaligned alliances. Opposition to the US now branded a state as rogue more likely than
nonaligned. Without the Soviet Union to counterbalance against it, the US could more
easily ordain security in the Middle East as it saw fit. Unfortunately for Iran, the US still
deeply mistrusted the Islamic Republic. Rather than contract the responsibility for
security to it, the US designed a system to contain it. President Bill Clinton initiated a
policy of “dual containment” to isolate and sanction Iran and Iraq. US Presidents also
invested heavily in the military capabilities of the conservative Gulf States to balance
them against Iran and Iraq. As these states received ballooning sums of US military
support, Iran’s security situation would increasingly deteriorate. The Soviet collapse also
vindicated the American ideology of free-markets and liberal democracy and left the US
unchallenged to spread it. The fall of the “iron curtain” suddenly imparted a worldwide
reach to the liberal order led by the US and formerly confined mostly to Western Europe
and Japan. The greater potential for US values to diffuse across the world amplified the
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fear among conservatives that Iran would fall victim to cultural onslaught from the West.
These structural changes, though slow, uneven, and ongoing, coincided with a new era in
the history of the Islamic Republic. The ceasefire with Iraq, and the ambiguous legacy
imparted by Khomeini’s death in 1989, prompted the regime to question how it could
best preserve itself and its principles.
Revolutionary pragmatists such as Rafsanjani and Khatami clashed with radicals
over how to adapt Iran to post-Iraq and post-Cold War realities. Pragmatists put national
interests far ahead of revolutionary ones. Rafsanjani sought to subjugate Iran’s radical
aspirations to the “normal” functions of the state. Pragmatists believed in strengthening
Iran’s geopolitical position by combatting its reputation as a pariah state. A normalized
image of the country would hopefully stimulate trade opportunities with the outside
world and reduce military tensions with Gulf States and the US. Rafsanjani toned down
Iranian rhetoric and soon declared, “Iran must stop making enemies” and refrain from
intervening in the internal affairs of others. 253 Rafsanjani ended the practices, such as
calling upon oppressed Muslim populations to revolt, which deleteriously affected Iran
state-to-state relations. In November 1989, his government organized a major
international conference entitled “The Persian Gulf” and announced a new foreign policy
toward the Gulf of solidarity and peaceful coexistence. 254 He and Khatami, loosely
following a policy of détente, ceased actions that agitated the regional order and
expressed an interest in cooperating with the US as equals. Their policy tacitly accepted
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the impotency of the Islamic Revolution to redraw the political order of the Middle East.
If anything, they hoped to manifest the ideals of the revolution in the state and prove the
success of an Islamic model of government, rather than actively export it. Khamenei
backed this shift as well, proclaiming in 1993 that Iran’s struggle against oppression “has
turned the Islamic Republic into a role model for which the world has respect.” 255 This
shift drew the ire of old guard radicals.
The most hardened radicals, like the cleric Ali Akbar Mohtashami, stayed
virulently suspicious of US policy and highly doubted the efficacy of détente to ease
tensions with the outside world. In Iran, two arguments permeate the discourse on
national security. One posits that greater neutrality toward regional and world adversaries
will eventually cause outside powers to stop viewing Iran as a threat. The other posits the
opposite conclusion to such a policy. This latter argument assumes the enemies of the
Islamic Republic oppose Islam and therefore will not stop opposing Iran until its regime
changes. They fear that America and Israel will not stop containing Iran until they reduce
it back to the despicable patron-client relationship of the Shah’s era. In this sense, if Iran
does anything short of projecting and demonstrating formidable strength against its
enemies, it might as well auction off its hard-earned independence. The argument equates
détente with weakness and stresses the ideological conflict between the US and Iran over
the geopolitical one. The US policy of containment, already fraught with illogic,
handicapped the rise of pragmatists. 256 It confirmed the antithesis of the argument put
forward by the pragmatists; namely, that the US would oppose Iran irrespective of
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changes to its external behavior, and perhaps even oppose it more vehemently. The
Guard leadership seemed to waver between these two arguments. Certain leaders
endorsed the pragmatic agenda, while others did at first and then did not after it failed to
bear fruit. By the end of Khatami’s first term, the Guard evinced its opposition to the
reformist bloc, which had more or less allied with the pragmatists. The pragmatist
approach had failed in foreign affairs and appeared uncomfortably close to the reform
movement. These associations ruined its image in the Guard leadership and the Guard
proceeded to counter the progressive forces in Iranian society.
Rafsanjani attempted to control the Guard’s radical impulses after Khomeini’s
passing by integrating it with the army. During the war, the Guard had exercised fully
independent command and control and established its own network of military
workshops, research facilities, and factories, distinct from the regular army. 257 President
Rafsanjani and his cohort of technocrats rationalized the sprawling system of weapons
development and manufacture in 1989 by abolishing the Guard’s independent ministry
and replacing it with the Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics
(MODAFL). 258 MODAFL coordinates Iran’s military-industrial complex and plans the
budgets of the two armed forces. The Guard circumvented Rafsanjani’s reform by
gaining control of an important charitable foundation and by dominating the new
ministry. Mohsen Rafighdoost, who led the Guard Ministry from its inception to
dissolution, became head of the Oppressed and Disabled Foundation in 1989, which is
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now the second largest company in Iran, behind only the state-owned National Iranian
Oil Company. The foundation continued to fund Guard enterprises in place of the Guard
Ministry and its overseas franchises served as fronts for Guard operations. 259 However, in
order to safeguard his integration effort, Rafsanjani appointed Akbar Torkan head of
MODAFL. Torkan was seen as a pragmatic, he had formerly held a significant position in
the army’s Defense Industries Organization (DIO) and was an engineer by training. 260
One of Torkan’s first actions was to centralize weapons procurement and logistical
command. 261 1995 legislation supportive of Rafsanjani’s policies clarified that military
equipment impossible to produce domestically must be purchased from abroad
exclusively through MODAFL, a direct challenge to the Guard’s practice of cultivating
foreign military-to-military relations independent of the army. 262 The centralization of
supply, logistics, and command in the Iranian military hypothetically reduced the Guard’s
freedom to formulate its own strategy significantly.
The Guard asserted control of MODAFL when Rafsanjani’s presidency ended and
has retained it more or less since then. Every head of MODAFL since Akbar Torkan has
made his career through the Guard. 263 From 2009-2013, former Quds Commander
Ahmad Vahidi, who incidentally was implicated in the 1994 bombing of a Buenos Aires
Jewish center, led the organization. Brigadier General Mostafa Mohammad, who
managed MODAFL from 2005-2009, served in Lebanon among other positions. Major
General Ali Shamkhani led MODAFL from 1997-2005 and rose to prominence as a
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Guard commander in the Iran-Iraq war and later concurrently led the Guard and army
navies. The current head of MODAFL is Brigadier General Hossein Dehghan, whom
Rouhani selected after reportedly having his initial pick, a pragmatist named Hossein
Alaei, rejected by Khamenei. Like all his predecessors, Dehghan joined the Guard shortly
after the revolution and served in various distinguished leadership roles. In 1982, for
example, he deployed to the Levant to command the Guard’s Lebanon and Syria
contingents for two years. 264 Dehghan later served as Shamkhani’s deputy in MODAFL
for six years under the Khatami administration. 265 Analysts see him as more pragmatic
than his predecessor, Vahidi, and as representing a conservative compromise between
pragmatic-minded elements of the Rouhani administration and regime stalwarts. The
Guard has monopolized control of MODAFL in order to support its foreign policy aims.
In 2007, the US sanctioned MODAFL for its role in procuring centrifuges and leading
ballistic missile research, development, and production. 266 The Treasury Department
more recently charged a chain of companies linked to MODAFL with providing the
Syrian government fuel, fuses, charges, aluminum, and other goods necessary for the
production of mortar projectiles, rockets, and missiles—weapons which have been used
on Syrian civilians. 267
Rafsanjani attempted to further mesh the Guard and army in 1992 when he
merged them under the Armed Forces Joint Staff (also known as the General Staff of the
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Combined Armed Forces), which made the Guard commander hypothetically subordinate
to the joint staff chief. Decision-making in Iran, however, rarely adheres to the form it
takes in legislation. Personal connections and reputations influence policymaking much
more than do formal chains of command. Major decisions require consensus and, most
importantly, the approval of the faqih. The Guard needs only to brandish its ideological
credentials to bypass figures such as Akbar Torkan who have nominal control over
organizational facets of the Guard. Iranian political analyst Wilfried Buchta argued that
although the Guard commander is theoretically subordinate to the Joint Staff, he has
always functioned independently of it. 268 He understood the creation of the Joint Staff as
primarily a way to control the regular army, whose highest-ranking officer had been
under the command of the Joint Staff Chief Hassan Firouzabadi since 1995. Firouzabadi,
who fought as a Guard commander during the war, is still the joint staff chief.
Firouzabadi maintains a radical tenor, in harmony with the Guard’s ideological
principles. As recently as May 2012, he publicly insisted that “The Iranian nation is
standing for its cause that is the full annihilation of Israel” and that threats and sanctions
would not deter the Islamic Republic from “its revolutionary causes and ideals.” 269
Firouzabadi does not appear interested in denaturing the Guard or in acting out of step
with the wider Guard leadership. The May 2000 resignation of commander-in-chief of
the regular army Ali Shahbazi-Zolqadr illuminated the extent of Firouzabadi’s slant
toward the Guard. Shahbazi disagreed with Firouzabadi’s hawkish anticipation of
escalating border clashes with Iraq and his tolerance of the Guard’s encroachment into
268

Wilfried Buchta, Who rules Iran? : the structure of power in the Islamic Republic (Washington: The
Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 2000), 147.
269
Rachel Hirshfeld, “Iranian Commander Reiterates Need to Annihilate ‘Zionist Regime’,” Israel
National News, May 21, 2012.

90

duties designated to the army. 270 The London daily added that Shahbazi disagreed with
MODAFL Minister Ali Shamkhani about favoritism for the Guard, and he demanded that
a greater proportion of the defense budget be allocated to the regular military. 271 The
Guard appeared in tight control of positions that Rafsanjani intended to be impartial and
professional.
To complement the creation of the Joint Staff in 1992, Iran passed the “Complete
Regulations of the Islamic Republic of Iran Armed Forces,” which codified the principles
of Iran’s military doctrine. The regulations defined the goals of Iran’s postwar security
doctrine as protecting the independence, territorial integrity, and regional interests of the
regime, the regime itself, and “Muslim or oppressed nations that are not hostile to
Islam.” 272 The regulations enumerated the general conditions of military employment,
which apply to both the regular army and the Guard. The first three conditions of
employment are, in descending order of importance, “belief in the religion of Islam;”
citizenship; and, “Faith in the Islamic revolution and the regime of the Islamic Republic
and readiness to self-sacrifice to achieve their goals.” 273 The first condition makes clear
that religion serves as the unit of loyalty in the Iranian armed forces, above citizenship.
The third condition reinforces that point and the list does not explicitly include loyalty to
the Iranian nation-state, although having faith in the Islamic regime implies this. The
overall point of these conditions is to elevate the Islamic qualities of Iran above its
national qualities, so that its soldiers love Iran for its dedication to Islam, rather loving
270
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Iran in and of itself. The effect of these conditions presumably helps preserve the state.
Loving Islam necessarily means placing loyalty in the Islamic Republic, because
according to its idealized image, the Islamic Republic embodies the will of God. Military
competency was also linked with “spiritual discipline stemming from the belief and faith
of the personnel,” a theme expanded on in the regulations for the Guard. 274
Employment conditions for the Guard exceed the general conditions in their
religious stringency. The employment regulation for the Guard declares as its first three
conditions “Belief in the principles of pure Mohammadan Islam, the Islamic revolution,
and the regime of the Islamic Republic;” “Belief in and practical obligation to religious
guardianship;” and, “Practical obligation to observe Islamic laws and the laws of the
Islamic Republic and observance of Islamic moral standards.” 275 This set of conditions
requires Guard cadres to follow Islamic laws more seriously than their army counterparts
and strives to distinguish them by testing them against higher moral and religious
standards. If higher religious devotion logically equals higher loyalty to the state, then the
Guard outstrips the army in regime fealty. These regulations conferred on the Guard a
special religious and revolutionary status; “Official guards refers to the personnel who are
employed by the Guard Corps to fight on the path of God and for the guarding and armed
defense of the Islamic revolution, its gains, and the regime of the Islamic Republic of
Iran.” 276 Later in the regulations, the Guard is made responsible for publishing (hardline)
journals, holding training camps, field trips, and short instructional courses “in order to
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strengthen the ideological-political training perspective” of its members. 277 The process
of demilitarization after the war clearly preserved the duality in Iran’s armed forces,
imbuing the Guard with a heavily ideological quality and upholding the army’s
professional characteristics. This most basic ideological-professional difference was also
reflected in the division of labor between the two.
The regulations revealed the principles undergirding the armed forces as a whole
and the duties that differentiate the Guard and army. In defining the “principles and basic
characteristics of the Armed Forces,” the regulations enumerate “Being Islamic” first.
They then expound this:
In organizing and equipping the Armed Forces, the precept is Islamic ideology.
All aspects and dimensions are governed by religious rules and regulations. The
Armed Forces have as their duty the ideological mission of holy war [jihad] in the
path of God, following the moral principles of Islam, and respect for the human
dignity of individuals. 278
The list ends with the principle of defense, which is defined as defending against any sort
of aggression against the country, punishing and suppressing the aggressor, and “while
believing in the principle of nonaggression help Muslim nations or the oppressed nations
that are not hostile to Islam in self defense.” 279 This principle accords with the Shi’i
doctrine of jihad, which legitimizes military means for the defense, not offense, of Islam.
As it was during the Iran-Iraq war, self-defense is yet again defined religiously rather
than territorially. Affronts to Islam as much as national threats warrant Iranian military
action that to the Western observer looks more like an act of intervention given its extraterritorial dimensions. The regulations define the central mission of the army as
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confronting any military aggression against the “independence, territorial integrity, and
regime…or the interests of the country,” but also includes as its tertiary mission
“Readiness to cooperate with the Guard Corps in helping Muslim nations and oppressed
nations who are not hostile to Islam in the world to defend themselves against military
threat and aggression.” 280 This presents a dichotomy assigning the duty of national
defense to the army and the duty of Islamic “defense” to the Guard. The regulations
demonstrate that despite Rafsanjani’s reforms, the Guard managed to remain an
ideological organization with legal authority to pursue an Islamic foreign policy agenda,
whereby it could defend oppressed Muslims or peoples outside of Iran’s border.
The substantively weak outcome of Rafsanjani’s reform means the Guard
probably put up a significant fight against the president. The Kuwaiti press reported two
assassination attempts by the Guard against Rafsanjani in January and June of 1990—
these reports can be neither confirmed nor refuted. 281 They appear plausible at least in the
context of the Guard’s other designs against Rafsanjani. In the years following the war,
the Guard supported his internal political opponents, rejected his push for integration, and
exported the revolution in contradiction with his efforts to normalize the Islamic
Republic’s foreign relations. It stayed stubbornly active in Lebanon and branched off to a
lesser extent in Sudan in 1990. 282 Two years after the ceasefire, the Guard and regular
Navy Commander, Ali Shamkhani, nearly embroiled Iran in another conflict when he
threatened to prevent Iraqi warships from sailing in the Persian Gulf. 283 The threat came
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amid Rafsanjani’s concerted effort to advance a final peace settlement with Iraq.
Notwithstanding these radical positions, the Guard demonstrated increased pragmatism
more generally.
In matters that elicited an ideological response, but at the immense peril of
national security, the Guard sided with the interests of the state. When the US targeted
Iraq for its invasion of Kuwait in the Gulf War, the Guard agreed with Rafsanjani’s
pragmatic approach, as it had during the Iran-Contra affair. The revolutionary principle of
anti-Americanism dictated a violent reaction to the entry of US forces into the Persian
Gulf. Iran and Iraq could have coordinated a punishing counterattack to the US invasion;
indeed, Hussein implored his former enemies to do so. Either country possessed the
military resources to close the Strait of Hormuz, which would have hindered the
deployment of an expeditionary army to the Arabian Peninsula, and wreak havoc on GCC
ports and merchant ships. A stinging attack on US forces and economic interests may
have deterred the US from establishing beachheads in the Persian Gulf and accomplished
the goal of expelling US forces from Iran’s vicinity. Ayatollah Mohtashami voiced this
perspective. He demanded a vigorous anti-American response, calling for attacks by
Muslim forces on foreign ships in the Gulf as well as on the palaces of the ruling royal
families in the region. 284 He suggested “we must take advantage of Muslim animosity to
the US” to execute plans “for violent confrontation,” and declared, “From this moment,
we must begin to prepare for holy war against the United States.” Mohtashemi blamed
the US for aspiring “to expand and consolidate” its hold on the region and “to gain
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complete political, economic, and cultural sway over the Islamic countries of the Middle
East.” 285 Mohtashami did not spare Hussein his vitriol either, but he emphasized that
preventing the US from physically establishing itself “in the wake of the crushing of
Iraq” mattered most. Majles Speaker Mehdi Karrubi added that the deployment of forces
in the Gulf “aimed to confront the smashing waves of the Islamic revolution, weaken
resistance of Hizbullah forces in the world, and stabilize the balance of power in the
interest of the Zionist[s].” 286
The ideological soundness of this anti-US position certainly appealed to the most
radical currents in the Guard and even impelled some to undertake rogue action. As
Washington deployed troops to Kuwait and Saudi Arabia in preparation for conflict,
mutinous units of the Guard, allegedly with the blessing of Ahmad Khomeini, attempted
to launch missile attacks against coalition forces to embroil Iran into the war. Rezai
ordered other loyal Guards to rush to the missile battery at Khorramshahr to prevent the
firing of the missiles. 287 While this action would have satisfied radical principles, it could
well have spelled out doom for the Iranian state. The US was at the height of its power in
1991, and could easily and perhaps gladly have dealt the Islamic Republic a lethal blow.
In this case, pragmatism ensured the survival of the state. Only the most radical
revolutionaries could endorse decisions that jeopardized the state, and, by extension, the
basis of their revolution. This faction has never been powerful enough to influence
decision-making in matters of crucial national security. Years later, however, Rafsanjani
fell out of favor with Khamenei and Guard leaders. In the summer of 1994, a blistering
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power struggle roiled underneath the surface. Rafsanjani’s initiatives to soften the radical
image of the Islamic Republic had over-extended into the Guard. Guard leaders
reportedly purged some 4,000 officers who composed a pro-Rafsanjani faction. 288 The
unprecedented decision followed months of unrest and strengthened the relationship
between Khamenei and senior Guard leaders, unified by ideology, outlook, and mutual
suspicion of the self-aggrandizing Rafsanjani.
Rafsanjani lost favor among the political elite because his shift in policy did not
manifest any marked improvements in Iran’s international standing. Khamenei allowed
Rafsanjani to test the first hypothesis. US policies, however, seemed to discredit it. A
declassified CIA report explaining an uptick in Iranian surveillance of US diplomatic and
military facilities in 1995 cited several US policies that prompted Iran to distrust the
policy of détente. These included a US military buildup in the Gulf in October 1994,
which was intended to counter Iraqi moves, but was misinterpreted by Tehran as a signal
of US opposition to Iran’s stance on the disputed islands of Abu Musa, and Greater and
Lesser Tunb, public statements by the speaker of the house in February 1995 that US
policy should aim at overthrowing the Iranian government together with the introduction
of legislation to tighten sanctions on Iran, the decision in May 1995 to base the US 5th
fleet in Bahrain, and press reports that the US Congress had allocated $20 million for
covert action against Iran. 289 These US policies accelerated the Guard’s opposition to
Rafsanjani’s agenda.
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Near the end of Rafsanjani’s presidency, the Guard initiated a lethal attack against
a high-rise apartment complex housing hundreds of US airmen. In June 1996, Saudi
terrorists loaded 5,000 tons of plastic explosives into a sewage tanker truck and parked
the vehicle outside of the apartment complex. The bomb blast tore a crater 85 feet wide
into the ground and blew out the entire side of the nearest apartment building. The blast
left 19 US airmen dead; the same day, the US blamed Saudi Hizbullah, a pro-Khomeini
terrorist organization with links to the Guard. After a three-year investigation, the US
concluded that the Guard played a direct role in the bombing. The attack reversed the
progress made by Rafsanjani in deconstructing Iran’s reputation in the Gulf as
revolutionary saboteur. Although the attack was obviously aimed at the US and not at
triggering a wave of Shi’i unrest, it signified that Iran, or at least powerful parts of it, still
identified with a radical, violent, anti-US program. Terrorist attacks periodically backed
by Iran have been intended to symbolize the nation’s persistent dedication to
revolutionary principle, even if those responsible represent only a fraction of the overall
state and population. These revolutionary outbursts often disrupt long periods of
pragmatic behavior to prevent the latter from completely enveloping the state, and, as
seen by radicals, from eclipsing the revolution. Neighboring states have mistaken this
strategic incoherence for revolutionary, expansionist designs to control the whole region.
From this perspective, diplomatic overtures look like duplicitous initiatives meant to
disguise the regime’s inextricable goal of revolution.
The court indictment of the defendants in the Khobar Towers bombing implied an
Iranian role but found insufficient evidence to make a direct accusation. Among the 13
indicted, 12 were members of Saudi Hizbullah and one was an unidentified Lebanese
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national. The court document associated two of the Saudis in particular with the Iranian
government. Ali Al-Houri, a major recruiter for Saudi Hizbullah who spoke fluent
Persian, “acted as a liaison for the party with the Iranian embassy in Damascus, Syria,
which was an important source of logistics and support for Saudi Hizbullah members
traveling to and from Lebanon.” 290 Another defendant, Hani Al-Sayegh also actively
recruited young Saudi men and arranged military training in Lebanon and Iran, in
addition to a role in carrying out terrorist attacks. Also fluent in Persian, Al-Sayegh
“enjoyed an unusually close association with certain military elements of the Iranian
government.” 291 The indictment noted that recruiters measured loyalty to Iran and dislike
for the Saudi government as key criteria and used the Sayyeda Zeinab shrine as a place to
meet malcontent Saudi Shi’is. 292
Noticeably, the indictment did not bring any charges against Guard personnel. It
did, however, accuse it of directing Saudi Hizbullah’s surveillance in 1995 of American
sites in eastern Saudi Arabia. 293 In late 1994, a Saudi Hizbullah cell “recognized and
confirmed Khobar Towers as an important American military location.” 294 Soon
thereafter, one of the defendants reported having received a phone call “from a high
Iranian government official inquiring about the progress of their surveillance activity.” 295
The indictment alleges a close level of cooperation between the Iranian government and
Saudi Hizbullah up until the final months leading to the bombing. At that point, the
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Guard effectively obscured yet maintained command of the cell or distanced itself from
the operation without forestalling the attack. Either way, the Guard prepared the Saudi
militants to conduct the attack, providing them resources, training, and intelligence, and
may or may not have actually commissioned it. Around June 1999, President Clinton
wrote a confidential letter to President Khatami in which he professed to have “credible
evidence that members of the [Guard], along with members of Lebanese and Saudi
Hizbullah, were directly involved in the planning and execution of the terrorist
bombing…of the Khobar Towers.” 296 An Iranian source trusted by the White House
divulged that Clinton enclosed with the letter documents and satellite photographs of
terrorists living in Iran, including two leaders of Saudi Hizbullah. 297 The evidence,
however, did not bear out any legal charges against Iranian officials or retaliation.
In the Khobar incidence, the Guard showed internal and external adversaries its
ability to counter the swelling tide of pragmatism inside Iran. Such provocations come
few and far between because of the considerable risk and political costs they incur.
Khamenei and other political patrons support such operations on a strictly limited scale.
Given the likelihood of unacceptable economic and military punishments, Tehran simply
cannot afford to endorse sustained revolutionary behavior. Actions like Khobar are
permitted, especially at moments of acute vulnerability, because they show Iran’s power
to hit at the heart of the sovereign territory of its adversaries. Iran’s reputation for
executing well-planned, dangerous terrorist attacks complements its overall military
doctrine of asymmetric warfare. It wants Israel and the US to know, for example, that a
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strike on its nuclear facilities will be reciprocated by possible terrorist attacks against US
and Israeli targets in the region. Iran’s terrorist operations rely on ideology for purposes
of recruitment and loyalty. But their aim is undoubtedly to pressure or deter enemies—
not to incite revolution. Still, such attacks are ideological insofar as they confront
enemies of the revolution. Anti-US terrorism like the bombings of Khobar and the Beirut
Marine Barracks obviously raise the costs to the US of maintaining a heavy military
presence in the Persian Gulf and often do so without immediately severe consequences.
The revolutionaries responsible for their coordination can understand them as part of a
plan to expel US military forces from the region. Indeed, President Reagan withdrew US
forces from Lebanon a year after the attack, under Congressional pressure directly
attributable to the barracks bombing. Outcomes like this create security voids for Iran to
fill and propagate its revolutionary ideology within.
The leadership of the Guard clarified its political loyalties in reaction to the
election of reformist president Mohammad Khatami. Defining Iran’s revolutionary values
is a fluid and perennially inconclusive process because, after all, the revolutionaries
themselves represented an array of ideologies. The victorious clerical faction founded the
new state according as much as possible, though not completely, to its idiosyncratic
beliefs, which did not necessarily enjoy broad popularity. They hoped to rekindle the
relevance of the umma in the modern political context by using the state to serve
transnational interests of the Muslim community. God intended for Islamic countries to
follow this path all along, but oppressive rulers and wicked akhunds (Muslim clergymen)
have distorted the Prophet Muhammad’s message “to justify acts of tyranny by the
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enemies of God.” 298 In his last will, Khomeini asserted that God sent the Qur’an to the
Prophet Muhammad “to institute the rule of justice and equity and to confer sovereignty
to the Infallible and divine authorities…that they in turn hand over such divine
sovereignty to qualified worthy persons.” 299 In his theoretical tract on Islamic
government, Khomeini explicated the ideal Islamic form of the legislative branch. “In
Islam the legislative power and competence to establish laws belongs exclusively to God
Almighty…It is for this reason that in an Islamic government, a simple planning body
takes the places of the legislative assembly.” 300
The constitution synthesized two divergent lines of thought about the future of
Iran’s political order. The country seemed to waffle between placing sovereignty with
popularly elected legislative and executive bodies, on the one hand, and, on the other, a
single religious authority. The new political order embodied this indecision. The
constitution itself obfuscates the exact locus of Iran’s national sovereignty. Article six,
for example, requires that the affairs of the country be “administered on the basis of
public opinion expressed by the means of election” yet article three establishes
“continuous leadership of the holy persons, possessing the necessary
qualifications…upon all...” The constitution tied legal authority to religion, but also made
democratic participation an indivisible part of the government’s legitimacy. In other
words, the faqih’s authority to supervise all major facets of state power was worthless
without mass participation. The pro-popular consent faction incorporated enough
ambiguity into the constitution to question its emphasis on Islamic order and divine, as
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opposed to popular, sovereignty. The possibility of reform has always exuded significant
appeal, because of these ingrained contradictions, to all strata in Iran. During the late
1990s, the Guard decisively threw its weight behind the conservative clerical order in
spite of President Khatami’s popular mandate to introduce reforms. Its role in social and
political repression virtually ended the reform movement and has severely stunted its
growth since then.
The Guard high command opposed strengthening party politics and the electoral
process. During the 1996 election season, Guard Commander Mohsen Rezai emphatically
supported Khatami’s opponent Nateq-Nuri. After being elected, Khatami refused to
cooperate and officially meet with him and pressuring Khamenei to replace him. 301
Khamenei obliged and replaced Rezai with his reportedly less antagonistic deputy, Yahya
Rahim-Safavi. 302 To Khatami’s disappointment, Safavi took an equally reactionary
stance against reform. Several weeks before his dismissal, Rezai expressed the gravity
with which the Guard leadership, unlike the public, opposed US-Iran relations. He
published a passionate appeal—apparently not approved by Khamenei or Rafsanjani—
arguing for the creation of an anti-American front comprised of Syria and Iraq. 303 His
proposal illustrated the extremity of his anti-US attitude. His rationale for prosecuting the
war against Iraq presumably followed a similar logic; if revolutionary Iran could sweep a
US puppet out of power, then it could install a similarly anti-US ruler in his place. Once
the Gulf War irreversibly wrinkled relations between the two nations, he surely
recognized a partner in Hussein. Creating an Islamic Republic in Iraq was secondary to
301
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the goal of spreading anti-US policy across the region. Perhaps he believed no Islamic
Revolution could take place without the expulsion of US influence. His glib readiness to
embrace a sworn enemy of the revolution, to say nothing of Hussein’s record of cruelty
and devastation against the Iranian people, startled many. His proposal of Iran-Iraq
cooperation only further alienated the Guard leadership from the rank-and-file.
In the summer of 1999 the Guard exemplified loyalty to the clerical order. In July,
the regime closed a popular liberal newspaper, which triggered a minor demonstration at
Tehran University. In reaction, members of the Law Enforcement Forces (LEF), a
constabulary police force closely connected to the Guard, and Ansar-e Hizbullah, a
paramilitary outfit also associated with the Guard, stormed the dormitory. The hardliners
killed an undetermined number of students and arrested several hundred others. 304
Afterward, as many as ten thousand students protested in the streets and inspired student
associations to act in kind in other major cities. The LEF and Basij violently dispersed the
protestors and organized counterdemonstrations across Iran’s urban landscape. Armed
units of the Guard, Basij, and LEF soon imposed order by aggressively patrolling
university quarters and central areas of Tehran. 305 The protests sufficiently scared the
Guard leadership into sending Khatami a letter raising the possibility of a military coup in
July 1999. A week later, the letter was leaked, probably by the Guard, to the press. The
signatories attacked the president for his laxity against those who “disrupt security and
order” and warned that “if you do not make a Revolutionary decision today and do not
fulfill your Islamic and national mission, tomorrow will be so late, and the problems so
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unsolvable, that it will be unimaginable.” They threatened, “our patience has come to an
end, and we will not permit ourselves any more tolerance in the face of your inaction.” 306
The Guard’s letter silenced the president and almost led to his resignation. The same day
that Khatami received the Guard’s letter, his own defense minister and former Guard
commander Ali Shamkhani abandoned him. At this critical juncture, he said on state
television on July 13, 1999, “forces loyal to the values of the revolution…will restore full
security…at any cost.” 307
Safavi denigrated Khatami’s efforts to furnish dialogue and mutual understanding
with former regional adversaries and the US. Speaking to senior Guard navy commanders
in April 1998, he asked, “Can we withstand American threats and [America’s]
domineering attitude with a policy of détente? Can we foil dangers coming from
[America] through dialogue between civilizations?” 308 In the same speech, Safavi
castigated the president’s liberal inclinations. An opposition newspaper published by
Banisadr quoted Safavi as saying, “I have made Supreme Leader Khamenei aware that
there is a new form of hypocrisy disguised by the clergy. They are pure hypocrites, who
claim to be implementing the law, but in truth are doing the opposite. Some of them
should be beheaded or have their tongues torn out.” 309 In the summer of 1998, the MEK
took credit for a destabilizing series of assassinations and bombings against the Guard. 310
Using them as a pretext, the Guard’s intelligence department in the following weeks
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apprehended four renowned Iranian literary figures and journalists while other officials
arrested a group of Baha’is and executed one for proselytizing. 311 The Guard deliberately
targeted Baha’is in order to radicalize Iran’s international image, which Khatami had
struggled to improve. Regime-sanctioned violence abounded. On January 15, 1999, for
example, a group of one hundred members of Ansar-e Hizbullah cried “death to the
enemies of the velayat-e faqih” as they stormed the Friday prayer session of a liberal
cleric and beat his supporters with iron bars. 312 The Guard also appears to have
commissioned a slew of assassinations against the opposition. 313
Notwithstanding Safavi’s disavowal of détente, other less radical Guard leaders
defended the utility of neutrality in improving Iran’s foreign affairs. Although he
sympathized with the Guard position against Khatami in the summer of 1999, Shamkhani
supported his vision for Iran’s overall military doctrine. Khatami appointed Shamkhani
head of MODAFL in 1997, an act which curbed his earlier proclivity for radicalism. In an
interview from 2000, Shamkhani stated,
Although we are not necessarily hostile toward the West, we have never had a
conciliatory approach and we have never defined our relations with the West on
the basis of ties of dependency… We can have [relationships of] mutual
interdependence with other countries, such as Russia, China or regional
countries…this type of relationship is based on safeguarding the national interests
of the two countries involved without any interference from a third party and
within the framework of international norms and conventions…Our defence
policy, our military doctrine, our training and education, our structural
organization and defence industry are dependent on our policy of detente. 314
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Shamkhani’s arc from radical to more pragmatic reflected a process of limiting actionable
revolutionary principles. Commanders typically moved from an expansive, ambitious,
optimistic faith in the ability of the Islamic Republic to realize its revolutionary principles
to a more modest outlook. Shamkhani pared his obligations to protecting the power of
velayat-e faqih, preserving Iran’s independence, and probably some form of defensive
jihad. Shamkhani represents somewhat of an exception, however, given his dependency
on Khatami’s political patronage. Bound by Khatami’s power of appointment and
dismissal, he had little choice but to agree with the president.
The Guard’s heavy-handed treatment of the reform movement failed to yield
results as reformists swept the February 2000 parliamentary elections. The Guard
ratcheted up its opposition and began to act upon the threat it made in the July 1999 open
letter. It realized that nothing short of intervention into the political arena would stave off
reform. After the Guardian Council annulled most of the results from the parliamentary
elections, a confidential source spread a rumor that the Guard’s intelligence branch in
conjunction with Quds were collaborating with arch-conservative clerics to oust Khatami.
Credence for this rumor grew after the April 16 publication of a Guard statement that, “if
necessary, our enemies, be they small or large, will feel the reverberating impact of the
hammer of the Islamic revolution on their skulls and the impact will be so strong that
they will never be able to engage in hatching plots or committing crimes.” 315 The
statement connected reform with imperialism and with apostasy. It described the
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“champions of American-style reforms in Iran” as “atheists fighting God.” 316 A week or
so later, an unnamed reformist provided Reuters a recording of a Guard meeting in which
plans for the coup was made. Preliminary steps included jailing reformists and slandering
them as foreign agents, closing reformist publications to interrupt the flow of
information, and convincing Khamenei of the danger to the system. Other steps included
disrupting the Tehran bazaar and the seminaries to gain the support of senior clerics,
harassing intellectuals, and using terror against Khatami supporters. 317 These threats
cowed Khatami into freezing his support for the reform movement, which killed its
momentum. To expand its role in the political realm, the Basij command announced its
intention to recruit 15 million new members and to arm all full-time Basij members. Basij
commanders encouraged “ordinary” Basij members to be politically active, code for
acting like anti-reform vigilantes. The Guard was also slated to grow from 1,000 to 1,500
battalions by the end of 2000. 318
For Safavi and other Guard leaders, a slide in the direction of reform was a
slippery slope to Western-style democracy. They associated corruption and immorality
with any forms based on national, popular sovereignty, unfettered by the supreme
guidance of a religious leader. The people would tragically forfeit Iran’s authentic,
Muslim identity and revert back to depending as the Shah did on slightly different but
still Western models. Western themes such as free speech and liberty were the first
needles to unwind the fabric of Iran’s Islamic Revolution. A reformist who writes an
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exposition of civil liberties may wind up in short time condemning of the institutions that
may circumscribe them with impunity. After Khatami’s first election, Rezai defended his
activism against the president:
It is very difficult for the IRGC men who obey the instructions of the Vali to see
that there are persons among the associates of the president-elect who question the
concept of absolute guardianship of the Valiy-e Faqih and even dare to consider
the vote of the people above that of the Leader. In the meantime, Iran is the land
of the “Imam of the Time” and speaking about national sovereignty and manmade laws vis-à-vis the Divine laws, had made the dear Islamic Guards seriously
concerned. 319
An underlying assumption in the constitution of the Islamic Republic is that there exists a
higher principle derived from God’s will against which man-made laws can be compared.
To believers, God is eternally good and so a principle that expresses his nature will
qualify human laws as good. Khomeini asserted that only the most eminent religious
scholars, e.g. the faqih, have the ability to discern divine laws and then apply them to
particular human laws. Removing that fulcrum of religious interpretation from the
legislative process would isolate human laws from their reference to the divine. It
logically follows that the absolute guardianship of the faqih forms the truest basis of
justice on earth. In addition to the deep ideological implications of reform, Safavi and
other commanders fear its consequences for their own power. The Guard’s authority rests
almost solely upon the good graces and trust of the faqih. A reformist victory would
weaken the Guard’s clerical benefactors and therefore contract its power.
Reformists threatened to eviscerate the Islamic Republic of its Islamic character
by proposing to transfer authority to the hands of the people. To Khomeini’s adherents,
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the crowning achievement of the Islamic Revolution was not the creation of a republic,
but the imposition of a religious framework upon it. As long as the government operated
within the bounds of the shari’a and under supervision by the faqih, the Islamic essence
of the revolution remained intact. Khomeini explained the government schema in a 1978
interview: “By ‘republic’ it is meant the same types of republicanism as they are at work
in other countries. However, this Republic is based on a constitution which is Islamic.
The reason we call it the Islamic Republic is that all conditions for the candidates as well
as all rules, are based on Islam…The regime will be a Republic just like one anywhere
else.” 320 The authority of a clerical body to vet candidates and veto irreligious laws
composed the bedrock of the state’s Islamic structure. The constitution of the Islamic
Republic endowed clerics with the ultimate and final say over Iranian politics—with a
primary, although not complete degree of sovereignty. The schismatic convulsions of the
reform period grappled with the question of sovereignty. Did final legal power rest with
and come from the people or the clergy? The issue of reform ultimately reduced to a yes
or no vote of confidence in the ability of the Islamic Republic—and Islam in general—to
enact its ideals in the political arena.
The Guard crushed the reform movement because it threatened to compromise
non-negotiable principles of the Islamic Republic. Safavi addressed this problem head on
in May 2002, when he accused reformists of separating the government from its religious
and revolutionary aspect and creating doubts and hesitation in the principles of the order
of the Islamic Republic and the government’s ability to overcome the country’s
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difficulties. 321 The reformist sense of doubt in the adequacy of the Islamic Republic
seeped into the Guard. Newer generations of recruits and conscripts lacked the memories
of the Shah’s repression and revolutionary euphoria that animated older cadres. They
seemed to lose faith in the conservative religious establishment. According to a statistical
evaluation of the presidential elections conducted by the Ministry of Islamic Guidance
and Culture, 73 percent of the Guard voted for Khatami in 1996. 322 The turnout for
Khatami was even higher among soldiers of the regular army. 323 The show of
disobedience was not an isolated event. During an episode of civil unrest in Qazvin in
August 1994, the commanders of the local Guard garrison refused to shoot at the civilian
population and forced Tehran to call in units from the Ashura battalions, a special corps
trained specifically in suppressing such unrest. 324 The growing stretch between core
revolutionary principles and popular opinion created a need for the conservative political
establishment to abridge public liberties like freedom of speech and other instruments of
reform. The battle over Iran’s political order contests the meaning of the revolution. The
Guard will not alter its behavior of radical foreign and domestic intervention until it
reframes its relationship to progressive principles of the revolution touted by reformists.
The conservative political establishment addressed the threat of reform by
tackling it at its cultural roots. It trounced provocative Western ideas and banned the
import of cultural objects loaded with political meanings. The Guard employed the Basij
to police the new regulations against dangerous items of Western origin. Deputy Guard
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Commander General Hassanzadeh, speaking in late 2001, commented on cultural issues
in front a crowd of Basijis, saying, “[The] Enemy infiltrates from cultural ways and
through writing, film, quarterly magazine, plays, festivals, consumption culture, insulting
people's sacred values, propaganda and disseminating lies.” Hassanzadeh told the Basijis
that Western society is Godless and warned that Western states “try to dominate all
countries in a liberal democratic system.” An example of this, according to Hassanzadeh,
was President George W. Bush’s statement that “the world is either with us or against us
and anyone who is against us must be destroyed.” Hassanzadeh slammed “slogans of
democracy, people's rule, and human rights” for destroying authentic ideologies. 325
Earlier that year, the Guard commander of Qazvin affirmed the Basij’s role in saving the
Islamic Republic, “in the next decade our problem will be the cultural onslaught and the
Basij must block its progress.” He added: “Instead of creating military bases, our policy
today is to create cultural societies.” 326 The Guard associated reform with the ideology of
liberal democracy exported by the US. This inferred that reform was an insidious plot
hatched by the US, and thus tantamount to counterrevolution. The Guard’s argument
displayed how American avowals of support for Iranian reform movements ultimately
damages their credibility, or authenticity, despite their grounding in political
contradictions specific to Iran’s revolutionary history and constitution.
The Guard’s overt and ideologically motivated involvement in politics violated
the final will of the very faqih whose legacy they claimed to be saving. In his last will
and testament, Ayatollah Khomeini drew a line against the trespassing of the military into
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politics. Giving his “brotherly advice to the armed forces who love Islam, who give their
lives at the war fronts for the love of leqa-ullah [union with God] and who carry out their
devotional work everywhere in the country,” Khomeini counseled them to,
not join any political party, group or faction. No military man, security policeman,
no Revolutionary Guard or Basij may enter into politics. Stay away from politics
and you'll be able to preserve and maintain your military prowess and be immune
to internal division and dispute. Military commanders must forbid entrance into
political ties by the men under their command…Therefore, the government
[is]…charged with the religious and national responsibility to oppose, from the
very beginning, any interference in politics…by the armed forces, regardless of
category… 327
Khomeini’s injunction pressured the Guard to inflate the radicalness of the reform
movement. Safavi may have accepted a prohibition on political campaigning, but refused
to see Khomeini as denying the Guard its constitutional duty to protect the revolution,
which by now had obviously ossified into a political order. The Guard painted the
reformists as challenging the revolution. Safavi separated his intimidations against
Khatami from the types of behavior proscribed by Khomeini’s last will.
[W]e do not interfere in politics but if we see that the foundations of our system of
government and our revolution is threatened…we get involved. When I see that a
[political] current has hatched a cultural plot, I consider it my right to defend the
revolution against this current. My commander is the exalted leader and he has
not banned me [from doing this]. 328
In their July 1999 letter to Khatami, the Guard commanders exaggerated the scope of the
aims of the reform movement far beyond its intentions. Yet again, they posed the
movement as inimical to the revolution. Allowed by Khatami, the Guard accused
reformists of desecrating “the foundations of the System” and the “sanctity of the
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Velayat-e Faqih.” The commanders poignantly lamented “the withering away of the
product of fourteen centuries of the torment and persecution of Shi’ism and Islam.” 329
They depicted the reform movement as undercutting the one political form impervious to
the external forces of blasphemy and imperialism. Anything else would return Iran and
Islam to its historically exploited and abused state.
During the presidencies of Rafsanjani and Khatami, the Guard showed itself
willing to make radical interventions in politics both at home and abroad, but Khomeini
also expressed a premonitory warning against such behavior. Khomeini conceded an
open-ended shape to Iran’s political order. He recognized the possibility for positive,
internal change that did not abandon the first principles of Islamic government. He
advised the nation and the armed forces to remain faithful to a progressive conception of
Islam. Khomeini defended his original idea of divine sovereignty, but added progressive
connotations to it. He wrote, “Islam is the only true ideology of liberty and
independence,” and elsewhere, “The enforcement of law is based on equity and justice;
on prevention of cruelty and dictatorship…on liberty, reason, independence, and selfsufficiency.” 330 Khomeini hinted that the Islamic Republic could adapt to changing
circumstances without departing from fundamental ideological principles like
independence, self-sufficiency, and Islamic government. Khomeini also separated this
process of internal change from the armed forces to strengthen the position of popularly
elected officials to affect change. The generational shift in Iranian politics, away from
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revolutionary structures and toward popular consent, has put additional pressure on the
Guard to integrate better with the general public. Iran’s government, though containing
authoritarian elements, exists in an atmosphere of ambiguity and potential for change,
which even Khomeini recognized. The Guard stands on the same feeble pillars and
popular opinion against the conservative order may overcome its resistance to change. In
a best-case scenario, the Guard would submit to moderating civilian influences by a
process of osmosis, wherein its strategies reflect progressive interpretations of the
principles of Islamic Revolution, rather than the static ones that they do now. In a worstcase scenario, the Guard would reject change at all costs, including violent repression at
the risk of civil war as has happened in Syria. Such an event would occur much less
likely in Iran than in Syria because of Iran’s basic sectarian unity. As noted, the idea of
reform appeals to portions of nearly all strata of Iranian society, since it will potentially
benefit all, rather than a single sect.
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Chapter Five: Revolution and Strategy

Shortly after the end of the Iran-Iraq war, Khamenei consolidated the various
government branches involved in covert foreign operations. He envisioned this new
institution, named Quds Force, as an efficient tool to spread and utilize the ideology of
Islamic Revolution. Foreign Shi’is indoctrinated with this ideology owe complete
allegiance to the supreme leader and Quds commanders and conduct terrorist and
insurgent attacks at their behest. In a speech in 1990, the year in which Khamenei formed
Quds, the supreme leader said that its mission is to “establish popular Hizbullah cells all
over the world.” 331 The organization embodies the state’s mandate to interact with and
shape the Islamic world. Its most dedicated partners believe in the religious enterprise of
Iran and postulate the fates of the Islamic Republic and Shi’is as coterminous. At best,
Quds expands the reach of the supreme leader and organizes the Shi’i diaspora for its
common defense against takfiri terrorists and imperialist aggressors. Quds itself has
merged national and religious interests. Since the Islamic Republic is a religiouslydefined sovereignty, operations which benefit its power necessarily aim at ideological
ends of strengthening the embattled Muslim, though more typically the Shi’i Muslim,
position in an inhospitable world. The intervention of Quds in Syria serves the very
realpolitik objective of preserving Assad’s power, but on a more superficial level, it has
also protected Shi’i heritage and holy sites. Political factors generally spur Quds to
action, but the outcomes suit the ideals of the Islamic Revolution, whether it be
weakening taghut rulers in the Gulf or enacting defensive jihad for victimized Muslims.
331

Dexter Filkins, “The Shadow Commander,” The New Yorker, September 30, 2013.

116

Terrorist actions against Saudi Arabia, Israel, or US military forces, may spring from
Iran’s geopolitical tensions with these states, but they adhere to the Islamic Revolution’s
parameters of acceptable and commendable behavior. The term Islamic Revolution itself
denotes the ideological superstructure that tempers Iran’s nationalist aspirations and
produces hybrid policies combining national interests with ideological principles. The
Islamic Revolution, depending on context, refers to either this ideological framework or
the process of Islamic resistance against tyrannical and irreligious forms of government.
The ideological framework defining the boundaries of Iranian policy does not
itself postulate violent confrontations with unbelieving superpowers. The orientation of
foreign powers to the principles of the Islamic Revolution determines how Iran
implements the strategic goals shaped by its ideology. The temperament of outside
powers leads Iran into binary modes of policy formation, which could be either violent
and oppositional, or diplomatic and accommodating. A non-threatening and inclusive US
position vis-à-vis Iran reciprocates similar behavior from even Quds. Conversely,
belligerent US positions will lead Iran into covert and corrosive actions. Either way, Iran
seeks to exercise national interests in harmony with its revolutionary principles. Its
behavior turns violent only once external forces categorically reject the foundations or
premises of Islamic Revolution. The US invasion of Iraq and President Bush’s
vilification of Iran elicited this confrontational impulse. The cataclysmic terrorist attack
on September 11, 2001 precipitated an enormously larger role for the US military in the
Middle East. President Bush’s new military doctrine, which aimed at a compound goal of
implanting democracy in the Middle East as a way of eradicating terrorism, initially
targeted two major sources of Iranian insecurity—the Taliban in Afghanistan and
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Saddam Hussein. These campaigns eliminated much of Iran’s competition for regional
dominance. They also, however, magnified the friction between the US and Iran. Despite
an early, albeit slim possibility of cooperation between the two, President Bush’s verbal
attacks against the Islamic Republic soured any chances for Iran to peacefully assert its
interests in Iraq. As a counterfactual, if the US had mollified its antipathy toward the
Islamic Revolution and continued to solicit Iranian input, Iran might have reciprocated
the good will. On the contrary, US force projection into Iraq and Afghanistan laid an
imposing concentric circle of US military forces with the intention of containing Iran.
In response to the US invasion of Iraq, Quds took a flexible and multifaceted
approach to shaping the situation in favor of Iran’s strategic interests, which were to
preserve the state and mitigate the US presence. In order of urgency, its objectives were
to prevent a US invasion of Iran, construct a Shi’i-led government, push the US military
out of Iraq, and maintain influence over Iraq without destabilizing it. Iran pursued these
goals in proportion to its security from a US invasion. As long as war was as an imminent
possibility, Quds would not promote policies that ran counter to US goals. Quds
commander Qassem Suleimani adopted a policy of accommodation to skirt the American
warpath. For a short time, Suleimani shared intelligence on the Taliban and Al-Qaeda
with the US, and in the summer of 2003, participated in the US project to build
democracy in Iraq. Suleimani quietly endorsed the US-led organization of a fledgling
government in Baghdad. US Ambassador Crocker passed him the names of prospective
Shi’i candidates and the two men traded preferences. Crocker did not offer veto power,
but he discarded candidates whom Suleimani found especially objectionable, “The
formation of the governing council was in its essence a negotiation between Tehran and
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Washington,” he said. 332 Suleimani’s flexibility in dealing with the Americans hewed to
the Guard’s habit of making tactical compromises in the interest of self-preservation,
while persevering in its commitment to strategic goals derived from ideological
principles. For example, opposing US interests in Iraq derived from Khomeini’s criticism
of the US as an imperialistic and anti-Islamic power. Straying from the goal would
increase Iran’s insecurity, whereas straying from the principle would negate the Guard’s
legitimacy and identity. The Guard simply cannot divorce foreign policy objectives from
the ideological framework of Islamic Revolution without undergoing crisis. Nonetheless,
national interests substantiate if not dominate most Iranian policies. This seeming
paradox leads many to simplify Iranian policy as either nationalist or revolutionary,
without recognizing the comingling of the two. During the Iraq War, the American
Ambassador to Iraq, Ryan Crocker, asked an Iraqi intermediary if Suleimani was
especially religious. The answer was “Not really…he attends mosque periodically.
Religion doesn’t drive him. Nationalism drives him, and the love of the fight.” 333
President Bush’s animus against Iran quickly disillusioned Quds from the
possibility of cooperating and Iran began pursuing its strategic interests more
aggressively. Political blowback from the war constrained President Bush from pushing
for a subsequent invasion against Iran. As that fear receded in Tehran, Suleimani
betrayed his intentions of disrupting a US-dependent Iraqi government and long-term
military presence. Quds extended its influence to an incredibly diverse array of political
and military actors in order to generate leverage out of the tensions between them.
According to American and Iraqi former officials, Suleimani exerted control over Iraqi
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politics by paying officials, subsidizing newspapers and television stations, and when,
necessary, by intimidation. 334 One former senior Iraqi official exclaimed, “I have yet to
see one Shia political party not taking money from Qassem Suleimani…He’s the most
powerful man in Iraq, without question.” 335 A prominent Iraqi Shi’i also noted, “it is
impossible to oppose Iran because they are paying all the pro-Iranian parties—and they
are paying all the anti-Iranian parties as well. 336 Flooding the country with funds made it
quite impossible for even those groups opposed to Iran to resist its enticements, since
doing so would put them at a steep competitive disadvantage. Iran complemented its
policy of buying political influence by supporting Iraqi militants opposed to the political
process altogether. If Iran could mobilize its proxy militias to attack the Iraqi
government, it could also halt them. Iran used violence to regulate Iraq’s domestic
politics; the power to broker peace in times of instability would induce the central
government to concede paramount issues to the Iranians, such as whether to lease longterm basing rights to the US military. Iran also angled its militias against the US to
prevent it from taking military control of the country. Funding the insurgency would
ensure that US forces were tied down. The US would worry about Iraqi insurgents before
it did their Quds handlers. Likewise, it would worry about retaliations by Iraqi militants if
it chose to conduct military strikes against Iran’s nuclear program. Frustrating both the
military and political goals of the US occupation served an ultimate purpose of quashing
the American public’s enthusiasm for making military commitments in the Middle East.
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The near complete control by Quds over Iran’s policies in Iraq is due to its
honorable mission to use and expand the Islamic Revolution. Quds was conceived to
unite all the military forces and intelligence apparatuses within the Guard that were
operating outside of Iranian borders. It enjoys the unconditional support of the supreme
leader and is generally charged with executing and shaping Iran’s most radical policies.
The force has between 10,000 and 20,000 members, divided between combatants and
those who train and oversee foreign assets. 337 Iraqi intelligence captured and unclassified
by US forces provided the Iraqi perspective on the purpose and activities of Quds. Iraq
remained anxiously preoccupied with Iran’s support for dissident groups inside and
outside the country and thus concentrated on gathering as thorough and reliable
intelligence on Quds as possible, although the documents may risk exaggerating the
threat posed by Quds. The Iraqis describe the overall duties of the force as including
military and strategic data collection of neighboring countries, assassinations within Iran
and without, coordinating terrorism abroad, and training and indoctrinating foreign
citizens of Islamic countries to overthrow their governments and install a regime founded
on the doctrine of velayat-e faqih. A report from 2000 document described the
assignments of the force as passing through the Guard’s general command and under
direct supervision of a delegate from the Office of the Supreme Leader. 338 The report
attributed Quds with offices in Lebanon, Palestine, Syria, Afghanistan, Turkey, Pakistan,
former Soviet Republics, Sudan and Egypt, and Iraq. These offices study the political and
economic issues of these Arab and Muslim-majority countries, collect intelligence, and
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establish political communications with “fundamentalist forces” in those countries. 339
Apart from communications and intelligence, Quds directs and forms radical movements
in the aforementioned countries.
It organizes, trains, recruits, and provides administrative support to loyalists of the
Islamic Revolution as well as to foreign militants who merely share Iran’s tactical goals.
It has formed Corps of the Islamic Revolution in countries such as Bosnia, Turkey,
Lebanon, Africa, and the Badr corps in Iraq. 340 The report describes the “Third Corps” as
supporting anti-Turkish Kurdish groups, suppressing Iranian Kurds, and carrying out
terrorist operations against Iranian Kurdish groups in Iraq; the “Fourth Corps” as
organizing Afghan groups inside Iran and conducting intelligence activities in the borders
between Afghanistan and Pakistan; the “Sixth Corps” as exporting terrorism to the Gulf
countries, primarily though groups under the Hizbullah umbrella; and the “Seventh
Corps,” consisting of 2000 Guards and command centers in Balbak and Beqaa, as
interfacing with Lebanese Hizbullah, the Islamic Jihad, and Al-Amal Islamic
Organization and supplying them with arms; the “Eighth Corps” as operating in North
African countries such as Algeria, Tunisia, and Egypt and having established command
centers in Sudan; and, the “Ninth Corps” as recruiting Turkish and Arab Muslims in
Germany and Austria—in addition to Corps assigned to internal security and the
arrangement of training programs. 341 The Guard typically uses front companies to
obscure its involvement in foreign operations. In March 1996, for example, a food
production company linked to the Guard was intercepted transporting a 320mm gun to
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Belgium on a commercial ship to target the Paris residence of Banisadr. 342 The report
also discussed a Quds training camp near Karaj Dam that rendered services to groups of
ten to twenty individuals from Pakistan, Algeria, Palestine, Bahrain, and Lebanon. In
October 1994, two larger groups of 40-45 Bosnian Muslims were trained at the camp. 343
The document was sent to MEK representatives to assist their organization’s insurgency
operation against Iran as well as to Jordanian intelligence. The document notes that Quds
has focused on building a relationship with Sudan. In 1993, Quds allocated $20 million to
build camps there. US intelligence officials corroborated this number, and one official
warned, “The target is not just the north—Egypt and North Africa—but also the south,
into [sub-Saharan] Africa, with the creation of Islamic states being the goal.” 344
According to the Iraqi intelligence, The camps hosted militants from Tunisia, Morocco,
Egypt, and Algeria. In addition to general education and religious seminars, the militants
received military training from Sudanese government soldiers. 345
The creation of these country-specific corps prepared the Guard to take advantage
of major regional developments, especially in Iraq. Iran had hosted, paid, supplied, and
sustained the largest Iraqi Islamic opposition group, the Badr Brigade. Badr was the
armed wing of the Supreme Council of the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI), a splinter
group of the Islamic al-Da’wa Party. As the Iranian revolution sparked a wave of antiShi’i repression in Iraq, scores of prominent Shi’i activists fled to Iran or otherwise faced
the possibility of execution. In April 1980, Hussein executed al-Da’wa’s founder,
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Mohammad Baqir al-Sadr, shortly after al-Sadr wrote in defense of Islamic Revolution.
The loss of this leader led to fracture in al-Da’wa. To its lay supporters, al-Da’wa
advocated the overthrow of the Ba’athist regime and its replacement by an Islamic,
though Iraqi state. The clerics in al-Da’wa valued political action only in relation to the
wider community of believers. They intended for the scope of al-Da’wa to surpass the
overthrow of a single regime. Rather, Saddam Hussein’s fall should follow Iran’s Islamic
Revolution and precede a chain of Islamic Revolutions across other oppressed Muslim
countries. Al-Da’wa’s cofounder Mohammad Baqir al-Hakim fit in this latter category
and eventually split from the mainstream party because of its reluctance to embrace
Khomeini’s doctrine of velayat-e faqih. This national-revolutionary tension within alDa’wa—one group caring foremost about the nation’s future and the other more about
the agency of the nation on the future of the umma—mirrored the struggle between Iran’s
revolutionary pragmatists and radicals. Tehran curried favor with al-Hakim and helped
him officially establish a vessel of Islamic Revolution, SCIRI, in 1982, which it also
recognized as the sole legitimate political representative of the Iraqi Shi’i opposition. 346
Hussein dealt ruthlessly with SCIRI, killing 80 members of Muhammad Baqr al-Hakim’s
family, and Da’wa, both of which rebelled, but with only one of them under Tehran’s
payroll. Without Iranian funding and supplies, Da’wa more or less buckled under the
weight of the Iraqi security services.
A 2002 Iraqi intelligence report, based largely on the interrogation of two Badr
members, underscored the intimacy of the Quds-Badr relationship. Obviously
information extracted by interrogation techniques is not an ideal form of knowledge
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about a secretive organization, but since the organization itself will not divulge the details
of its relationship with Iran, not many other methods of learning about Badr or most other
Iranian proxies are available. Membership in Badr consisted of fugitive and dissident
Iraqis, Iranian-Iraqis, and Iraqi prisoners of war (POWs). As a moral incentive, SCIRI
recruiters regaled Shi’i Iraqi POWs who turned coats with the concept of tawwabin, a
historical label for those who fought against Imam Hussein at the battle of Karbala only
to switch sides afterwards and pursue his killers. 347 These modern-day tawwabin formed
the backbone of the force and introduced a strong element of military professionalism, as
many were senior officers. 348 Initially, they voluntarily accompanied the Iranian army as
guides during the war, but in 1983 the Guard took over the Badr portfolio with plans to
reshape it into an auxiliary force. Afterwards, Badr fought against Iraqi forces under the
Guard’s command and effectively became an Iranian proxy. 349 By 1988, Badr’s general
force was estimated at 6000. 350 After the war, the Guard renewed asylum and support for
Badr in order to reserve a viable option to exploit any instability in Iraq with a friendly
force. Iran, however, was unwilling to restart a war with Iraq and Badr was too weak to
mount a serious challenge against the Iraqi regime by itself, a situation which suspended
the organization in limbo. Quds trained Badr corpsmen in camps in Qom and Tehran. It
provided specialized training to different regiments of the brigade, trained Badr
commandos in physical fitness, swimming, mountain climbing, and light personal
weapons, providing sessions in intelligence, espionage, and monitoring, and in military

347

Ibid., 4.
Ibid., 5.
349
Combating Terrorism Center, “Re.: Study of Badr Corps 9,” Harmony Program, October 7, 2002, 1-2.
350
Ibid., 4.
348

125

engineering, in anti-tank warfare, and targeting. 351 The Guard also accustomed the
brigade to working with Iranians in joint operations. For example, the Guard anti-air
battalion participated in the brigade’s last triennial combined arms exercise before the US
invasion. As interpreted by Iraqi intelligence, Iran’s participation in the exercise signaled
its intention to assist the brigade in the event of an Iraqi uprising. 352
Iran exerted strategic control of Badr and close oversight of its cross-border
excursions. The Joint Staff of the Iranian Armed Forces allocated about $20 million for
the annual budget of Badr, which paid entirely for salaries. Weapons distributed to Badr
before 1990 were given free of charge but afterwards were sold by the Guard in addition
to foodstuffs, vehicles, and equipment. 353 Evidence indicates that the Guard had full
authority in determining the legal status and conditions of employment of Badr
members. 354 An Iraqi census in 2001 estimated the number of Iraqis living in Iranian
refugee camps at 53,000, 12,000 of whom were in the brigade. 355 The brigade set its own
goals, but it had to request financial and technical capabilities from Quds Operations
through its Iranian official. Quds Operations then issued the approval and informed the
Badr divisions how to implement their goals. 356 Before 1999, Badr conducted some
operations inside Iraq independently of Iranian supervision. 357 After reorganizing itself,
Badr reverted to consistently coordinating with Quds and Iranian military units and
border precincts. The report referenced some limits to the ability of Tehran to use the
brigade if and when Hussein’s regime fell. Badr appeared convinced that “any
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exceptional circumstance inside Iraq” would lead the US to prohibit Iran from interfering
in the upheaval. With Iranian borders closed to the brigade in such a scenario, it would
have to move in with Tehran’s tacit support through the mountainous northern region of
Iran. 358
With Tehran’s backing, Badr attempted to fulfill its mission of overthrowing
Hussein’s regime and replacing it with an Iraqi Islamic Republic. In early 1991, after
being routed by US forces liberating Kuwait, demoralized Iraqi troops rebelled against
Saddam Hussein. Often mischaracterized as originally a Shi’i revolt, the non-sectarian
army mutiny soon catalyzed a full-scale popular uprising. Badr fighters quickly streamed
into Iraq, in crossings recorded by US reconnaissance planes and satellites, to stir the pot;
they vandalized portraits of Hussein and attacked regime symbols such as Ba’ath party
offices and police stations. 359 The fighters put up posters of Ayatollah Khomeini and
Muhammad Baqr al-Hakim and converted mosques and hospitals into militia
headquarters. 360 Their insertion of religious themes into the uprising imbued it with
pungent sectarian overtones and a distasteful Iranian-inspired political agenda. According
to a top ranking Iranian intelligence officer, some 150 Guards slipped across the border
as well to foment disorder, and probably to supervise the Badr fighters, in Najaf, Karbala,
and Basra. 361 The US withdrew its support of the rebels partly due to the overshadowing
by Iranian agents and Hussein proceeded to slaughter the offenders. Residents of Basra
and other southern towns blame SCIRI for having bastardized an army-based anti-regime
revolt into an Iran-sponsored Shi’i rebellion and then having abandoned rebellious Iraqi
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denizens to Hussein’s reprisal once the prospect of success slipped away. 362 This version
of the uprising does not enjoy total consensus; Iraqis from Da’wa, for example,
vindictively recalled an absent Iranian role. 363 Iran’s tentative response conveyed its
hesitancy to reignite an ideological war with Hussein. To achieve its political dreams,
SCIRI would have to depend on either the internal combustion of the regime or a US
invasion of Iraq.
The party gradually pivoted away from Tehran as all parties rooted in the Islamic
Revolution but eager for national cachet eventually do. The organization appropriated a
staunchly independent and national image. A senior SCIRI official explained: “Badr’s
reputation has always been distorted because of the fact that Badr was founded in
Iran…This does not mean Badr is an Iranian organization or loyal to Iran.” 364 Its selfredefinition only accelerated as SCIRI prepared to fill the political vacuum following the
US invasion. In August 2002, for example, SCIRI traveled to Washington to attend an
opposition gathering organized by the Bush Administration in anticipation of the
invasion. SCIRI quietly downplayed its affiliation with Khomeini’s ideology and
burnished its capability to govern Iraq under US terms. SCIRI, as well as Da’wa,
however, struggled to make the full transition from Islamist organization to a national
democratic party. Both parties realized that the different notions of Islam embedded
between Iraq’s sects disqualified the possibility of installing an Islamic government
steeped in Shi’i doctrines. Hence, they could pursue the US proposal of secularized
democracy, or meld their Islamist bearings with the democratic institutions insisted upon
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by the Americans, with the result of sectarian democracy. An old friend and former ally
of Maliki explained the dilemma:
Before 2003, certain ideas were haram to the Islamists: ideas like democracy,
nationalism, and citizenship. These people could not embark on a national project.
They didn’t know how. The Islamists were left with only one option that would
keep them as Iraq’s leaders: to step away from the Islamist project, and go for the
sectarian project. For Sunni leaders, their job is to frighten people about the
Shiites. And, for the Shiite leaders, it is to do the opposite. In this way, the
existence of one justifies the existence of the other. 365
SCIRI succeeded in penetrating many of the state institutions established by the US,
while publicly decrying the occupation. The party participated in the US-founded Interim
Governing Council (IGC), along with Da’wa and secular Iraqi leaders, and nearly all of
the Badr fighters fused with Iraqi security forces. This reshuffling ruffled Iran’s radicals
but pragmatists assessed the change as beneficial. SCIRI now served as a conduit for Iran
to communicate with the West and shape a post-Hussein Iraq. By 2007, the organization
rebranded itself as “The Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq” (ISCI) to confirm its departure
from an earlier era of dependency on Iranian ideology and aid. In 2003, the Khatami
administration sought influence in Iraq via SCIRI while the Guard opted to work with a
more radical, though as yet less pro-Iranian, competing Shi’i party, known as the Sadrist
Movement.
The attitude of hostility to the US occupation taken by the Sadrists differed
sharply from the opportunistic one taken by SCIRI. The extent to which Iraqi leaders
participated in and represented US-designed institutions polarized Iraq’s Shi’i
communities depending on how they interpreted US intentions. The leader of the Sadrist
Movement, Muqtada al-Sadr, situated his movement distinctly outside the US
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experiment. He denounced the IGC: “The government is the result of an illegitimate
order by the IGC, which in itself is illegitimate because it was appointed by an
illegitimate occupation…We do not recognize it, directly or indirectly, since it exists
contrary to the wishes of the Iraqis.” 366 The Sadrists immediately took a militant position
against the US occupation, and their armed wing, the Mahdi Army, spearheaded the first
major armed resistance against US forces Most Iraqis also met perceptions of Iranian
meddling with extreme revulsion. Al-Sadr denigrated SCIRI for both its cooperation with
the US and its historical association with Tehran. One of his representatives proclaimed,
SCIRI “does not represent Iraq, [it] represents outside forces and works with Iran, the
U.S., and Israel. We need someone from inside who suffered with Iraqis and represents
the people’s voice. We don’t want an Iranian state.” 367 Al-Sadr’s opposition to all foreign
influence presented an obstacle to the Guard, but the universal importance of outside aid
for every key player in Iraq eventually overpowered his doctrinal stance. The Sadrist
Movement skyrocketed in popularity immediately after the US invasion. Its rejection of
the US and Iran and track record of resistance to Hussein all resonated with the Shi’i Iraqi
masses, but its fierce independence also won it powerful enemies—the US, the hawzas,
SCIRI, and Da’wa. 368 Al-Sadr risked losing the battle if he continued to refuse Iranian
military supplies and training in a country awash with armed groups tied to powerful
outside benefactors. Al-Sadr’s readiness to spoil the nation-building effort, and therefore
prevent the US from accomplishing its goals, enticed the Guard.
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In the chaotic days following Hussein’s downfall, Tehran divided by receiving
discrete delegations from the rival Shi’i Iraqi groups. SCIRI’s calculated approach to
taking advantage of the US invasion mirrored the pragmatism of President Khatami,
whereas the Sadrists’ strong-willed, anti-US response converged with that of the Guard.
Mohammad Baqir al-Hakim, who led SCIRI before his assassination in August 2003,
visited Iran at the request of Khatami and Parliament Speaker Mehdi Karrubi. 369
Hakim’s openness to working with the Americans and his pivot from Tehran deeply
perturbed the Guard. The Guard retaliated by inviting the truculent Al-Sadr to Tehran,
where he met with Quds Commander Suleimani and Khamenei, but was refused meetings
by Khatami, his aides, and his allies in parliament. It is unclear how much aid Al-Sadr
himself accepted, if any at all, but these meetings paved invaluable inroads into his
militia. Evolving political circumstances in Iraq obliged the Guard to push harder for
leverage among Mahdi Army militants, with or without Al-Sadr’s direct approval. In
2005, after suffering crushing military defeats against the US in Al-Sadr City and Najaf,
Al-Sadr discarded the approach of armed confrontation. He explained the arc of his
movement as going from “peaceful resistance, then to armed resistance, and finally to
political resistance.” 370 After publicly forswearing armed resistance, he joined the Shi’ibased electoral coalition United Iraqi Alliance and cinched its victory at the polls in
2005. 371 Many Sadrist militiamen, still buoyed by hatred for the US and skeptical of the
government’s independence, balked at Al-Sadr’s redirection and left his fold.
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Mahdi Army factions that rejected their leader’s call against violence tightened
relationships with the Guard interlocutors. Al-Sadr never fully controlled his followers;
many of his fighters consisted of uneducated and more or less destitute gunmen in search
of a bellicose leader, like lighting attracted to a lightning rod. Al-Sadr’s decision in 2005
also precipitated an unprecedented level of sectarian fighting that bolstered the Iranian
argument that its offers of aid reflected its role as Shi’ism protector. Moreover, many
Mahdi Army factions acquired local revenue sources, mostly criminal in nature, which
freed them to ignore Al-Sadr. 372 These men looked for a new leader as Al-Sadr recanted
violence. As one police commander put it, “If Muqtada al-Sadr goes on TV now and asks
JAM [Mahdi Army] to lay down their weapons, do you think that all the fighters would
obey? Of course not. Maybe 70 percent would.” 373 The Guard filled this void; its
intelligence units easily wove their way into the loose-knit collection of armed groups
nominally belonging to the Sadrist Movement. According to a leading Sadrist militant,
the situation changed in 2005, “as the Iranians became more involved with the help of
important advisers to Muqtada. Iranian policy was to offer aid in the shape of financial
support, modern weapons, and a good communications system. Once lured into accepting
them the recipient cannot do without them.” The Supreme Leader in fact instructed the
Guard to keep its networks in the Mahdi Army underground until after the December
2005 elections. A letter written by him to Suleimani asserted that representatives of
SCIRI, Islamic Jihad, and Ansar al-Islam agreed that “Quds personnel…which have been
established in Iraq will not carry out any operations whatsoever which might identify
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themselves until the elections, and that these actions be entrusted to other supporters of
the Islamic Revolution. Let that force prepare itself for coup d’etat operations and carry
out the necessary planning, so that if the elections are against the policy of Islam, they
can enter the scene in a serious way.” 374 One can deduce that Quds held sway with Shi’i
militants throughout 2005, but waited to mobilize them against coalition and government
forces until after the Iraqis constituted a Shi’i-dominated government.
After a Shi’i coalition won the 2005 election, Tehran intensified support for its
networks and primed individual leaders to break off from Al-Sadr because of his
newfound inclination for nonviolence. After the elections, the Sadrist Movement
participated as an important faction in Prime Minister Maliki’s coalition government.
Maliki rewarded the Sadrists with a degree of autonomy, as evidenced by the prohibition
of Coalition Forces operating in Al-Sadr City, a suburb of Baghdad and the geographic
bastion of the movement. 375 In 2006, Quds attempted to fashion the collection of
disparate yet conciliatory groups into a unified militia resembling Hizbullah. Iran
predicated its support for these groups on their opposition to the central government and
hostility to Coalition Forces. Quds recruiters began arranging for classes of 30
individuals to attend paramilitary training in Iran. Recruits received instruction in one of
four areas of expertise, either IEDs and explosives, light weapons, mortars, or movements
and tactics. 376 Training occurred in three installments of approximately 35 days each
(including travel time) and cadets generally trained in teams of four. In May, Suleimani
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appointed Qais Khazali to lead this burgeoning network of better trained militants. 377
Khazali adopted the name Asaib Ahl al-Haq (AAH), which means League of the
Righteous, and led attacks against Coalition and Iraqi forces throughout 2006. 378 AAH
claimed more than 6,000 attacks on US forces, including multiple mortar and rocket
attacks on US facilities, and after al-Qaeda’s power plummeted in 2008, US officials
named AAH the biggest single threat to US forces. 379 Coalition Forces designated AAH
and smaller splinter groups as “special groups” because of their specialized combat
education and cellular organization. Khazali did not abnegate his loyalty to Al-Sadr, but
was receiving supplies, training, and funding and making decisions independent of him.
The growing power of rogue factions such as AAH in the Mahdi Army strained the
relationship between Al-Sadr and Maliki, who held the former responsible for them. In
late 2006, Maliki decided to engage his security services with the increasingly unruly
Shi’i militias. From January 2007 to mid-2008, Coalition and Iraqi offensive operations
targeted the Mahdi Army’s military strength in Baghdad and southern Iraq, which
decimated the already tenuous unity of the militia. Violence spiked across Iraq;
explosively Formed Projectile (EFP) usage rose to an average of 120 incidents a month
across Iraq in the second quarter of 2008, while 1,100 rockets were fired in Baghdad
between March and May 2008. 380 In the second half of 2008, Coalition Forces unearthed
98 special group munitions caches. 381
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Suleimani intermittently stopped the bloodshed by utilizing his widespread
influence, and inviting the warring sides to Tehran where he could mediate their
differences. Ambassador Crocker conveyed the power of Suleimani’s strategy to dictate
Iraqi politics in a diplomatic cable uncovered by WikiLeaks. Writing about a ceasefire in
2008 that ended the fighting between the Iraqi government and the Mahdi Army, Crocker
incisively explained the situation.
Indeed, the May 12 agreement marked the second time in the last seven weeks
that Tehran has brokered a face-saving way for Iraq’s largest competing Shia
factions—the UIA (representing the GOI[Government of Iraq]) and the Sadrist
Trend—to disengage at least temporarily from a protracted GOI-led security
operation that could have been extremely bloody for both sides. What the
agreement does not do—or even try to do—is address the underlying economic
and political factors that have led to intra-Shia conflict: widespread
unemployment and resentment among the urban Shia underclass; a perception that
the ISF[Iraqi Security Forces] is a uniformed militia of the Shia establishment; an
embattled government that is reluctant to grant its opponents any measure of
legitimacy; and an abundance of armed groups who consistently demonstrate a
casual willingness to resort to violence…The apparent unwillingness or inability
of the competing groups to address those issues ensures that further internecine
Shia bloodshed is all but inevitable. When such violence occurs, it seems likely
that the parties will again trudge to Tehran and ask Qassim Soleimani to sort out
the chaos that he has been instrumental in creating and perpetuating. 382
The genius of Iran’s strategy lay in its ability to essentially divide and conquer the Iraqis.
Its offers of aid caused internal alienations between those who accepted them and those
who resisted the temptation. Quds’ constant prodding into the powerful Shi’i groups
inevitably persuaded factions within them to make Faustian bargains with Iran. Iran’s
support fragmented these groups internally and prevented any one and all of them from
coalescing into an independent front.
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The Mahdi Army atomized under pressure from Iranian overtures. Factions that
accepted aid were Iranian proxies by fait accompli. The Iranians capitalized on the
poverty of Al-Sadr’s militants to wedge them from their leader:
[Iranians] started giving $800 to anyone who would attack the Americans or
assassinate some Iraqi figures. People were given lists of names of former
Baathists, present-day political figures, or ordinary people to be killed because
they were meant to be working against society…They give volunteers $300 to
$400 a month, train them to use weapons and to fight the Americans. Of course
this is an indirect way of controlling Iraq. It is easy enough for Iranian
intelligence to persuade a man to join the groups it controls through money and
good weapons if he is unemployed and the Mehdi Army pays no wages. 383
For a party that billed itself as immune to outside manipulation, the growing Iranian
influence upset many Sadrists, who connected the Guard’s activities in Iraq with the
country’s unremitting sectarian and intra-sectarian conflicts. They attributed unabated
chaos and disunity even within Shi’i communities to the Guard’s policy. Sadrists who
opposed Iran even cooperated with the Americans to root out their common enemy.
Those willing to cooperate were part of a larger group that called itself the “noble Mahdi
Army” and accused others in the militia of sedition and killing innocent Sunnis. One Iraqi
commented, “The true Mahdi Army believes in loyalty to Iraq, but there are thieves and
gangsters among them now.” 384 This group still followed the political leadership in
Baghdad and the clerical leadership in Najaf, and believed the movement had been
infiltrated by Iranians and corrupted by criminal behavior. 385 The “noble” militiamen
informed on the “criminal elements” of the organization to the US military. One
informant said he was especially worried about the Mahdi Army leaders who had
received training in Iran, “I know these men well, we went through our religious training
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together, but they are no longer honest. They pretend to be following al-Sadr’s orders, but
they are really following Iran.” 386 These men either stopped responding to Al-Sadr or
formed completely new militias. This division became readily evident following a
January 2007 statement by Al-Sadr to the Mahdi Army. He urged his fighters to comply
with a security sweep in mid-January by not targeting coalition or government forces and
declared the higher command, or “noble Mahdi Army,” would purge all rogue factions
and regroup. 387 Loyal elements assented, at least at first, while an assortment of new
Iranian-backed militias kept fighting. Iran unraveled whatever acquiescence remained
between volatile Mahdi Army factions and Al-Sadr.
The lethal consequences of Quds’ meddling jarred US policymakers in 2007,
when an AAH special group organized by Qais Khazali conducted a brazen attack against
a US command center in Karbala. On January 20, 2007, gunmen, some of who reportedly
spoke English, snuck past three checkpoints manned by Iraqi security, wearing new US
combat fatigues and travelling in US military-type black sport utility vehicles, and used
small arms fire and hand grenades to surprise attack US soldiers. 388 They kidnapped four
US soldiers and executed them all as US forces honed in on their location. This attack
came a week after US soldiers raided the Iranian Liaison Office in Irbil in Iraqi Kurdistan
and detained five Iranian diplomats. 389 The US accused the diplomatic office of
providing cover for Quds operatives engaged in covert actions against Coalition Forces.
On March 20, 2007, the US captured Qais Khazali and Ali Musa Daqduq, the top
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Hizbullah lieutenant in charge of monitoring Iraqi special groups. In a press statement on
the raid, a US general estimated Quds’ funding for special groups between $750,000 and
$3 million a month. Both Khazali and Daqduq confessed the Quds Force “knew of and
supported planning for the eventual Karbala attack that killed five coalition soldiers…Ali
Musa Daqduq contends the Iraqi special groups could not have conducted this complex
operation without the support and direction of the Quds Force.” 390 Three days later, the
Guard Navy captured 15 British soldiers and held them for several days, no doubt in
response to the capture of Khazali and Daqduq. In August 2007, Suleimani promised
General Petraeus to dramatically decrease Iranian activity in Iraq if the US released
Khazali. Petraeus responded that Iran needed to immediately cease its actions, which he
called tantamount to a war by proxy against the US and that it made no sense to release
Khazali since he was a centripetal force in campaigns against the Iraqi government and
the Coalition. 391
Quds’ manipulation of these special groups should not belie the underlying limits
of its ideological appeal to most Iraqis. Declassified summaries of US interrogations of
captured members of special groups illustrate the tactical rather than strategic alignment
of Iraqi militants with Iran. One such hapless detainee and his fellow students complained
about the training they received in Iran. He did not trust the Iranians, but respected his
Lebanese trainers, who taught the bulk of the courses. The detainee characterized Iraqi
Shi’i as only reluctantly accepting training from the Iranians. He described Iraqi Shi’i as
moral, good, compassionate, and emotionally sensitive, and Iranian Shi’i, by contrast, as
390
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negating those qualities while simultaneously believing themselves to be superior. 392 The
detainee firmly believed in having an Iraqi leader (Muqtada al-Sadr) and that even a bad
Iraqi leader is better than an Iranian one. 393 Another detainee recalled the excessive
rudeness of his Iranian instructor and a general mistreatment of the Iraqi recruits. 394 A
different detainee derided the Badr Organization for wanting to give Iraq to Iran. He
explained the problematic relationship between al-Sadr and the Iraqi government as an
outcome of the fact that Badr owned approximately 60 percent of the government. 395
These Iraqis, though marginalized by the mainstream Mahdi Army for their association to
Iran, accepted Iranian training only so far as exigent political and sectarian reasons
demanded it. The ineffectiveness of the ideology of Islamic Revolution with Iraqis
explains why Quds’ training program, while successful tactically, never spawned a wider
movement or more powerful militia as it had in Lebanon.
Nevertheless, Iran outmaneuvered the US in determining Iraq’s future. In 2010,
when a newly-elected parliament failed for a total of nine months to agree on whom to
appoint to the executive branch, Suleimani met with his multiplicity of contacts to
hammer out a deal and catalyze the formation of a new government. According to Iraqi
and Western officials, Suleimani invited senior Kurdish and Shi’i leaders to meet with
him in Tehran and Qom to coax them into supporting Maliki’s candidacy for prime
minister. Suleimani won al-Sadr’s support by promising to place his men in the Iraqi
service ministries. 396 His skills as arbitrator came at a price. Maliki returned at least three
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favors to the Iranians. He appointed the pro-Iranian Kurdish leader Jalal Talabani
president, neutralized the CIA-backed Iraqi National Intelligence Service, and, most
importantly, he agreed to evict all American forces from country by the end of 2011. 397
The White House knew the exact terms of agreement between Suleimani and Maliki and,
without fighting them, put its stamp of approval on the new government. Obama’s
decision frustrated many; one former American diplomat decried it, “We lost four
thousand five hundred Americans only to let the Iranians dictate the outcome of the way?
To result in strategic result?” 398 The opposition leader Ayad Allawi told reporter Dexter
Filkins, “I needed American support…But they wanted to leave, and they handed the
country to the Iranians. Iraq is a failed state now, an Iranian colony.” 399 The US
retrenched its military commitment in Iraq, knowing full well that Iran would fulfill the
security vacuum left by its withdrawal. The Obama Administration set in motion a
piecemeal and uncertain process of transferring responsibility for regional security to
Iran. It has further signaled its intention to do so by revitalizing the diplomatic approach
to limiting Iran’s nuclear program and dropping its untenable precondition of zeroenrichment capability. In the horrific Syrian civil war, the administration has vacillated
between involvement, which would necessarily mean confronting Iran, and neutrality.
Suleimani has consolidated Iranian influence in Iraq by remolding previously
hostile special groups into buttresses for the Maliki government. The two special group
networks that accepted full Iranian aid and direction, AAH and another small but potent
group, Kataib Hizbullah, now augment the security forces against the waves of sectarian
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terrorism. US and Iraqi military intelligence officials have evaluated Kataib Hizbullah as
the most advanced and pro-Iranian special group. Unlike AAH, which sprung from the
Mahdi Army, most of Kataib Hizbullah’s personnel served with the Badr Corps before
2003. 400 In Badr, they would have adopted the ideology of Islamic Revolution and built
deep relationships with Quds operatives. In 2010, a US intelligence officer numbered the
group somewhere between 500 and 1,000. 401 One US intelligence analyst described them
as often armed similarly to Guard and Hizbullah commando units, replete with assault
rifles, body armor, and night vision goggles. The group has used advanced anti-material
weapons as well and, according to the Wall Street Journal, intercepted the data feed from
US drones. 402 According to a Treasury Department designation, Kataib Hizbullah played
a role disproportionately significant to its small force size. Its leader, Abu Mahdi alMuhandis, allegedly smuggled sniper rifles, explosively formed penetrators (EFPs),
mortars, rockets, and ammunition from Iran to Iraq for distribution among special groups
and subsequent targeting of Coalition Forces, as well as facilitated the movement and
training of Iraq-based Shi’i militants.403 Muhandis, before joining Badr’s campaigns
against Iraq during the war, participated as an operative of Da’wa in the bombing of
Western embassies in Kuwait and the attempted assassination of the Emir of Kuwait in
the early 1980s. 404 He is a clear US enemy. Ambassador Crocker recalled telling Maliki
“that if Muhandis wanted to stay healthy, he needed to stay in Iran.” 405 The Treasury
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Department had designated him as an advisor to Suleimani and several American and
Iraqi officials have named him Suleimani’s personal representative to Prime Minister
Maliki. 406 After the US withdrawal, Muhandis was given a guesthouse on the property of
Maliki’s national-security adviser in the vaunted Green Zone. A block away from
Muhandis lives AAH leader, Qais al-Khazali. Iraqi and American officials have
accredited Maliki with deploying both militias against his opponents. 407
The lynchpin of Iran’s control of these special groups is the authority impressed
by the supreme leader upon militia commanders. They accept the central supposition of
the Islamic Revolution, admitting that the supreme leader represents the best of the
marja’iyya, and following his orders. Their loyalty to the Islamic Republic supersedes
any other affinities for nationally-based sources of power, whether political or clerical.
Battat, for example, places loyalty in the supreme leader above rival marja’iyya and Iraqi
political leaders. Theoretically, the leaders of Hizbullah, due to their party’s official
belief in the supreme leader, would also follow the command of Khamenei
unequivocally. However, for an organization of its size and ambition, with its many
different identities, Hizbullah balances its allegiance to Tehran with competing national
obligations. This mechanism of loyalty works best in small groups with narrow interests.
The secretary-general of Kataib Hizbullah, Wathiq al-Battat, announced the formation of
an offshoot called “Mukhtar Army” in February 2013. Later that month, the new militia
shelled an encampment of the Mojahedin-e Khalq, killing eight and wounding nearly
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100. 408 Battat tactlessly admitted to the press that his group receives weapons and other
support from Iran and had previously said that he is advised by Quds. 409 In an interview
from early 2013, Battat aired the ideological line of Kataib Hizbullah and Mukhtar
Army. 410 “Ideologically speaking, the Shia knows no borders. All horizons are open to it.
A Shiite authority, whether in India, Iraq, or anywhere else, has influence upon all the
Shiites…I represent the Shiite enterprise, and the Iranians are part of the Shia. I am proud
to be a foot soldier in the army of the leader, Sayyed Khamenei.” His faith in the supreme
leader necessarily aligns him with Iranian policy, even if it threatens his country of birth.
Asked if he would support Iran if war were to break out between Iraq and Iran, Battat
answered in the affirmative:
All I know is that the Islamic Republic of Iran is ruled by a just Imam, who is
connected to the Infallible Imam…Iraq, on the other hand, is ruled by a
democratic government of technocrats, which is not connected to the Rule of the
Jurisprudent or to any authority. If our government decides to fight…I'm giving
you a frank answer... If it decides to fight the Infallible Imam, I will stand
alongside the Infallible Imam against Iraq. If the Infallible Imam is in India and
decides to fight Iraq, I will stand alongside India. If the Infallible Imam is in the
U.S. and decides to fight Iraq, I will stand alongside the U.S….My rule is to stand
alongside the Infallible Imam, because I know that justice is with him.
His total loyalty to the supreme leader, and idea of the revolution as a purely Islamic
success story, suggests that he has deprived the Islamic Revolution of its necessary
national context. He egregiously overestimated the power of the doctrine of velayat-e
faqih. According to his vision, Khamenei dictates policy single-handedly—in accordance
with divine law and unimpeded by the democratic inputs that actually do influence his
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decisions. In the interview, Battat describes Khamenei as a “just dictator” and ignores the
interviewer’s counterargument that “Khamenei is not a dictator. Iran holds elections
every four years…Khamenei is a religious ruler.” On the topic of Syria, Battat stated his
group will fight “wherever our holy places are attacked” and gave Bashar al-Assad
“credit for standing honorably alongside the resistance…What is important is the
common enemies—the Americans and the Israelis. We must confront them with all our
force. After we annihilate the Jews, we can deal with domestic matters.”
Iran stopped marshaling its proxies against the central government in Baghdad
once a US withdrawal was assured. Without US forces to protect it from Sunni terrorist
groups such as the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant, Maliki’s increasingly sectarian
government has required paramilitary supplements to its security services. Iran positioned
its proxies to fulfill this role, and to replace the US as security provider. The fusion of
Iranian-backed militias with Maliki’s government may consummate Iran’s influence in
Iraqi affairs. Since 2013, AAH has been rapidly expanding its presence across Iraq after
forming a political party following the US withdrawal. 411 The party has established a
social services program to aid widows and orphans and launched a network of religious
schools. One of the clerics leading the party said he would like to see the doctrine of
velayat-e faqih implemented in Iraq by a majority vote, and portraits of Khamenei and
Khomeini hang in its Baghdad offices. This shift to politics and social services mirrors
the growth of Hizbullah into a national party. Iran has also deployed these militias to
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Syria, with Maliki’s consent. 412 July 2013, AAH announced the presence of a sub-group
fighting in Syria, named Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq-Liwa’a Kafeel Zaynab (AAH-LKZ), or
League of the Righteous-Supporters of Zaynab. AAH-LKZ has released combat footage
on its main Facebook page, which has over 33,000 members, showing military
maneuvers featuring snipers and machine-gun teams and the use of mortars, rockets, and
possibly armored vehicles. 413
Quds’ policy in Afghanistan bore a close resemblance to its multifaceted policy in
Iraq. As in Iraq, Iran dealt with a diverse array of factions, some of them inimical toward
one another. The US government levied a surprising claim against this policy, alleging
that Quds furnished supplies and intelligence to the Taliban. The allegation is
inconsistent with the history of Guard-Taliban relations, yet within the scope of the
Guard’s willingness to make tactical compromises. In 1998, the Taliban, after seizing
much of Afghanistan, killed eleven Iranian diplomats and journalists. Soon after, Guard
and regular army units amassed on the border and prepared for a possible war against the
Taliban, which had also earned infamy for butchering Afghan Shi’is and was aligned
closely with Saudi Arabia. Iran gladly welcomed the removal of the Taliban regime.
Once the US invasion diminished the political and military power of the Taliban,
however, Iran’s calculus apparently shifted. A weak and marginal Taliban was an asset; a
powerful and connected one, a liability. In 2007, the US Treasury Department designated
Quds Force as an agency for terrorism under Executive Order 13224. 414 Quds was the
412
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first national military branch included on the list. 415 Quds supported and ordered armed
groups to target Coalition Forces and did not have an interest in providing any materials,
logistics, or orders for acts of terror that these groups may have incidentally committed.
Quds was neither a cause nor a prime enabler for terrorist actions in Iraq and
Afghanistan. The designation misrepresented its aims as evil, rather than oppositional.
Regardless, the department’s press statement alleged that Quds provided weapons and
financing to the Taliban to support its anti-US activity in Afghanistan. It accused Quds
of, since at least 2006, arranging “frequent” shipments of small arms and ammunition,
rocket propelled grenades, mortar rounds, 107mm rockets, plastic explosives, and
“probably” man-portable defense systems to the Taliban. In 2010, the Taliban reportedly
approached the Guard to request full support, as opposed to selected commanders on the
field. 416 According to Director of National Intelligence Dennis Blair, Taliban
commanders had publicly credited Iranian support for their successful anti-Coalition
operations. 417
Iran courts groups from across the ideological spectrum in order to maintain at
any given moment at least one viable link in demonstrably chaotic and volatile situations
abroad. This process involves economic, diplomatic, cultural, political, and military
investments in a broad set of actors and depends on many government organizations
other than the Guard. 418 The wide spread gives Iran significant leverage over any single
actor in conflict with another actor also under its influence. Ideally, this strategy allows
415
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Iran to mediate between opposing parties in either Iraq or Afghanistan, as well as stoke
the violence that necessitates such mediation in the first place. The upshot of this makes
Iran arbitrator of regional affairs. Calibrated military support for the Taliban is in no way
an implausible scenario. Iranian support for politically counterproductive, violent factions
in either Iraq or Afghanistan also achieves its other objective of harming US forces and
extending their stay in costly and inhospitable military engagements. In the long run, this
policy destroyed US morale necessary to make active security commitments in the
Middle East—a fundamental and ongoing goal of the Islamic Revolution. These violent
groups form a cornerstone of Iran’s dual strategy of, one, expanding its influence in its
neighboring countries and, two, pushing the US away from the Middle East.
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Conclusion

The terms radical revolutionary and pragmatic revolutionary do not suffice as
categories for aptly explaining contemporary Iranian politics. The contradiction between
Khomeini’s transnational ideology and the revolutionary yet national state that it yielded
resolved decidedly in favor of the forces of self-preservation and national interest. This
led the Guard to purge its truly radical wing, symbolized by its abandonment of the
Office of Liberation Movements. The elimination of true radicals signified that every
other revolutionary realized the necessity of preserving the state. The main contest
between revolutionaries shifted to the interpretation of Khomeini’s principles.
Conservative, or “radical,” interpretations, for example, sanctified the office of the
supreme leader and dictated a cynical and rigid opposition to détente, especially with the
US. Progressive, or “pragmatic,” interpretations, on the other hand, looked for ways to
expand popular sovereignty and improve Iran’s relations with the world. A dichotomy
between conservative pragmatist and progressive pragmatist more truthfully captures the
actual political situation in Iran today. Indeed, Suleimani has shown incredibly pragmatic
behavior in his willingness to cooperate with strategic enemies like the US and the
Taliban. At the same time, he and other senior Guard leaders have evinced their
commitment to certain conservative principles, like the doctrine of Velayat-e Faqih and
general opposition to the US security architecture in the Middle East. The conservatives,
however, fight an increasingly uphill battle to retain social relevancy and political power
at high levels. One hopes that their considerable pragmatism will translate into a
willingness to negotiate with reformists and eventually compromise on core anti-US and
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anti-Israel principles. If pressures for reform mount into a domestic political crisis,
conservatives may have no choice but to shift to a moderate perspective, especially if in
order to preserve themselves.
The current crisis in Syria has demonstrated the futility of repression as an
instrument for preserving the power of the unpopular and privileged few. Despite the
Guard’s heavy support for the al-Assad regime, its commanders have surely gleaned a
few potent lessons from the tragic failure of al-Assad’s repression techniques against
initially peaceful popular demonstrations. In captured documentary footage of the
Guard’s combat advisory role in Syria, Quds commander Ismail Heydari told the
filmmaker: “unfortunately in the early days—when dealing with the demonstrations—the
Syrian government made mistakes and its led to all this. It’s not like that in the IRI,
fortunately Islam has taught us to be kind.” In the same video, Heydari expressed an
ideological understanding of the conflict,
You can’t call this a civil war between the Syrian government and Syrian people.
Not at all. And many people agree with me on this, the current conflict in Syria is
in fact one of Islam against the infidels. A war of good against evil. We’re in the
right because we’re backed by the Supreme Leader and Sayyed Hassan
Nasrallah.…Who is on the other side? Israel, who else? Saudi Arabia, Turkey,
and Qatar, and they get money from the UAE too. The USA, Britain, France, and
other Europeans help them too. This all shows that our side is the side of “right.”
Heydari’s blending of criticism of the al-Assad regime—he also critiqued the Syrian
Arab Army for its flagrant mistreatment of civilians—with strong belief in the ideological
correctness of Iran’s intervention in the war indicates the complexity of the relationship
between principles and a straightforward understanding of the facts. Guard commanders
seem to display acumen for reading factual situations incisively while placing them in a
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framework consistent with their official ideological standpoint. They match their actions
to fluid and nebulous principles. Indeed, in addressing the conservative backlash to the
signing of a preliminary deal over Iran’s nuclear program, Khamenei said he supported
“heroic flexibility” in bending Iran’s ideological framework to permit diplomacy. The
flexibility of such principles may ultimately allow the Guard to accept domestic political
change clear of conscience.
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